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Summary 
Game theoretic modeling and analysis is a challenging research topic that requires 
much attention from social scientists and researchers. The classical means of using 
analytical and empirical methods have presented difficulties such as mathematical 
intractability, limitations in the scope of study, static process of solution discovery 
and unrealistic assumptions. To achieve effective modeling that yields meaningful 
analysis and insights into game theoretic interaction, these difficulties have to be 
overcome together with the need to integrate realistic and dynamic elements into 
the learning process of individual entities during their interaction. 
In view of the challenges, agent-based computational models present viable 
solution measures to complement existing methodologies by providing alternative 
insights and perspectives. To this note, co-evolutionary algorithms, by virtue of its 
inherent capability for solving optimization tasks via stochastic parallel searches 
in the absence of any explicit quality measurement of strategies makes it a suitable 
candidate for replicating realistic learning experiences and deriving solutions to 
complex game theoretic problems dynamically when conventional tools fail.  
The prime motivation of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive treatment 
on co-evolutionary simulation modeling – simulating learning and adaptation in 
agent-based models by means of co-evolutionary algorithms, whose viability as a 
simple but complementary alternative to existing mathematical and experimental 
approaches is assessed in the study of repeated games. The interest in repeated 
interaction is due to its extensive applicability in real world situations and the 
added fact that cooperation is easier to sustain in a long-term relationship than a 
single encounter. Analysis of interaction in repeated games can provide us with 
interesting insights into how cooperation can be achieved and sustained.  
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This work is organized into two parts. The first part will attempt to verify 
the ability of co-evolutionary and/or hybridized approaches to discover strategies 
that are comparable, if not better, than solutions proposed by existing approaches. 
This involves developing a computer Texas Hold’em player via evolving Nash-
optimal strategies that are comparable in performance to those derived by classical 
means. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is also investigated where performance 
and adaptability of evolutionary, learning and memetic strategies is benchmarked 
against existing strategies to assess whether evolution, learning or a combination 
of both can entail strategies that adapt and thrive well in complex environments. 
The second part of this work will concentrate on the use of co-evolutionary 
algorithms for modeling and simulation, from which we can analyze interesting 
emergent behavior and trends that will give us new insights into the complexity of 
collective interaction among diverse strategy types across temporal dimensions. A 
spatial multi-agent social network is developed to study the phenomenon of civil 
violence as behavior of autonomous agents is co-evolved over time. Modeling and 
analysis of a multi-player public goods provision game which focuses specifically 
on the scenario where agents interact and co-evolve under asymmetric information 
is also pursued. Simulated results from both contexts can be used to complement 
existing studies and to assess the validity of related social theories in theoretical 








Lists of publications 
The following is the list of publications that were published during the course of 
research that I conducted for this thesis. 
 
Journals 
1.  H. Y. Quek, C. H. Woo, K. C. Tan, and A. Tay, 'Evolving nash-optimal poker 
strategies using evolutionary computation', Frontiers of Computer Science in 
China, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 73-91, March 2009. 
 
2.  H. Y. Quek, K. C. Tan, C. K. Goh, and H. A. Abbass, ‘Evolution and 
incremental learning in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’, IEEE Transactions 
on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 303-320, April 2009. 
 
3.  H. Y. Quek, K. C. Tan, and H. A. Abbass, ‘Evolutionary game theoretic 
approach for modeling civil violence’, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary 
Computation, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 780-800, August 2009. 
 
4. H. Y. Quek, K. C. Tan, and A. Tay, ‘Public goods provision: An evolutionary 
game theoretic study under asymmetric information’, IEEE Transactions on 




1. C. K. Goh, H. Y. Quek, E. J. Teoh, and K. C. Tan, “Evolution and incremental 
learning in the iterative prisoner’s dilemma,” in Proceedings of the IEEE 
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, Edinburgh, UK, September 2-5, vol. 




2. C. K. Goh, H. Y. Quek, K. C. Tan and H. A. Abbass, “Modeling civil violence: 
an evolutionary, multi-Agent, game-theoretic approach,” in Proceedings of the 
IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation,” Vancouver, Canada, July 16-
21, 2006, pp. 1624 - 1631. 
 
3. H. Y. Quek, and C. K. Goh, “Adaptation of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
strategies by evolution and learning,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium 
Series on Computational Intelligence, Computational Intelligence and Games, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, April 1-5, 2007, pp. 40-47. 
 
4. C. S. Ong, H. Y. Quek, K. C. Tan, and A. Tay, “Discovering Chinese Chess 
strategies through co-evolutionary approaches,” in Proceedings of the IEEE 
Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence, Computational Intelligence 
and Games, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, April 1-5, 2007, pp. 360-367. 
 
5. H. Y. Quek, and A. Tay, “An evolutionary, game theoretic approach to the 
modeling, simulation and analysis of public goods provisioning under 
asymmetric information,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Congress on 
Evolutionary Computation, Singapore, September 25-28, 2007, pp. 4735-4742. 
 
6. H. Y. Quek, and K. C. Tan, “A discrete particle swarm optimization approach 
for the global airline crew scheduling problem,” in Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Soft Computing and Intelligent Systems and 
International Symposium on Advanced Intelligent Systems, Nagoya University, 
Nagoya, Japan, September 17-21, 2008. 
 
Book Chapters 
1.  H. Y. Quek, H. H. Chan, and K. C. Tan, “Evolving computer Chinese Chess 
using guided learning,” in Biologically-Inspired Optimisation Methods: 
Parallel Algorithms, Systems and Applications, Studies in Computational 
Intelligence, Vol. 210, A. Lewis, S. Mostaghim, and M. Randall, Eds. Berlin / 




The course of completing my doctoral dissertation has been a fulfilling journey of 
intellectual curiosity, personal accomplishment and purposeful reflections. It has 
taught me much about the multi-faceted geometry of life - one that encompasses 
much uncertainty, asymmetry, intricate inter-dependencies and new perspectives 
of understanding and making sense of our existence. To this end, I would like to 
convey my heartfelt thanks to many people who have made this journey possible. 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Assoc. Prof 
Tan Kay Chen for giving me the opportunity to pursue this multi-disciplinary area 
of research. His guidance, understanding and kind words of encouragement and 
advice have always served as a strong motivational force which kept me on track 
throughout my candidature. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor Assoc. 
Prof. Arthur Tay for his relentless support and belief in me; Prof. H. A. Abbass for 
providing much assistance and suggestions that helped improve my research work, 
Assoc. Prof. Vivian Ng for nurturing me under the ECE outreach program, also to 
Ms Chua for all the fruitful discussions about human relations and everyone else 
who had kindly contributed ideas towards the completion of this thesis. 
I am grateful to a bunch of happy folks in the Control and Simulation Lab 
for making my four years’ stay fun and enjoyable: Chi Keong aka Zhang Lao for 
all his timely advice, Dasheng for sharing his research experiences, Eu Jin for his 
profound discussions, Brian and Chun Yew for their fair share of jokes, Chiam for 
playing big brother, Chin Hiong for his great tips; Chen Jia and Vui Ann for their 
jovial presence which spice up the entire lab atmosphere; not forgetting Sara and 
Hengwei for giving their utmost technical and logistical support from time to time.  
  vi
I would also like to extend my gratitude to members of the outreach team: Li 
Hong, Teck Wee, Swee Chiang, Mo Chao, Yen Kheng, Siew Hong, Kai Tat, Yit 
Sung, Marsita and Elyn, for making my stay a fun, educational and enriching one; 
to my personal friends for their encouragement through my ups and downs; to my 
travel buddies for the wonderful backpacking experiences together, and to all my 
volunteering compatriots for accompanying me on the beautiful journey of giving 
and sharing the joy that goes beyond spoken words. 
 Last but not least, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my family – 
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces for their love and support which have always 
been a constant source of strength for me; but most importantly my parents for 
making so much sacrifice to raise me up painstakingly, educating me, showering 
me with unconditional love and always tolerating my random eccentricities and 
irrationality with enduring patience and care. To them, I dedicate this thesis…  
 
“The best and most beautiful things in the world cannot be seen or even touched but must be felt 
within the heart.”            ~ Helen Keller 
  
“If it’s true that we are here to help others, then what exactly are the others here for?”  

















Lists of publications ..............................................................................................iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................v 
Contents ................................................................................................................vii 
List of Figures.......................................................................................................xii 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................xvii 
1 Introduction....................................................................................................1 
1.1 Essential elements of game theory.........................................................2 
1.2 Types of games ......................................................................................4 
1.2.1 Information structure .................................................................4 
1.2.2 Mode of game play ....................................................................6 
1.2.3 Interaction outcome ...................................................................6 
1.3 Scope of analysis....................................................................................8 
1.3.1 Strategy ......................................................................................8 
1.3.2 Outcomes of interaction.............................................................9 
1.3.3 Mechanism of game play .........................................................10 
1.4 Development and applications of game theory....................................10 
1.5 Modeling and analysis .........................................................................12 
1.5.1 Analytical approaches..............................................................12 
1.5.2 Empirical approaches...............................................................14 
1.5.3 Computational approaches.......................................................15 
1.6 Learning in agent-based models ..........................................................17 
1.7 Evolutionary Algorithms .....................................................................19 
1.8 Overview of this Work.........................................................................21 
1.9 Summary ..............................................................................................24 
2 Evolutionary Algorithms.............................................................................25 
2.1 Elements of EAs ..................................................................................27 
2.1.1 Representation..........................................................................27 
  viii
2.1.2 Fitness ......................................................................................27 
2.1.3 Population and generation........................................................28 
2.1.4 Selection...................................................................................28 




2.1.9 Stopping Criteria......................................................................30 
2.2 Advantages of EAs ..............................................................................31 
2.3 Co-evolutionary algorithms .................................................................32 
2.4 Drawing parallels .................................................................................35 
2.5 Summary ..............................................................................................37 
3 Evolving Nash Optimal Poker Strategies ..................................................38 
3.1 Background study ................................................................................40 
3.2 Overview of Texas Hold’em................................................................43 
3.2.1 Game rules ...............................................................................43 
3.2.2 Playing good poker ..................................................................45 
3.3 Game theory of poker ..........................................................................47 
3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium.....................................................................47 
3.3.2 Illustration of game theory for poker .......................................48 
3.3.3 Discussion on calculated results ..............................................51 
3.4 Designing the game engine..................................................................52 
3.4.1 Basic game elements................................................................52 
3.4.2 The odds calculator ..................................................................53 
3.4.3 Graphical User Interface ..........................................................54 
3.5 The co-evolutionary model ..................................................................55 
3.5.1 Strategy model and chromosomal representation ....................56 
3.5.2 Fitness criterion........................................................................58 
3.6 Preliminary study .................................................................................60 
3.6.1 Strategy model for simplified poker ........................................60 
3.6.2 Fitness criterion equivalent to winnings ..................................61 
3.6.3 Fitness criterion excluding winnings and deducting the 
squares of losses.......................................................................62 
3.6.4 Fitness criterion with higher power .........................................63 
3.6.5 Discussion on preliminary findings .........................................64 
  ix
3.7 Simulation results.................................................................................65 
3.7.1 Verification of results ..............................................................65 
3.7.2 Analysis of the evolved CEA strategy .....................................67 
3.7.2.1 Preflop/Flop strategies .............................................69 
3.7.2.2 Turn/River strategies ................................................71 
3.7.3 Benchmarking ..........................................................................77 
3.7.4 Efficiency.................................................................................79 
3.8 Summary ..............................................................................................80 
4 Adaptation of IPD strategies.......................................................................81 
4.1 Background study ................................................................................83 
4.2 Adaptation models ...............................................................................85 
4.2.1 Evolution..................................................................................85 
4.2.2 Learning ...................................................................................86 
4.2.3 Memetic Learning....................................................................87 
4.3 Design of learning paradigm................................................................87 
4.3.1 Identification of opponent strategies........................................88 
4.3.2 Notion of “success” and “failure”............................................88 
4.3.3 Strategy Revision .....................................................................90 
4.3.4 Double-loop Incremental Learning..........................................91 
4.4 Implementation ....................................................................................92 
4.5 Simulation results.................................................................................96 
4.5.1 Case Study 1: Performance against benchmark strategies.......97 
4.5.1.1 Test A: Performance against ALLC, ALLD and 
TFT ...........................................................................97 
4.5.1.2 Test B: Performance against seven different 
benchmark strategies ..............................................103 
4.5.2 Case Study 2: Performance against adaptive strategies.........109 
4.5.2.1 Test C: Relative performance of MA, GA and 
ILS ...........................................................................109 
4.5.2.2 Test D: Performance of MA, GA and ILS in 
setup with 10 strategy types ....................................113 
4.5.3 Case Study 3: Performance Assessment in 
Dynamic Environment ............................................116 
4.5.3.1 Test E: Performance of MA, GA and ILS against 
dynamic opponents .................................................117 
4.6 Summary ............................................................................................119 
  x
5 Modeling Civil Violence ............................................................................121 
5.1 Evolutionary multi-agent social network...........................................123 
5.1.1 Overview................................................................................123 
5.1.2 EMASN Framework ..............................................................124 
5.1.3 Game theoretic interaction.....................................................125 
5.2 Civil violence model ..........................................................................128 
5.2.1 Agents ....................................................................................128 
5.2.2 Empirical rules .......................................................................131 
5.2.3 Environment...........................................................................133 
5.3 Evolutionary Engine ..........................................................................134 
5.3.1 Evolution of Agent Behavior .................................................134 
5.3.2 Learning .................................................................................137 
5.4 Simulation results...............................................................................139 
5.4.1 Basic CVM Dynamics ...........................................................140 
5.4.2   CVM Response under varying NC..........................................142 
5.4.3 Active defectors and charismatic leaders: Effects on 
quiescent civilians..................................................................151 
5.4.4 CVM Response under varying jail terms...............................155 
5.4.5 Casualty Model ......................................................................158 
5.5 Findings and discussions....................................................................162 
5.6 Summary ............................................................................................163 
6 Public Goods provision under asymmetric information ........................164 
6.1 Iterated public goods game ................................................................167 
6.1.1 IPGG with Asymmetric information .....................................168 
6.1.2 Mathematical formulation......................................................168 
6.1.3 Environment...........................................................................171 
6.2 Game theoretic fundamentals ............................................................173 
6.3 Information asymmetry......................................................................174 
6.3.1 Asymmetric player types .......................................................174 
6.3.2 Genotypic representation .......................................................175 
6.3.3 Action spaces .........................................................................176 
6.4 Co-evolutionary learning mechanism................................................177 
6.5 Simulation results...............................................................................179 
6.5.1 Homogeneous vs Asymmetric game-play .............................180 
6.5.2 Varied degrees of decision making and nature of PG............186 
  xi
6.5.3 Multi-level selection: group vs individual reward .................197 
6.6 Findings and discussions....................................................................203 
6.7 Summary ............................................................................................205 
7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................206 
7.1 Contribution .......................................................................................206 








































List of Figures 
2.1  Pseudo code of EAs ......................................................................................26 
2.2  Drawing parallels between CEAs and Game theory ....................................36 
3.1  Overall architecture of Poki..........................................................................41 
3.2  Name of poker card combinations ................................................................45 
3.3  Game tree of simplified poker variant from player 1’s perspective .............48 
3.4  Initial state of the GUI………. .....................................................................54          
3.5  The GUI at a paused simulation ...................................................................55 
3.6  Strategy structure for Preflop/Flop ...............................................................57        
3.7  Strategy structure for Turn/River..................................................................57 
3.8  Strategy array of the strategy model for the simplified poker ......................61 
3.9  Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 1, 
fitness criterion 1...........................................................................................61 
3.10  Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 2, 
fitness criterion 1. .........................................................................................62 
3.11  Comparison of plots of 11f and 22f . ...............................................................62 
3.12 Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 1, 
fitness criterion 2. .........................................................................................63 
3.13 Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 2, 
fitness criterion 2. .........................................................................................63 
3.14  Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 1, 
fitness criterion 3. .........................................................................................64 
3.15  Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 2, 
fitness criterion 3. .........................................................................................64 
3.16  Plot of fold and raise thresholds against generation when “Opponent 
Raise is high, Total raise is low and Hand strength is low” for 
Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River (right). ...................................................66 
3.17  Plot of fold and raise threshold against generation when “Total raise is 
0 and Hand strength is high” for Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River 
(right). ...........................................................................................................66 
  xiii
3.18  Plot of fold and raise threshold against generation when “High 
opponent raise, high total raise and low hand strength” for 
Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River (right). ...................................................66 
3.19  Plot of threshold value against hand strength for Preflop/Flop (left) 
and Turn/River (right). Dotted line: raise threshold. Solid line: fold 
threshold........................................................................................................67 
3.20  Plots of thresholds against hand....................................................................70 
3.21  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Preflop/Flop and high OR. ....71 
3.22  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Preflop/Flop and low TR.......71 
3.23  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Preflop/Flop and high TR......71 
3.24  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and low OR.........75 
3.25  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and medium 
OR.................................................................................................................75 
3.26  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and high OR........76 
3.27  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and low TR. ........76 
3.28  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and medium 
TR. ................................................................................................................76 
3.29  Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Turn/River and high TR. .......76 
3.30  Winnings of Evobot vs. PSOpti against generation of evolution. ................78 
3.31  Winnings of Evobot vs. Poki against generation of evolution. ....................78 
3.32  Plot of time taken against generation............................................................80 
4.1  Overview of the evolution process ...............................................................86 
4.2  Overview of the double-loop learning process .............................................92 
4.3  Strategy representation of a typical player ...................................................93 
4.4  Simple flowchart depicting the operations of the GA strategy.....................94 
4.5  Simple flowchart depicting the operations of the ILS algorithm..................95 
4.6  Simple flowchart depicting the operations of the MA algorithm .................95 
4.7  (a) AGS and (b) ACR for MA, GA and ILS when each plays with TFT, 
ALLD and ALLC over 20 runs.....................................................................99 
4.8  Strategy specific AGS and ACR for MA, GA and ILS as each plays 
with (a) itself, (b) TFT, (c) ALLD and (d) ALLC over 20 runs .................101 
  xiv
4.9  Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) 
minimum AGS in the MA, GA and ILS populations as each plays with 
TFT, ALLD and ALLC over 20 runs .........................................................102 
4.10  (a) AGS and (b) ACR for MA, GA and ILS when each plays with TFT, 
ALLD, ALLC, PAV, RAND, STFT and TFTT over 20 runs ....................105 
4.11  Strategy specific AGS and ACR for MA, GA and ILS as each plays 
with (a) itself, (b) TFT, (c) ALLD, (d) ALLC, (e) PAV, (f) RAND, (g) 
STFT and (h) TFTT over 20 runs ...............................................................107 
4.12  Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) 
minimum AGS in the MA, GA and ILS populations as each plays with 
7 benchmark strategies over 20 runs...........................................................108 
4.13  (a) AGS, (b) ACR, (c) niche count and (d) learning ratio as MA, GA 
and ILS play against one another over 20 runs...........................................110 
4.14  Strategy specific (a) AGS and (b) ACR for MA, GA and ILS over 20 
runs..............................................................................................................112 
4.15  Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) 
minimum AGS in the MA, GA and ILS populations when each plays 
against one another over 20 runs ................................................................113 
4.16  (a) AGS and (b) learning ratio obtained when MA, GA and ILS play 
with one another over 20 runs.....................................................................114 
4.17  Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) 
minimum AGS in MA, GA and ILS as each plays in the presence of 
benchmark strategies over 20 runs..............................................................115 
4.18  (a) AGS and (b) learning ratio for MA, GA and ILS as each plays with 
an opponent that changes dynamically every 1, 10-20 and 100-150 
generations ..................................................................................................119 
4.19  AGS attained as MA, GA and ILS play separately against (a) itself and 
opponent, (b) itself and (c) the opponent, when opponent’s nature 
changes every 50-100 generations..............................................................119 
5.1   Framework of the Evolutionary Multi-Agent Social Network...................124 
5.2   No interaction between (a) isolated agents, (b) like agents and (c) 
quiescent and other agents. .........................................................................125 
5.3  8-Directional Agent Vision Radius ............................................................130 
5.4  State transition flow diagram between different agent states .....................132 
5.5  Relationship between EE and CVM ...........................................................135 
5.6   Co-evolution of different agent groups.......................................................135 
  xv
5.7  Binary encoded genotype for agent strategy...............................................135 
5.8  Workflow for evolution of agent strategies ................................................137 
5.9  “Punctuated Equilibria” in temporal response of CVM .............................141 
5.10  Temporal response for (a) 0, (b) 10 and (c) 60 cops...................................142 
5.11  Family of temporal response curves for different NC .................................143 
5.12  Spatial response depicting local outburst with 40 cops at episode (a) 1, 
(b) 2 and (c) 3..............................................................................................144 
5.13  Spatial response depicting group clustering with 10 cops at episode (a) 
3, and (b) 4 ..................................................................................................145 
5.14  Spatial response of crowd dispersing with 20 cops at episode (a) 4, (b) 
5, and (c) 6 ..................................................................................................146 
5.15  Spatial responses illustrating deceptive behavior with 80 cops at 
episode (a) 1 and (b) 2 ................................................................................147 
5.16  Actual and perceived active ratios for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops ....................148 
5.17  Population dynamics for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes .........148 
5.18  Cooperation ratio for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes...............149 
5.19  Average grievance level for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes....150 
5.20  Average greed level for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes ..........150 
5.21  Active history for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over a span of 5000 episodes ....151 
5.22  Active duration distribution for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 
episodes.......................................................................................................151 
5.23  Actual and perceived active ratios (a) without and (b) with influence 
over 5000 episodes......................................................................................153 
5.24  Population dynamics (a) without and (b) with influence over a span of 
5000 episodes..............................................................................................153 
5.25  Cooperation ratio (a) without and (b) with influence over a span of 
5000 episodes..............................................................................................153 
5.26  Active duration distribution (a) without and (b) with influence over 
5000 episodes..............................................................................................154 
5.27  Actual and perceived active ratios of introducing influence at (a) 20th 
and (b) 2500th episode.................................................................................154 
 
  xvi
5.28  Actual and perceived active ratios for fixed jail terms of (a) 5, (b) 500 
and (c) variable jail term.............................................................................156 
5.29  Cooperation ratio for fixed jail terms of (a) 5, (b) 50 and (c) variable 
jail term.......................................................................................................156 
5.30  Active history for fixed jail terms of (a) 5 and (b) 500 over 5000 
episodes.......................................................................................................157 
5.31  Active duration distribution for fixed jail terms of (a) 5 and (b) 500 
over 5000 episodes......................................................................................157 
5.32  (a) Active ratios and (b) population dynamics for the first 250 episodes...159 
5.33  Spatial interaction between perpetrators and civilians for episode (a) 0, 
(b) 10 and (c) 57..........................................................................................159 
5.34  Population dynamics for peacekeeping force of size (a) 40, (b) 80 and 
(c) 120.........................................................................................................161 
5.35  Active duration distribution for peacekeeping force of size (a) 40, (b) 
80 and (c) 120 .............................................................................................161 
5.36  Population dynamics for fixed jail terms of (a) 100, and (b) 500 
episodes.......................................................................................................162 
6.1  AGS of various types for (a) homogeneous and (b) asymmetric game 
play..............................................................................................................183 
6.2  ACL of various types for (a) homogeneous and (b) asymmetric game 
play..............................................................................................................183 
6.3  AGS of different player types for changes in (a) NGames and (b) N.............192 
6.4  ACL of different player types for changes in (a) NGames and (b) N.............193 
6.5  Strategy and usage profiles for type (a) NP, (b) AC, (c) TC and (d) PR 
under homogeneous and asymmetric information......................................195 
6.6  AGS for (a) S1, (b) S2, (c) S3 and (d) S4 with N = 240, N Games = 50 .........199 
6.7  ACL for (a) S1, (b) S2, (c) S3 and (d) S4 with N = 240, N Games=50 ...........199 
6.8  Overall AGS for (a) multiple and (b) two levels of contribution ...............200 
6.9  Overall ACL for (a) multiple and (b) two levels of contribution ...............200 
6.10  AGS for (a) S1, (b) SI, (c) SG and (d) SM with N = 240, N Games = 50 ........200 
6.11  ACL for (a) S1, (b) SI, (c) SG and (d) SM with N = 240, N Games=50 ..........201 
  xvii
List of Tables 
3.1  Performance of the various computer players against one another ..............41 
3.2  Humans vs. PSOpti2 .....................................................................................42 
3.3  Nash strategy for simplified poker................................................................50 
3.4  Winnings of Evobot and several conventional strategies against 
PSOpti and Poki............................................................................................79 
4.1  Payoff Matrix for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma......................................84 
4.2  Conditions governing the construction of a valid payoff matrix ..................84 
4.3  List of some commonly used benchmark strategies .....................................85 
4.4  Identification of opponent strategies.............................................................88 
4.5  Taxonomy Matrix for carrying out IL ..........................................................90 
4.6  List of parameter values used in the simulation runs....................................96 
4.7  Brief summary of case studies to be conducted............................................97 
4.8  Proportion of runs that a row-wise strategy is better, similar and worse 
than a column-wise strategy .......................................................................113 
4.9  Proportion of total runs that row-wise strategy is better than column-
wise strategy ...............................................................................................116 
4.10  Proportion of total runs that two strategies are similar according to 
paired T-test ................................................................................................116 
5.1  Payoff matrix when number of cops is (a) equal to, (b) greater than or 
(c) less than the activists in sight ................................................................126 
5.2  Summary of Game Theoretic Agent Attributes..........................................131 
5.3  Summary of State Transition ......................................................................132 
5.4  Basic movement rules in the CVM.............................................................133 
5.5  Preference movement strategies for different agent types..........................133 
5.6 Performance Matrix when number of agents is equal to opposing 
agents in sight .............................................................................................138 
5.7  Performance Matrix when number of agents outnumbers opposing 
agents in sight .............................................................................................138 
  xviii
5.8  Performance Matrix when opposing agents outnumbers number of 
agents in sight .............................................................................................138 
5.9  List of parameter values used in the simulation runs..................................140 
6.1 Asymmetric Information Types used in the IPGG ....................................  175 
6.2 Genotypic Representation for Different Information Types......................  176 
6.3 Types of Action Spaces used in the IPGG .................................................177 
6.4 List of Parameter Settings used in the Simulation Runs ............................179 
6.5 Combinations of Different Settings for Varied Degrees of Contribution 







































“In terms of the game theory, we might say the universe is so constituted as to maximize play. The 
best games are not those in which all goes smoothly and steadily toward a certain conclusion, but 
those in which the outcome is always in doubt. Similarly, the geometry of life is designed to keep 
us at the point of maximum tension between certainty and uncertainty, order and chaos…” 
                                     ~ George B. Leonard 
 
“No man is an island”            ~ John Donne, Meditation XVII 
  
Game theory [1] is the study of strategic behavior and interaction among two or 
more decision making entities - typically referred to as players, in interdependent 
situations where the outcomes of interaction are not determined unilaterally by 
any one player but collectively by the combination of choices of all players. In 
such contexts, all players involved in the strategic interaction – coined a game, 
decide their course of action based on a set of rules e.g. strategy and are generally 
concerned only with the maximization of their own individual well-bring or payoff. 
However, as each is fully aware that his actions can and will affect one another’s 
success, and literally takes this fact into account during the process of decision 
making, it becomes complex but interesting at the same time to analyze how 
players would prefer to act in different scenarios, and the corresponding nature of 
outcomes which arises eventually amidst the interaction.  
By virtue of its nature, game theory - a branch of applied mathematical 
discipline that spans socio-economic origins; constitutes a powerful framework to 
which we can study multi-person decision problems [2] in many real life contexts. 
Its assemblage of associated ideas and theorems provides a rational basis to model 
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and replicate complex, inter-weaving relationships which subsist very much in the 
day-to-day interaction between social entities. More often than not, game theoretic 
analysis can shed light and provide us with a potential channel to gain fruitful 
insights into the behavioral complexities and interconnections which characterize 
real world interaction at numerous levels of contact – between genes, animals, 
individuals, groups, firms, stakeholders or even nation states. Such understanding 
will be of concern and importance to social scientists, policy makers, economists, 
biologists, psychologists and cognitive researchers, perhaps even laymen as well. 
 
1.1 Essential elements of game theory 
 
In game theory, there are several essential elements that are common ingredients 
to all situations of strategic interaction. These include basic terminologies like 
player, strategy, payoff, game, as well as the important concepts of dominance and 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) [3]. Defined below, these fundamental aspects are crucial 
and constitute the crux of game theoretic modeling and analysis. 
 
Definitions of core terminologies and concepts 
 
Player:   
A single, indivisible, decision making entity that is participating in the strategic 
interaction, has a nontrivial set of strategies (more than one) and selects among 
possible strategies based on payoffs. 
 
Strategy:  
A complete plan that defines the moves or actions which a player should execute 
for every possible scenario of interaction in a given game, regardless of whether a 
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scenario does arise. For example, a strategy for checkers would define a player's 
move at every possible position which is attainable during the course of the game. 
The set of all strategies that is available to a player is called its strategy space. In 
the game theoretic context, a player is typically driven to find an optimal strategy 
in the huge space of possible strategies in order to maximize its well-being in the 
associated environment of interaction. 
 
Payoff:   
A numerical figure that quantifies the utility or level of satisfaction e.g. profit, 
welfare etc, which a player derives from the outcome of a strategic interaction. It 
reflects the motivations and represents the usual means of measuring success for a 
player’s strategy within the game. In most games, the payoff to any player in every 
situation is expressed in the form of a payoff matrix or function that maps an input 
strategy profile (specification of strategies for every player) to an output payoff 
profile (denoting payoff values for every player). 
 
Game:   
A strategic interaction among mutually aware players (usually rational and seeks 
payoff maximization), where the decision of one impacts the payoffs of others and 
vice versa. A game can be completely specified and described by its players e.g. 
their types (which include the information known and used by each player for the 
basis of decision making, and how each player values the possible outcomes or 
utilities that result from making choices in strategic interaction), each player’s 
strategies, resulting payoffs awarded for each outcome (denoting a particular 
combination of choices made by all players) and the order in which players make 
their moves (in the case of sequential game). 
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Dominance:  
The concept establishes the relationship between strategies such that one is better 
than another for a player regardless of the profile of actions which other players 
may choose to play. In this context, a strategy is dominant if it is always better 
than other strategies e.g. earns a larger payoff. Similarly, a strategy is dominated 
if it is always better to play some other strategy e.g. earns a smaller payoff. 
 
Nash Equilibrium (NE):  
A set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has the incentive to 
unilaterally change his action. This occurs when a change in strategy by any one 
player would lead to a lower corresponding payoff for that player, given that all 
others do not change the strategies that they have currently adopted for use. The 
concept is typically used as an avenue to analyze and possibly predict the outcome 
of strategic interaction among several decision makers but does not necessarily 
imply a situation with best cumulative payoff for all the players involved. 
 
1.2 Types of games 
 
Games generally capture intrinsic aspects of complex, real world problems while 
being simple enough to enable extensive in-depth analysis. They can be broadly 
classified into a variety of basic types, depending on differences in the inherent 
nature of information structure, mode of game play and the interaction outcome. 
Some common distinctions in each category are listed and described as follow. 
1.2.1 Information structure 
 
• Perfect versus Imperfect 
A game is said to have perfect information if all players know all the moves that 
have taken place thus far. Examples include Chess, Tic tat toe, Go etc. In contrast, 
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a game of imperfect information is one in which some information of the game is 
not revealed to all players e.g. in card games like Poker, Blackjack etc, where each 
player's cards are hidden from other players. 
 
• Complete versus Incomplete 
Complete information is used to describe a game in which players have access to 
knowledge e.g. payoffs and available strategies, of all players; while incomplete 
information denotes otherwise. Though similar, complete and perfect information 
are not identical. The prior refers to a state of knowledge about the game structure 
and objective functions of players, while not necessarily implying knowledge of 
actions in the game e.g. one may have complete information in the context of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) [4], but yet still subjected to the bounds of imperfect 
information, since one does not know the action of the other player.  
 
• Symmetric versus Asymmetric 
Though not widely considered, there is a crucial need to define this category of 
distinction between games. Symmetric information games refer to those in which 
players subscribe to the same type of information and subjected to identical set of 
available strategies for the basis of decision making. In contrast, players subscribe 
to different types of information and strategy sets for the asymmetric case. The 
latter can arise due to differences in beliefs (which cause fundamental differences 
in the inherent strategy structures) or the degree of accessibility to information 
(some players might have access to more or different information as compared to 
others) for different players. A popular example pertains to the market for lemons 






1.2.2 Mode of game play 
 
• Simultaneous versus sequential 
Simultaneous games are those where players execute their moves concurrently, or 
if they do not, the players who move later are unaware of the actions that are made 
by players who move earlier. On the opposite note, sequential games are those 
where some players will choose their actions before others and players who move 
later can use knowledge about earlier actions as a basis to make their decisions. 
 
• One-shot versus repeated 
One shot games are those in which players only participate in one single round of 
interaction with each other. For games played in the repeated manner, players 
interact over a series of rounds which can be either finitely or infinitely repeating, 
depending on the time horizon of consideration. Unlike one-shot games, repeated 
games capture the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of 
his current actions on the future actions of other players. 
 
• Two player versus multi-player 
Games where interaction always takes place in a pair-wise manner between any 
two entities are called two-player games. Multi-player games are those in which 
the mode of interaction is between N players where N > 2. In some sense, two 
player games can be considered a special case of multi-player games where N = 2. 
 
1.2.3 Interaction outcome 
 
• Zero sum versus non-zero sum 
In zero sum games, total benefit to all players for any combination of strategies 
always adds up to zero. This is equivalent to implying that available resources can 
  7
neither increase nor decrease such that one can benefit only at an equal expense of 
others. Poker, Chess and Go exemplify such games because one wins exactly the 
amount the opponents lose. In non-zero sum games, however, some outcomes can 
have net results that are greater or less than zero. As such, one’s gain does not 
necessarily correspond to a loss of another. Examples of such nature include the 
IPD, Battle of the Sexes etc. 
 
• Cooperative versus non-cooperative  
A game is cooperative if players are able to make enforceable contracts and form 
binding commitments through the presence of an external party e.g. legal system. 
In non-cooperative games, players are unable to enforce contracts beyond those 
specifically modeled in the game and the act of cooperation must be self-enforcing. 
Epitomizing the nature of many real world problems, non-cooperative games are 
generally concerned with situations with some conflict of interests among players 
in the game but for which there is no natural incentives for anyone to cooperate. 
As such, using relevant concepts in non-cooperative game theory to analyze the 
decisions which players make and the collective outcomes of their interaction can 
help enhance the understanding and resolution of conflicts and rivalry. 
 
• Transitive versus Intransitive 
A transitive game is one in which the relations between A and B; B and C directly 
implies the relation between A and C e.g.  (A > B) and (B > C) Æ (A > C). In the 
context of game theory, A, B, and C denote three distinct strategies employed in 
the course of game play and the inherent relation for any strategy pair denotes the 
order of dominance between the relevant component strategies. For intransitive 
games, however, the above relations are not always preserved. 
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1.3 Scope of analysis 
 
Depending on the area of interest and concern, game theoretic interaction can be 
analyzed from a number of different perspectives such as strategy, outcomes of 
interaction, mechanism of game play, as presented in the following subsections. 
Apart from seeing and evaluating each viewpoint separately, varied perspectives 
can complement one another to give us a holistic picture into the richness of 
complex interaction among multiple intelligent entities, which is otherwise quite 




From the strategy perspective, analysis looks at game theoretic interaction through 
the lens of an individual player. It is concerned with action plans that lead to the 
maximization of one’s expected payoff, which is closely tied to the approach of 
maximizing the expected value of numerical utility function for an individual in 
decision theory [6]. The only difference, as opposed to decision theory, is that the 
analysis is essentially framed in the context of a multi-person decision theory – 
one which is concerned with the study of rational utility maximization behavior of 
each entity given that others are maximizing their utilities concurrently as well. 
Using this perspective of study, we can verify the existence of optimum 
strategies and in turn decipher their inherent nature if they do exist. As far as the 
individual is concerned, the dominance relationship between different strategies 
can also be examined to give us a better understanding of the traits that constitute 
a good strategy. This can then provide an explanation as to why good strategies 
have an edge over inferior ones, which allows us to draw possible insights into 
how rational, self-interested players will tend to behave and act under different 
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circumstances. Such information is pertinent and can certainly serve as a useful 
guide for decision making in the likely event that the notion of optimal strategies 
might not even exist in numerous complex situations. 
 
1.3.2 Outcomes of interaction 
 
As opposed to the micro perspective of analyzing strategies which are adopted by 
individuals, the second perspective takes a macro view at the outcomes of game 
theoretic interaction. Instead of seeing things from the position of a single player 
in the game and concerning ourselves with one’s payoff maximization behavior, 
the nature of collective outcomes and overall payoffs from scenarios of interaction 
that involve a relatively large number of individuals e.g. stock markets, auctions, 
public goods provision etc, are of primarily interest here.  
By virtue of the complex interconnectedness that exists between players’ 
actions and collective outcomes of interaction in the game theoretic context, it is 
insufficient for us to understand the entire picture of strategic interaction by 
analyzing solely from the individualistic strategy perspective. In numerous 
contexts, the mapping which couples actions and outcomes is always never 
straightforward - the maximization of individual payoffs using individualistically 
optimal strategies is typically not equivalent and does not necessarily translate to 
the maximization of group/overall payoffs. As such, the wider perspective of 
examining interaction outcomes can actually complement analysis from the prior 
perspective and help us, in particular policy makers, to gain a fuller and better 
understanding of the consequences of interaction. In the process, we also seek to 
identify and study interesting emergent behavior and trends amidst the collective 
interaction of different player strategies over time. 
 
  10
1.3.3 Mechanism of game play 
 
The third perspective of analysis involves the design of the underlying rules and 
mechanism of game play so as to achieve the desired objectives for game theoretic 
interaction. Instead of adhering to just a fixed set of rules, mechanism design [7] 
differs from the two prior modes of analysis in that it asks about the consequences 
of different types of rules. It is not concerned merely about the collective outcome 
of interaction for a particular scenario but those arising from different mechanisms 
of game play. It questions generic factors which affect the outcomes and analyzes 
how the consequences of interaction can be improved if they are undesirable – 
depending on the objectives that policy makers have in mind, an outcome, though 
in NE, might not necessarily be deemed desirable to achieve in nature. Examples 
of mechanism design can encompass compensation and wage agreements which 
effectively spread risk for the firm while maintaining incentives for the employees, 
optimal auctions that maximize revenue and allocate resources efficiently etc. 
 
1.4 Development and applications of game theory 
 
Contrary to its theoretical foundations as a mere tool for economic analysis, the 
theory of games has seen extensive development since its fundamental and formal 
conception by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [8]. Distinguished Nobel laureates 
in game theory have since been honored for their contributions in pioneering the 
analysis of equilibria in non-cooperative games [3], [9], devising the economic 
theory of incentives under asymmetric information [5], [10], [11], enhancing our 
understanding of conflict and cooperation through game theoretic analysis [12], 
[13] and laying the foundations of mechanism design theory [14] - [16]. 
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In line with the advances in theoretical concepts, the applications of game 
theory have spanned cross-disciplinary boundaries. This budding trend derives a 
vital need for researchers to negotiate multiple fields of expertise. Social scientists 
and computer scientists, for instance, have successfully applied relevant concepts 
to study the possibility of attaining and sustaining cooperation in both the classical 
and extended variants of the IPD [17] – [23]. Military strategists have turned to 
game theory to study conflicts of interest that are resolved through “war games” 
[24], [25] while sociologists have taken an interest in the development of an entire 
branch dedicated to examine issues involving group decision making [26] – [27]. 
Epidemiologists also use game theory for analyzing immunization procedures and 
methods of testing a vaccine or other medication [28]. Economists and policy 
makers are generally concerned with the study of economic problems relating to 
public goods provisioning [29], efficient auctions for resource allocation [30], 
bargaining and negotiation [31], [32] etc. Game theoretic principles are likewise 
applied to analyze the outcomes of competition between firms and corporations 
[33] in business and the modeling of stock market [34] for financial institutions 
etc. In politics, outcomes of elections are closely studied by political scientists via 
the concept of voting [35]. Mathematicians and game theorists have also analyzed 
and devise good strategies for games like poker, chess and checkers. 
Other than the classical form of game theory, analysis using variants of the 
theory has also provided useful insights. Biologists have used evolutionary game 
theory (EGT) [36] to explain numerous seemingly incongruous phenomena in 
nature e.g. altruism and kin selection [37], [38]. Behavioral game theory [39] – 
[41] is also linked to phenomenal works by psychologists and cognitive scientists 
that give us a better understanding of the complex human being. 
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1.5 Modeling and analysis 
 
To be able to perform insightful analysis in game theory, the ability to construct 
feasible models which capture essential and realistic aspects of interaction among 
all players participating in the game constitutes an important prerequisite. As a 
means of determining a solution to the decision problem that each player faces e.g. 
deriving the optimal strategies which dictate how players should act in order to 
maximize their individual payoffs, models should allow researchers to incorporate 
sophisticated micro-models of reasoning and preference for individual players and 
flexibly replicate strategic interaction without a need to abstract away such details. 
Since the popularization of game theory, analytical, empirical and computational 
approaches have constituted the primary methodologies of performing modeling 
and analysis. These will be discussed in the following sub sections. 
 
1.5.1 Analytical approaches 
 
Traditionally, the modeling and analysis of game theoretic problems has always 
been done using analytical approaches, where rigorous theoretical proofs are used 
to obtain precise prediction for the existence and nature of dominant strategies and 
NE points – situations where every player chooses actions that are best responses 
to the best responses of all others. The heart of such approaches is based around 
the theory of n-player non-zero sum games - in which John Nash formulated and 
proved the existence of at least one equilibrium solution for every generic game 
that involves N preference-maximizing players. This important research finding 
provides a powerful theoretical framework to optimize an individual’s strategy e.g. 
choosing a best response in an interaction of such nature, and predicting a likely 
combination of joint actions as the eventual outcome - NE. 
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 Refinements have since been made along the way, leading to Harsanyi’s 
concept of a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) [42] and Maynard Smith’s theory 
of evolutionary games [36]. The prior deals with situations where payoffs in the 
game are dependent on some private unobservable properties of a player e.g. the 
cards which a player holds in a game of Poker. The latter generally overlays a 
dynamic model of gradual strategy-adjustment on top of the static equilibria of 
Nash’s original formulation. Evolutionary dynamics and existence of evolutionary 
stable strategies (ESS) can then be studied using replicator equations [36]. 
Despite the desirability of such techniques, using mathematical treatments 
to model complex problems typically involves a need to impose multiple core 
assumptions and constraints such as homogeneous player types, use of symmetric 
information for basis of decision making, common strategy framework, perfect 
rationality etc for tractability reasons. The result is an inevitable scale down of the 
actual problems to their much simplified versions, of which, the intrinsic realism 
of the problems will be largely compromised for solvability. In essence, we will 
no longer be addressing the original problems which we ought to be solving. The 
large mismatch between what we meant to solve and what we are actually solving 
generally renders any analysis of results from rigorous mathematical derivations 
senseless with regards to their applicability to the associated real world context.  
Moreover, the idealized context which we derive the optimum or dominant 
strategy solutions from theoretical proofs also casts a doubt with regards to the 
degree of reproducibility for such strategy usage in practical settings. For example, 
Goeree and Holt [43] give an overview of ten simple games where game theoretic 
solutions are easily obtainable but intuitively implausible. This is due to the likely 
fact that players tend to be boundedly rational with finite computation power and 
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limited knowledge of their environment of interaction. Given these imperfections 
of reality, it is unlikely that the solutions derived from analytical approaches will 
apply with absolute certainty even if they are rigorously proven to be theoretically 
sound. This is due to the fact that players do not necessarily adjust their behavior 
to the theoretical optimum strategy in the midst of their interaction. 
 
1.5.2 Empirical approaches 
 
To create models that mirror real world interaction to a more realistic degree, the 
corresponding methodologies for modeling and analysis should seek to preserve 
the characteristic features of the original problem as far as possible. This naturally 
leads us to think about and re-examine the usage of empirical approaches, where 
experimentation is conducted on actual human subjects. Such methodologies are 
widely employed by economists, psychologists and social scientists alike, to study 
behavioral interaction in game theoretic settings.  
As opposed to the analytical approaches which are theoretically grounded, 
experimental observations to testable hypotheses are primarily used to guide the 
research study in empirical approaches. One obvious advantage of such means is 
the fact that a large supply of players - human subjects, is available off the shelf 
for experimentation. Ideal as it may seem, experiments are typically designed to 
be performed under laboratory controlled condition for ease of isolating the salient 
factors that will help contribute to the verification of pre-defined hypotheses. As 
such, information gained in the process is again limited in the scope of study and 
might not necessarily reflect the actual situation where interaction is meant to take 
place e.g. in an auction house with information flowing freely among numerous 
bidders. The study is incomplete in some sense as it is not always straightforward 
[44] to analyze the necessary cognitive mechanisms which are utilized during the 
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course of interaction. Moreover, coupling effects among different factors might be 
impossible to study if the highly constrained laboratory scenario setup involves a 
deliberate exclusion of any related factor in the experiment design. 
 
1.5.3 Computational approaches 
 
With the possibility of addressing the challenges encountered by prior approaches, 
computational approaches present yet another viable alternative to perform game 
theoretic modeling and analysis. This is usually realized via the use of simulation 
in agent-based computational models (ACMs) [45], which Axelrod [46] regards as 
a third way of doing science in addition to deduction and induction techniques. 
Following the tremendous increase in computing power and processing speed of 
computers in recent decades, the utilization of computation as a feasible problem 
solving paradigm is becoming more popular and increasingly relevant in today’s 
context. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that computational methodologies are never 
conceived to replace the existing approaches but rather to complement them by 
offering alternative insights into the nature of game theoretic interaction through 
new perspectives of modeling and analysis. 
The ACM methodology is similar, and in essence a subset of the empirical 
approaches as mentioned earlier, with the exception that human subjects are now 
replaced by computer agents [47] – intelligent software entities which are flexibly 
designed with the ability to perceive, evaluate and make independent decisions on 
the basis of current information and past experiences, and to act in accordance to 
their self-interests and preference-maximization behavior to satisfy internal goals. 
Equipped with limited knowledge and bounded rationality, the agents embrace 
learning and adaptation to their environment similarly to the way which humans 
locally cope with a changing world through scenarios of interaction. In this sense, 
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ACMs are particularly suitable to model and study systems which are composed 
of multiple interacting entities and exhibit emergent properties [48], [49] - those 
arising from interaction of different entities which cannot be deduced simply by 
aggregating the properties of each. By designing multi-agent systems (MAS) [50] 
and conducting controlled computational experiments where multiple autonomous 
agents interact simultaneously in setups that closely resemble the relevant contexts 
of study; observations and analysis on interaction outcomes will be able to provide 
us with increased understanding and useful insights into the problem of interest. 
Similar to human-based empirical experiments where the test subjects are 
readily available in abundance, number of entities in ACMs can also be scaled up 
to investigate outcomes of interaction with large numbers. The added advantage is 
that the numbers, as a form of model parameter, can be flexibly adjusted with ease 
through a change of simulation settings. The scope of study for ACMs is also less 
restrictive since we are free to design computational experiments to considerable 
degree of complexity as we deem fit - something which is of great difficulty to 
replicate in the much constrained laboratory settings of human-based experiments.  
As opposed to analytical approaches that usually entail simple closed form 
solutions, ACMs are also not bounded by issues of mathematical intractability, 
allowing complex scenarios with more realistic features to be studied. Moreover, 
given the fact that interaction of real world entities is generally contingent on past 
experiences, and entities continually adapt to those experiences, ACMs might be 
the only practical method of analysis as mathematical methods are typically very 
limited in its ability to derive dynamic consequences [46]. This is especially so in 
the context of repeated games, in which the iterative nature of interaction clearly 
highlights the suitability of ACMs for modeling and analysis. 
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1.6 Learning in agent-based models 
 
In tandem with the application of ACMs to game theory, learning methodologies 
often form part and parcel of the implementation. As a crucial aspect of artificial 
intelligence [51], they define means by which agents are able to process, update 
and utilize current information and past experiences that are acquired from their 
environment to make intelligent decisions in a dynamic way. More importantly, 
learning methodologies facilitate positive strategy adjustments which help agents 
improve their payoffs or positions relative to their environment of existence and 
interaction over time, by drawing from available information and experiences. 
By far, the ability to learn and improve constitutes an important element of 
human adaptation and is especially vital when it comes to modeling aspects of 
game theoretic interaction in the real world context – one that is characterized by a 
dynamically changing environment where multiple players are constantly adapting 
their strategies to one another within an underlying mechanism of game play that 
is possibly also changing as well. Without learning, modeling of agent behavior in 
computational models becomes unrealistic. Some popular examples of learning 
methodologies in ACMs include Q-learning [52], Bayesian learning [53], branch-
and-bound [54], dynamic programming [55], temporal difference learning [56], 
gradient descent [57], and simulated annealing [58] among many others. 
As much as learning is important in ACM, the incorporation of realistic 
modes of learning must also not be under-emphasized. For instance, we are not 
nearer to understanding the properties of systems if we simply compute outcomes 
of interaction by running experiments which we equip agents homogeneously with 
the same non-dominant strategy [44]. From the perspective of individual agents, 
learning methodologies should ideally take into account of realistic elements such 
  18
as the dynamism of learning process, probabilistic nature of decision making and 
notion of bounded rationality [59] – which includes limited information, imperfect 
cognitive processing and learning capabilities, and finite duration for decision 
making. The constraints of bounded rationalism are due to the fact that decision-
makers usually lack the abilities and resources to arrive at optimal solutions in 
reality, and instead apply their rationality only after simplifying available choices 
substantially. To this note, many existing techniques fail to deliver the required 
sense of realism as most operate with core assumptions that agents are perfectly 
rational, embrace homogeneous forms of learning, or interact and make decisions 
which are clearly too deterministic.  
On a wider note, learning in game theoretic interaction can be saliently 
viewed as a process where entities in ACMs evolve gradually and incrementally in 
response to a changing environment (which comprises of the game mechanism as 
well as all other evolving entities). For instance, agents do not instantaneously and 
simultaneously adjust their behavior to theoretical optimum strategies. Rather, the 
adoption of a new strategy may spread through a population of agents as word of 
its efficacy diffuses in a manner akin to mimetic evolution [44]. We can view each 
agent and its environment as coevolving counterparts where each undergoes co-
evolutionary learning [60] as a form of adaptation to one another.  
Finally, with appropriate learning mechanisms in place for each entity in 
an ACM, a paradigm is also required to discover eventual outcomes of the game 
theoretic interactions which we are seeking to analyze from different perspectives 
e.g. the nature of dominant strategies, existence of NEs and possibly different 
pathways of convergence to the outcomes - whose dynamism are typically not 
addressed by learning models in classical game theory. From the perspective of 
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analytical approaches, this ideally equates to solving multi-player optimization 
problems and deriving the solution outcomes where all players play out their best 
strategies. As far as ACMs are concerned, a dynamic and realistic computational 
framework, similar to that proposed in EGT, is needed to model and simulate co-
evolutionary learning and adaptation in strategic environments. 
 
1.7 Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
To the above note, Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) [61] present a simple and 
elegant framework to address challenges of modeling realistic learning experience 
and solution discovery in ACMs. Originally conceptualized based on Darwin’s 
Law of Natural Selection, the paradigm’s inherent capability for solving complex 
optimization tasks via stochastic, parallel searches makes it a suitable candidate 
for finding solutions to complex game theoretic problems, especially those which 
are mathematically intractable to analytical approaches and too extensive in scope 
to be covered by human-based experiments. For instance, in the attempt to assess 
the presence of strategy mixtures which constitute equilibria in any game theoretic 
interaction, it is necessary to evaluate the interaction between known strategies as 
well as the space of strategies which are yet to be considered. Given the very large 
strategy space, exhaustive search will prove infeasible. In comparison, population- 
based heuristic search methods like EAs clearly speed up the process of solution 
discovery and present possible avenues for studying interaction between different 
strategies by sampling the search space in a systematic manner [44]. 
Apart from being a search and optimization paradigm, EAs also accounts 
for realistic aspects of replicating learning experiences for agents. As opposed to 
deterministic, idealized learning models in which agents always choose the best 
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decision that maximizes payoffs, the use of stochastic elementary processes like 
selection, recombination and mutation in EAs introduces a probabilistic dimension 
to the process of agent learning and strategy discovery. This mode of evolutionary 
learning is more in sync with the nature of how humans learn in the real world 
context, which is essentially characterized by uncertainties and imperfections in 
decision making. For instance, making unintentional mistakes, bounded rationality 
in thinking, incomplete or imperfect knowledge about the situation of game play 
etc, can well result in outcomes where agents do not always make the best choices 
that are available to them. The list goes on. As a dynamic optimization framework, 
EAs, unlike many existing static methodologies also drives the process of learning 
and adaptation for the agent population on a continuous basis. 
In addition, different agents are likely to embrace learning in diverse ways 
e.g. some might like to imitate or partially adopt the strategies of others while the 
rest might prefer a trial and error mode of learning. Instead of assuming that all 
agents will always adopt homogeneous learning styles and converge in a straight 
forward manner towards the adoption of optimal strategies, models should seek to 
accommodate mixing and blending of different learning methods, so that the final 
stable states, if there are any, can be attained via varied pathways of convergence. 
To some degree of flexibility, such assorted outcomes can be subtly captured by 
the process of evolutionary learning. Details will be furnished in Chapter 2. 
Although some arguments have been staged against EAs with regards to 
its inconsistency in obtaining optimal solutions, the paradigm is nonetheless, easy 
to design and yield good, if not the best, solutions most of the time. This is crucial 
as we usually seek and settle for good enough or satisfactory solutions rather than 
the best solution in most of our real world encounters [62]. This is especially true 
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given the earlier stated facts that agents are imperfect in their process of making 
decisions. It makes not much sense to study situations of optimality when agents 
themselves might not even acquire the best strategies. Given the context of real 
world interaction, it is necessary to examine the attainability of solution outcomes 
given the existing strategic behavior of agents. Focusing our attention on good 
strategies with a greater likelihood of attainability e.g. large basin of attraction [63] 
in the strategy space is more realistic and pragmatic than mapping optimal ones 
that have low chances of adoption. The analysis of strategies should suffice as a 
useful guide for social scientists and policy makers alike to attest the effectiveness 
of mechanisms and policy decisions, as well as to design and formulate new ones. 
EAs also provide the flexibility to incorporate input knowledge from users 
so that parameter optimization can be carried out within the bounds considered to 
achieve effective abstraction of the problem. This constitutes an important trait as 
designers of social experiments can flexibly include subsets of information that 
are useful, and exclude those that have little or no contribution to the outcome and 
whose inclusion might even complicate the search process. With input knowledge 
well represented in structured chromosomes, it also becomes easier to analyze the 
final strategy due to the explicit nature of solution representation in EAs. 
 
1.8 Overview of this Work 
 
From the afore-mentioned discussion, game theoretic modeling and analysis is a 
challenging research topic that requires much attention from social scientists and 
researchers. To achieve accurate and effective modeling which yields meaningful 
analysis and insights into game theoretic interaction, the difficulties in analytical 
and human-based empirical methods will have to be overcome; together with the 
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paramount need to facilitate solution discovery and integrate realistic and dynamic 
elements into the process of learning for individual entities during their interaction. 
Though EAs provide a feasible solution measure to address the above issues, it is 
however, very difficult or almost impossible to construct an absolute measurement 
of quality via which traditional evolutionary approaches and optimization-based 
search algorithms can be used; since the “goodness” of game strategies can only 
be evaluated when they pit themselves against one another. In view of the above 
challenges, co-evolutionary algorithms (CEAs) [64], a special variant of EAs, are 
used. Implementing the same general evolutionary framework as traditional EAs, 
CEAs are suitable to simulate learning in games as they do not require any explicit 
quality measurement of strategies in order to function - the search for increasingly 
better strategies are driven solely by strategic interactions among competing ones. 
The prime motivation of this work is to provide a comprehensive treatment 
on co-evolutionary simulation modeling – the application of stochastic CEAs to 
simulate evolution and adaptation processes and further game theoretic analysis in 
ACMs. In particular, the thesis will assess the viability of using CEAs as a simple 
but complementary alternative to existing mathematical and experimental methods 
in the study of repeated games. The interest in repeated interaction is largely due 
to its extensive applicability in many real world situations and the added fact that 
cooperation may be easier to sustain in a long-term relationship than in a single 
encounter [65]. As opposed to the analysis of short-run games which is often too 
restrictive, the analysis of interaction in repeated games can probably provide us 
with interesting insights into how cooperation can be achieved and sustained.  
This rest of the work is organized into four parts. Part one, consisting of 
Chapter 2 will cover some core concepts, advantages as well as some applications 
  23
of EAs, followed by a comprehensive review on CEAs, and then finally drawing 
parallels as a means of comparison between aspects of CEA and game theory. The 
second part of this work will attempt to verify the ability of using co-evolutionary 
and/or hybridized approaches to derive solutions and discover good strategies that 
are closely similar or comparable, if not better, than solutions which are proposed 
by existing methodologies, in two game theoretic test problems. Chapter 3 seeks 
to develop a competitive computer poker player that specialized in Texas Hold’em. 
This is achieved by means of exploring the possibility of applying CEA to evolve 
Nash-optimal poker strategies that are comparable in performance to those derived 
through traditional means [66]. Chapter 4 redirects the application of CEA to the 
classical IPD problem setup, where the comparative performance and adaptability 
of evolutionary, learning and memetic strategies is benchmarked against a list of 
existing IPD strategies [67]. The objective is to assess whether evolution, learning 
or a combination of evolution with learning can lead to formation of strategies that 
will adapt and thrive well in complex environments. 
The third part concentrates on the use of co-evolutionary approaches for 
game theoretic modeling and simulation, from which we can analyze interesting 
emergent behavior and trends that will give us new insights into the complexity of 
collective interaction among diverse strategy types across temporal dimensions. 
Chapter 5 extends the IPD model discussed in Chapter 4 to a spatial version in an 
attempt to simulate and analyze the phenomenon of civil violence as the behavior 
of autonomous agents within a multi-agent social network [68] is co-evolved over 
time. Chapter 6 pursues the modeling and analysis of a multi-player public goods 
provision game, focusing specifically on the scenario where agents interact and 
co-evolve under asymmetric information [69]. In both chapters, simulated results 
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can be used to complement findings from existing game theoretic studies and to 
assess the validity of related social theories in theoretical and complex situations 
that often go beyond their original scope of assumptions. Finally, chapter 7 in the 
fourth and final part concludes the thesis with a broad summary of contributions 




In this chapter, we have covered the necessary concepts, definitions, scope and a 
survey of development and applications in game theory to appreciate this work. 
This chapter also presented the deficiency in some of the existing approaches with 
regards to the modeling and analysis of game theoretic interaction. Subsequently, 
the use of EAs, specifically CEAs, as a viable learning method, has been proposed 
to complement existing computational approaches of using ACMs for the purpose 
of addressing issues of mathematical intractability, constraints in scope of analysis, 
inherent realism of interaction and the dynamism of learning, solution discovery 
and strategy improvement in game theoretic modeling and analysis. Finally, the 
overview of this work is presented with a brief introduction to the chapters that are 
















Before we embark on the use of evolutionary approaches to model and simulate 
game theoretic interaction using ACMs, a core understanding of EAs is necessary. 
Originated as a branch of computational intelligence [70] techniques which also 
encompass fuzzy logic [71], artificial neural networks [72] swarm intelligence [73] 
- ant colony and particle swarm optimization, and artificial immune systems [74] 
etc, EAs are stochastic, population-based search algorithms that are inspired from 
Darwin’s theory of evolution and use several stochastic processes like selection, 
reproduction, crossover and mutation, among many others, to develop generations 
of strategies that follow the basic principle of survival of the fittest.  
 To further elaborate, Darwin’s theory states that all organisms have their 
own unique genetic make-up. During reproduction, their genes are passed on to 
the next generation, of which some are altered occasionally by variation processes. 
All organisms are tested by the environment and by one another, where only the 
fittest survive to propagate their genes to subsequent generations. Over time, only 
those with genes that are best suited for adaptation to the environment is left. EAs 
use precisely this concept to solve complex optimization tasks via a population of 
candidates - each being a possible solution to the problem. Candidates are tested 
and sorted according to their performance (or fitness level), and those that perform 
better will get a higher likelihood to “reproduce”. A candidate may also be varied 
to widen the scope of search and avoid locally optimum solutions. Information 
exchange among population from one generation to another that is provided by 
selection and variation processes is used as an efficient guide to direct the parallel 
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search via the solution/strategy space. After substantial iterations, the algorithm 
should eventually evolve a solution that is optimal or near optimal for the problem.  
Other than genetic operators, EAs also uses mechanisms which are absent in 
the natural world to improve its performance and efficiency during the course of 
search. Two such examples include elitism [75] and niching [76]. The prior clones 
the best candidates and replicates the exact genetic makeup in the next generation 
to ensure that good solutions found so far are not lost through evolution. The latter 
penalizes candidates with similar characteristics by reducing their likelihoods of 
reproduction. This has an effect of preserving population diversity and widening 
the search capability of EAs. There are four generic variants which are in used – 
the genetic algorithms (GA) [77], evolutionary strategies (ES) [78], evolutionary 
programming (EP) [79] and genetic programming (GP) [80], each of which differs 
in terms of the representation, genetic processes used or means of implementation. 
As far as the scope of thesis is concerned, GA will be used throughout different 
chapters unless otherwise stated explicitly. A brief pseudo-code of EA’s operation 
is shown in Figure 2.1 and details of the various elements that comprises EAs is 
highlighted and described in section 2.1. 
 
                   Initialize population of individuals 
                   Evaluate each individual in the initial population 
                   t :=0 
                   Repeat 
                       Niching to penalize like individuals  
                       Select parents from population 
                       Generate offspring from parents by genetic operators 
                   Evaluate offspring population 
                   Elitism to retain elite individuals 
                   Select survivors for new population 
                       t := t + 1 
                   Until some terminating criteria is satisfied 
Figure 2.1: Pseudo code of EAs 
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2.1 Elements of EAs 
 
Several basic elements constitute the crux of the robust search and optimization 




Before EAs can be applied to a problem of concern, there must first and foremost 
be a way to represent an individual or entity of evolution, which is otherwise also 
known as a chromosome. This is inspired by the encoding of genetic inheritance 
in the DNA of every biological organism. Each chromosome essentially encodes a 
possible solution or set of solution parameters to be optimized. In the context of 
game theory, each chromosome will denote a possible strategy which players can 
use to interact with other players during the game. By structuring a chromosome 
appropriately in terms of the representation, effective evolution can take place to 
evolve the optimized solution or parameters eventually. Some commonly used 
representation includes real number, binary or even complex data structures such 




Fitness represents the criteria to which nature selects individuals to survive on to 
subsequent generations. For a biological organism, its fitness is measured by the 
corresponding interaction with its environment e.g. its lifespan, the opportunities 
to reproduce, number of offspring etc. For EAs, an individual’s fitness is likewise 
measured by the “goodness” of the solution which it represents. For instance, a 
dominant strategy will have higher fitness as compared to a dominated one. The 
fitness value is then used to determine the extent which an individual e.g. strategy 
is allowed to reproduce into the next generation. 
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2.1.3 Population and generation 
 
As a population-based paradigm that conducts multiple concurrent searches, EAs 
are commonly initialized with a random pool of potential solutions as a start. After 
each solution has undergone fitness evaluation, the entire population is subjected 
to evolutionary processes as described from 2.1.4 to 2.1.8. This produces a new 
population of individuals and one generation or evolutionary cycle is said to have 
elapsed. EAs will typically require from several to many generations (depending 
on the complexity of the problem and size of search space at hand) before a good 




Selection is one of the most fundamental operations in EAs where individuals are 
selected to propagate to subsequent generations. Based on nature’s law; the fitter 
individuals in the population should be given higher likelihoods to survive and 
reproduce but weaker ones should nonetheless be still given some finite chances 
of survival. It is crucial to implement a fair selection scheme so that balance can 
be maintained in the EAs e.g. the algorithm will not be overly biased towards the 
choosing of fit individuals at the expense of weaker ones as this will lead to the 
rapid population of like individuals and loss of genetic diversity. This can lead to 
premature convergence and danger of being trapped in a local optimum. Likewise, 
the algorithm should not give too much emphasis on preserving weak individuals 
as this leads to low selection pressure and rate of convergence. A fine balance 
between exploration and exploitation is typically required for good performance. 
Commonly used selection schemes include the fitness proportionate or roulette 
wheel selection [61], tournament selection [81], stochastic universal sampling [82], 




Crossover or recombination is the process where genetic characteristics from two 
individuals are blended together and passed down to their offspring. This is in the 
hope that at least some of the children will be fitter than either of their parents. In 
EAs, crossover will generally involve an exchange of chromosomal materials in 
the creation of offspring. Individuals chosen by selection e.g. parents will usually 
reproduce with a certain crossover probability which is typically set high, so as to 
facilitate the exchange of search information among individuals in the population 
from one generation to the next. This is one advantage which EAs have over other 
independent search schemes. Exchange of genetic materials is usually performed 
using a variety of crossover schemes and much is dependent on the chromosomal 
representation and problem nature. Some popular schemes [83] include single and 




In the natural world, mutation denotes the random modification of some genetic 
material which is inherited by an individual. Though most mutation would appear 
harmful, they may be beneficial occasionally and result in increased fitness for the 
organism. Mutation is necessary in EAs to preserve diversity of individuals and 
maintain the exploration ability of the evolutionary search process. This is usually 
implemented with a low probability and involves randomly changing each of the 




Originally proposed by Goldberg [76] to promote population distribution, prevent 
genetic drift as well as to search for possible multiple peaks in single objective 
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optimization problems, niching is a mechanism which is implemented in EAs to 
maintain the diversity of individuals within the population pool. It works on the 
principles of speciation such that individuals who are too alike are penalized to 
reduce their fitness and chances of being selected. Though not directly linked to 
nature’s evolution, this mechanism has an effect of spreading evolutionary search 
effort across the problem’s search space, thereby increasing its search capability 
and subsequent chances of locating the global optimum, especially in complex or 
multi-modal problems. Niching is usually implemented on the basis of a sharing 
or crowding radius e.g. individuals within the radius are considered alike to one 
another and each is penalized in accordance to the number of individuals which 




First conceptualized by De Jong in [42] to preserve the best individuals found and 
prevent lost of good ones due to the stochastic nature of evolutionary processes, 
elitism, like niching, is a mechanism which does not see any parallels in nature’s 
version of evolution. It is employed in EAs to ensure that the fittest chromosomes 
in the population are passed on to the next generation without alteration by genetic 
operators. Elitism ensures that the population’s minimum fitness is never reduced 
from one generation to the next and this usually also entails a more rapid inherent 
convergence. Typical implementation involves replacing the weakest ne% of the 
offspring population with the fittest ne % of the parent population.  
 
2.1.9 Stopping Criteria 
 
The stopping criteria in EAs refer to the conditions which will stop the evolution 
process when met. This is important as problems are different in their own right 
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and computational resources and time are also limited. As such, it is important to 
set some criteria so that good, if not optimal solutions, can be derived within the 
constraints which we have to abide by in realistic circumstances so as not to allow 
the EAs to execute forever. Some typical criteria can involve setting a maximum 
number of generations, stopping once a certain level of convergence is reached etc. 
 
2.2 Advantages of EAs 
 
As stated earlier, EAs as a robust and generalized heuristical search method offers 
added advantages over the existing search paradigms when it comes to tackling 
complex problems; since we are mostly concerned not so much to find the global 
optimum solution, but rather a solution that is the best that can be achieved with 
available time and resources. In terms of representing solutions, EAs work with a 
coding of the problem’s parameters and not the parameters directly. It operates 
directly using only objective function values without problem-specific information 
or even derivatives, giving it a considerable advantage in tackling a very broad 
range of problems successfully. Performing search via a population of individuals 
instead of a single independent search entity reduces the chance of getting trapped 
in a local optimum and also hastens the process of solution discovery. By virtue of 
its flexibility of implementation, EAs can also be hybridized easily with other 
methods to deliver added performance improvement. Moreover, the probabilistic 
elements in the heart of EAs, though far from indicating directionless search, are 
actually used to guide the algorithm to explore areas of the search space which are 
most likely to lead to improvement [84]. 
Since its popularization, EAs and other evolutionary methods have since 
made significant contributions to countless areas of research and applications such 
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as massive parameter optimization [85], scheduling [86], engineering design [87], 
analysis of social interaction [88] and complex multi-agent systems [89]. Many of 
the areas often traverse multi-disciplinary boundaries, thus allowing researchers to 
discover creative solutions, derive insights from cross-disciplinary contexts and 
understand existing problems from whole new perspectives.  
 
2.3 Co-evolutionary algorithms 
 
In the context of our study, it can be extremely difficult to formulate a fitness 
function that reflects the underlying properties of games as accurate measurement 
to determine “goodness” of solutions cannot be obtained in most cases. This is 
because the fitness of each strategy can only be evaluated through interaction with 
other evolving strategies who can be members of the same or different populations, 
depending on the search problem of concern. The deliberate use of any ill-defined 
fitness measure to suit the application of traditional EAs and optimization-based 
paradigms can well lead the search process towards the discovery of inferior/sub-
optimal strategies, which is certainly not desirable. 
Given this perspective of concern, CEAs constitute a special type of EAs 
whose nature offers a fitting and viable solution. Inherently, CEAs apply selection 
and variation processes iteratively to the competing population of strategies under 
the same general evolutionary framework as discussed previously but differs from 
conventional EAs with respect to how the fitness of a typical strategy is derived. 
For traditional EAs, fitness value of a solution is always invariant and independent 
of the population’s composition at any point of the evolutionary time-line. The 
distinguishing feature in CEAs pertains to the notion of fitness inter-dependency 
among different individuals which the fitness evaluation process establishes. For 
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instance, each strategy’s fitness is highly dependent and correlated to the fitness of 
his interaction partners, which in turn suggests that a strategy’s chance of survival 
depends effectively on its fitness relative to the partners. Fitness is relative and 
dynamic and manifests itself as a function of the population composition which is 
subjected to change from one generation to the next. Regardless of the number of 
populations, the most conventional pattern of interaction - complete mixing [36] is 
to have every member interact with every other individual who can possibly serve 
as potential partners - a symmetric two-player game with a single population of n 
individuals yields n(n − 1)/2 distinct interactions while an asymmetric two-player 
game with two populations of size m and n will derive mn distinct interactions.  
CEAs are generally divided into competitive and cooperative [90] schools 
of differentiation where the latter aims to solve a difficult problem X – which is 
decomposable into a collection of easier sub-problems; by coevolving an effective 
set of solutions – each individual denoting a solution to one of the corresponding 
sub-problems, that can work together to form a complete solution to the original, 
larger problem. In cooperative CEAs, there is no sharing of genetic information 
between solutions in different sub-populations and fitness evaluations are made by 
forming collaboration between an individual of one population and representatives 
of other populations. In competitive CEAs, each individual represents a complete 
solution to the problem and competes with one another for the right to survive just 
like what is typically in place for conventional EAs. 
As far as the scope of this thesis is concerned, subsequent chapters will 
focus on the use of competitive CEAs. Nonetheless, both types of CEAs, despite 
innate differences, share similar motivations with respect to the learning process 
and apply to problems in which formulation of explicit fitness function is difficult 
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or impossible e.g. evolving game playing strategies in the context of this work. 
There are generally four variations of fitness measures as Wiegand [91] defines: 
 
Definition 1: Objective measure 
A measurement of an individual is objective if it considers that individual 
independently from other individuals, aside from scaling or normalization effects. 
 
Definition 2: Subjective measure 
A measurement of an individual is subjective if it does not consider that individual 
independently from other individuals.  
 
Definition 3: Internal measure 
A measurement of an individual’s is internal if it does influence the course of 
evolution in some way. 
 
Definition 4: External measure 
A measurement of an individual is external if it does not influence the course of 
evolution in any way. 
 
From the definitions of the above four types of measure, it is clear that traditional 
EAs adopt an objective internal measure in its fitness evaluation. CEAs, on the 
other hand adopt a subjective internal measurement for fitness assessment and this 
pertains to the payoff which each player derives in the context of game theoretic 
interaction. In the co-evolutionary framework, two or more populations generally 
co-exist and co-adapt to one another over time. This is especially suitable when it 
comes to modeling game theoretic interaction and learning among asymmetric or 
different groups of strategies. The utility maximization behavior of each rational 
entity in the population via strategy improvement can be efficiently modeled as 
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EAs are naturally designed for optimization tasks. In such context, each player 
starts with an initial strategy and adapts to the dynamic environment by bettering 
its strategy over time by means of co-evolutionary learning where players of the 
same type evolve strategies collectively and independently of other types. As a 
subset of EAs, the dynamism in CEAs does provide an important element that is 
missing from the traditional theory of games, making it appropriate for analyzing 
scenarios with repeated interactions and modeling social systems. CEAs also 
maintain population diversity better than “classical” EAs [92]. 
 
2.4 Drawing parallels 
 
To draw close parallel with game theoretic interaction in reality, it is vital for any 
model to possess a viable and realistic learning mechanism for players to improve 
their strategies over time. With the assumptions of bounded rationality, players do 
not have perfect information about the global environment and are not attributed 
with advanced information processing capacities to undertake strategy revision 
using Bayesian Learning or Nash optimization. Though the replicator dynamics in 
EGT seems viable, its applicability relies essentially on the core, but somewhat 
unrealistic assumption of an infinitely large player population [93]. A probabilistic 
element is also lacking as outcomes generated based on iteratively simulating the 
static replicator dynamics equations are by and large deterministic in nature.  
CEAs is selected as the proposed learning mechanism in the series of work 
that are presented in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, as it is able to produce 
characteristics that are closely similar [94] to the replicator dynamics using only a 
finitely large population. Such characteristic of the co-evolutionary framework not 
only fulfills constraints of limited computational resource, but also allows us to 
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flexibly study situations that may not involve infinitely large number of players. 
The co-adaptation of entity populations over numerous evolutionary episodes also 
captures the essence of the population-based and temporal nature of EGT. In 
addition, co-evolution provides a stochastic learning framework which incorporate 
uncertainty and realistic imperfections into the process of simulation. In situations 
when theories only cover idealized scenarios where core assumptions are not 
violated, CEAs can allow flexibility to model realistic constraints like information 
asymmetry, bounded rationality, framing and other model imperfections. The 
elegant co-evolutionary framework captures three distinct aspects of learning [94] 
within each evolving population or strategy type - learning by replication, social 
exchanges and experimenting. These processes correspond to notions of selection, 
crossover and mutation respectively. The analogy between various components 
will be further elaborated in Chapter 6. In summation, the following parallels in 
Figure 2.2 can be drawn between CEAs on one hand and game theory on the other 
when attempting to employ co-evolutionary simulation modeling in the context of 
game theoretic modeling and analysis. 
 
 
CEAs      Game theory 
Fitness     ÅÆ   Payoff 
Individual/Chromosome  ÅÆ   Strategy 
Selection of fit individuals   ÅÆ   Selection of good strategies 
Selection    ÅÆ  Learning by replication 
Crossover    ÅÆ  Learning by social exchanges 
Mutation    ÅÆ  Learning by experimenting 
 




In this chapter, we have covered core concepts and fundamental processes that are 
involved in the implementation of EAs. An understanding of these basic building 
blocks leads on to a discussion on its advantages and potential applications. This 
is followed by a comprehensive review of CEAs – stating its salient characteristics 
and distinction from EAs. Finally, parallels are drawn as a means of comparison 





















Evolving Nash Optimal Poker Strategies 
 
Poker is a card game that is widely played by many around the world. In the 
recent decades, it has experienced an unprecedented surge in popularity owing to 
the prevalence of online poker which made it much more convenient for players to 
search for and join a poker game. In unison, the decreasing cost of computational 
power has also allowed the creation of strong computer players using artificial 
intelligence (A.I.). Much research had revolved around the game, not only to 
develop better strategies, but also using it as a viable means to study psychology, 
economics and the effectiveness of neural [95] and Bayesian networks [96].  
Suitability of poker in such studies spans from a couple of factors. Firstly, 
it is a game of imperfect information as some information of the game state e.g. 
the opponent cards [97], is not known to players at any one time. This differs in 
contrast to games of perfect information e.g. Chess, where all game information is 
displayed on board. Secondly, poker is computationally less complex than other 
games of imperfect information e.g. bridge. Despite so, impact of this imperfect 
information trait is nonetheless not as negligible as that in scrabble [97]. Due to 
such dynamic nature of the game, no computer player has ever beaten the human 
poker champion, unlike what had been achieved in Chess [98]. Though computer 
players are getting better at the game from the current state of A.I. research, none 
is as yet, able to beat a human of grandmaster ranking in both the heads-up (one 
versus one) and multiple player version consistently. 
With the goal of developing good poker strategies, CEAs present a viable 
means of evolving intelligence as it is able to create generations of strategies that 
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follow the basic principle of survival of the fittest via evolutionary processes. A 
foreseeable advantage of this technique is its ability to produce good strategies 
with minimal, if not without use of expert knowledge and explicit fitness measure. 
This allows the creation of objective strategies and possibly a discovery of those 
unthought-of before. Closely related to EAs, CEAs have the potential to “solve 
complex problems even their creators themselves do not fully understand” [77]. 
This chapter attempts to develop a poker A.I. that plays approximately at 
NE [3] using a CEA that employs offline competitive co-evolution e.g. [99] as the 
means of adaptation. The version of poker used is the heads-up pot-limit Texas 
Hold’em and the reason for aiming to achieve NE instead of merely maximizing 
winnings is due to the intransitive nature of poker. This implicates that attempts to 
develop players which win maximally against other players through any offline 
evolutionary means might not be possible, unless excellent opponent modeling is 
present. Being able to create players that play at NE e.g. at worst draw against any 
opponent [3], is crucial, at least as a start point for developing good poker players. 
Based on performance analysis of these players, insights on how well CEAs can 
be applied to full-scale Texas Hold’em can then be made.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses some prominent 
works in the existing poker literature. Section 3.2 provides an overview of Texas 
hold’em. Section 3.3 introduces the game theoretic fundamentals behind poker 
and Section 3.4 describes the game engine design. The proposed co-evolutionary 
model is elaborated in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 highlights findings from a 
preliminary study. Section 3.7 presents and analyses the simulated results and 
efficiency of CEAs. Section 3.8 concludes with a broad summary of discussion on 
the result analysis as well as some possible future model improvements. 
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3.1 Background study 
 
Numerous techniques had been used to develop poker A.I. The most successful of 
all are developed by the Department of Computer Science, University of Alberta. 
Poki is one such A.I. that specializes in multiple-players pot-limit Texas Hold’em. 
The system structure [100] (shown in Figure 3.1) is segmented into hand-strength 
assessment, hand-potential assessment, betting strategy, bluffing, unpredictability 
as well as opponent modeling [101] – [103]. The A.I. makes use of probabilistic 
knowledge and selective-sampling simulation [104] to implement betting. Every 
time it is to make a decision, it will do a selective-sampling simulation to look 
ahead and determine its best course of action. A probability triplet which consists 
of three probabilistic numbers representing the probability of it folding, calling or 
raising, is returned. One action is chosen randomly according to their probabilities. 
The opponent modeler is a component used to predict the next action of opponents. 
During the development of this component, neural network was applied [105] to 
improve it. The biggest strength of Poki is its ability to adapt to its opponents’ 
style of play and exploit their weaknesses.  
PSOpti, the most successful heads-up pot-limit Texas Hold’em A.I. is also 
developed by University of Alberta. It was the winner in both the Association for 
the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Computer Poker Competitions 
in 2006 and 2007 [106]. The A.I. uses Game Theory to play poker [107]. Firstly, 
the game tree is simplified through abstraction of the game. Abstraction is done by 
reducing and eliminating the number of betting rounds, composing preflop and 
postflop models, and using bucketing techniques that group hands of similar value 
together. These reduce the complexity of solving the game tree from O(1018) to 
O(107). Linear programming is finally used to solve the smaller game tree. From 
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the games it had played, PSOpti managed to beat all computer players (Table 3.1) 
and most of the human players, except those of master ranking and above (Table 
3.2). The strength of PSOpti lies in its ability to play close to the NE by using a 
pseudo-optimal strategy that displays almost no exploitable weakness. However, it 
employs no opponent modeling, which makes it less capable of exploiting much 
weaker opponents as compared to other poker A.I. systems.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Overall architecture of Poki 
 
 
Table 3.1: Performance of the various computer players against one another [107] 
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Apart from conventional means, EAs have also been used in poker research. 
Barone and While [108] applied EAs to a simplified version of poker where they 
had a player with evolving strategies play many games against fixed opponents. 
The strategies for each situation are the ones undergoing evolution rather than the 
player itself. Experimental results indicate that the evolving player performs better 
against fixed opponents as generations elapse. However, the player takes many 
generations before it can fully exploit the opponents. This makes it infeasible for 
playing against real opponents, as games do not last many rounds and opponents 
are not fully static. In view of the complexity in poker, the authors also used EAs 
to find specialized intransitive countering strategies [109].  
Another application of EAs in poker is postulated by Frans Oliehoek et al. to 
calculate NE using co-evolution [110]. The experiment was done on a simplified 
version of poker with only 8 cards. The objective is to verify if the CEAs can help 
to speed up the calculation to achieve an optimal strategy. Simulated results show 
that not many generations are required to achieve a strategy which plays relatively 
close to the NE in the 8-cards variant. This highlights the possibility of applying 
EAs, particularly CEAs, to larger scale of the game. 
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3.2 Overview of Texas Hold’em 
 
Texas Hold’em is played with a standard 52-cards deck by 2 to 10 players. It is 
different from normal poker as community cards rules are included. This offers 
more strategic depth and less luck factor; making it one of the most popular [111] 
poker variant that is played today. 
 
3.2.1 Game rules 
 
A game round is divided into four stages - Preflop, Flop, The Turn and The River. 
Each stage is differentiated from one another by the number of community cards 
revealed. In the pot-limit version, stakes are determined by the small bet and big 
bet amounts, where the big bet is typically twice of the small bet.  
 
• Posting of blind 
Before every round begins, blinds are posted by the first two players – the dealer 
and player on his/her left. The dealer pays an amount equal to half the small bet 
while the second player pays a full small bet. These are called the big blind and 
small blind respectively. The cards will then be shuffled and two cards will be 
distributed to each player.  
 
• Preflop 
Preflop is the first stage of betting. Betting will start with the player left of the 
small blind, i.e. the third player. During his/her turn, a player can choose either to 
fold, call or raise. If the player chooses to fold, he/she will be out of the game 
immediately. If the action is to call, the player will have to bet as much money as 
needed to match the highest stake from any of the other players at that point in the 
game. If the player chooses to raise, not only does he/she need to match the 
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highest stake, he/she also has to add an additional amount that is equivalent to that 
of a small bet to the highest stake, thereby creating a new highest stake. After this, 
the turn goes in a clockwise manner around the table. Betting will continue until 
everyone that is still in the game calls, which will then conclude this stage. It is to 
be noted that the stake can only be raised three times during each stage. 
 
• Flop 
The Flop stage commences after Preflop ends. In this stage, three community 
cards will be dealt and revealed faced up on the table. These are cards which any 
player can use to form combinations of five cards with the cards on their hands. 
Quality of the combinations is used to determine the winner at the end of the game. 
After the three cards are revealed, betting will resume with players that are still in 
the game taking turns to choose their actions. Beginning with the dealer, this will 
proceed clockwise just as in the Preflop. Also, betting will continue until everyone 
still in the game calls and the stakes can only be raised three times. 
 
• Turn 
In the Turn that comes after Flop, an additional community card will be dealt face 
up. Betting proceeds just as it was done in the previous two stages. In the Turn 
and the River, the raise amount is increased to the big bet amount. Each time a 
player raises, the raise has to be the amount equivalent to the big bet, instead of 
the small bet like in the previous stages. 
 
• River 
The River marks the last of the four stages where a final community card is dealt 
face up to bring the total number of community cards to five. The raise amount 
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remains fixed at the big bet amount and betting proceeds just as it was done in the 
previous three stages.  
 
• Showdown 
If there is only one player left after the end of the River, he/she will be the 
automatic winner of that round. Otherwise, a showdown stage will occur where all 
contending players take turn to reveal the two cards on their hands or choose to 
withdraw without revealing the cards (called “muck”). Players will form the best 
possible combination of five-cards with the community cards and his/her two 
cards. The combinations are ranked and the player with the best combination wins 
the round and all the money in the pot. In the event of a tie, pot winnings will be 
shared among all tied players. Figure 3.2 shows the various combinations in poker. 
For details on the ranking of combinations, refer to Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Name of poker card combinations 
 
3.2.2 Playing good poker 
 
Various forms of skills are required to master the game of poker. Some important 
ones include hand-strength evaluation, risk-rewards analysis, taking into account 
factors such as player position, bluffing, unpredictability and psychology.  
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• Hand-strength evaluation 
The most important skill in poker is the ability to evaluate the goodness of one’s 
cards. This informs a player of his chances of winning and subsequently helps him 
to decide on the action to take. Intuitively, a player should raise more often if his 
chances of winning is high to maximize winnings; and fold earlier if his chances 
of winning is low to minimize losses. 
 
• Risk-rewards analysis 
Despite occasions where a player’s chances of winning are not particularly good, 
he should also call and stay in the game when the amount in the pot is very large 
as compared to the amount he has to bet. For example, paying a small call amount 
of $2 to get a chance at winning a potential reward of $50 in the pot does justify a 
good risk to take despite having a low chance of winning. 
 
• Player position 
It is known that players at later positions have greater advantages than those at 
earlier positions, owing to their privilege of observing the actions of most players 
before making choices. Such information reveals how confident other players are 
of their chances of winning. It is to be noted that player position, however, plays a 
lesser role in games with fewer players. 
 
• Bluffing 
As poker is a game of imperfect information, not only does a player not know of 
his exact chance of winning, his opponents are equally uncertain as well. In order 
to maximize winnings, players will have to play on this fact. At times, they have 
to make the opponents believe that they have a better hand than what they actually 
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have, so as to trick them into folding. To be effective, the art of bluffing has to be 
executed with great caution and good timing. 
 
• Unpredictability 
Unpredictability is necessary to make it difficult for opponents to find weaknesses 
in a player. A player who plays predictably will be exploited by his opponents in 
no time. Thus, a good player is one who will vary his style of game play in order 
to prevent opponents from forming an accurate model of his strategy. 
 
• Psychology 
Finally, a right interpretation of the opponents’ psychological styles of game play 
is also crucial to play well in poker. An accurate opponent model, for instance, 
allows a player to predict his opponent’s actions and hence, achieve maximum 
winnings against him. 
 
3.3 Game theory of poker 
 
Poker is a sequential, stochastic, zero-sum game of imperfect information. To 
devise a good evolution model for developing strategies that play approximately 
at NE for a game of such nature, a good understanding of the game theoretic 
fundamentals is essential. 
 
3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium 
 
NE is defined as the state where no player stands to gain anything by changing 
his/her strategy unilaterally. In games of perfect information, pure strategies [112] 
are used to identify the NE. A pure strategy is one where every scenario that is 
represented in the strategy space corresponds to a single action which is always 
  48
performed with a probability of 1. In contrast, a mixed strategy is one where a 
player’s action to each scenario is determined by a probability distribution of all 
allowed actions. To achieve NE in games of imperfect information, players have 
to employ a mixed strategy. This can be reasoned via the following discussions. 
 
3.3.2 Illustration of game theory for poker 
 
As a full scale Texas Hold’em game is too complex to be solved theoretically, a 
simplified variation of poker is used in the following illustration. Consider a two 
players poker game which consists of only one stage and a betting round. At the 
start, each player will post $1 as blind. During his/her turn, the player can fold or 
call, but is not given any option to raise. If he calls, he pays an additional $1; if he 
folds, he is out of the game immediately. In this variation, there are only a total of 
three cards, numbered 1, 2 and 3 with a larger number value denoting a better card. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Game tree of simplified poker variant from player 1’s perspective 
Start 
1 3 2 
Player 1’s action 
3 2 Player 2’s card 3 1 2 1 
C F C F C F C F C F C F
Player 1’s card 





-1 -1 -1 -1 
-2 +1 +1 +1 -2 +1 +2 +1 +2 +1 +2 
C: Call F: Fold 
Pij: probability of player i calling when he has card j. 
Numbers in bold are the pay-offs of player 1. 
Pay-offs of player 2 are just the negative of player 1’s pay-offs. 
Dotted circles indicate ignorance of player 1, i.e. player does not know what card the opponent has. 
P11  P11 P13 P12 P12 P13 
P22  P22 P23 P23P21 P21
-1 
  49
Figure 3.3 shows the game tree of the simplified poker variation, where Pij is 
the probability that player i should call if he has card j. To achieve NE, all players 
must play the most possible way beneficial to themselves. From the game tree, it 
is observed that some actions are simply bad actions for player 2 e.g. calling when 
he has the card value 1. In some scenarios, it is also always good to call e.g. when 
the card value is 3. For player 1, it is always good to call if he has card 3. By 
observation, the solutions for 21p , 23p  and 13p  can be found to be 
021 =p ,  123 =p ,  113 =p  
The expected payoff, E for each player can be derived by using the Law of total 
probability as follows. 








































12222211 −++−= pppp                 (3.1) 








12222211 +−−−− pppp       (3.2) 
From (3.1), it is observed that the expected payoff maximization for player 1 is 
limited only to the adjustment of parameters 11p and 12p . As a larger 12p gives a 
larger E1, we can set 112 =p . This leaves us with only parameter 11p for player 1 
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whose value is to be determined. Likewise for player 2, value of parameter 22p  is 















2222112 +−−−= pppE                 (3.4) 
 
With equations (3.3) and (3.4), it is found that the expected payoff of either player 
is dependent on the strategy of the other player. As NE is a state where no player 



































            (3.6) 
 
Therefore, we have 
3
1
11 =p  and 3
1
22 =p .         (3.7) 
The mixed strategy at NE (which is also the optimal strategy essentially) is shown 
in Table 3.3: 
 
Table 3.3: Nash strategy for simplified poker 
Probability of calling 
Card value 1 2 3 
Player 1 1/3 1 1 
Player 1 called 0 1/3 1 Player 2 Player 1 folded NA NA NA 
 





21 =−= EE             (3.8) 
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3.3.3 Discussion on calculated results 
 
From the calculated results obtained through game theoretic analysis in section 
3.3.2, several observations can be made. Firstly, to achieve NE in the context for 
full scale poker, decision making must be modeled by a mixed strategy e.g. a 
probability triplet which uses separate probabilities to denote the tendencies to 
fold, call and raise. As a strategy consists of a set of rules for all decision nodes in 
a game tree and that a node is reached only via traversing branches, information 
that reflects the node which the game is currently on is necessary for a player to 
attain NE. Information that needs to be supplied to players are the cards (on both 
hand and community table) and history of opponent’s and player’s actions. 
Secondly, it can be seen that there are three types of strategies in zero-sum 
games. NE or optimal strategies are those which will not lose nor exploit the 
weaknesses of other strategies. Intransitive strategies, in contrast, are those which 
are likely to draw with optimal strategies, but are not optimal themselves. They 
tend to beat some strategies by huge margins but are in turn counter-able by some 
other strategies. For instance, strategy )1,1,1( 131211 === ppp will achieve the same 
expected payoff E1 )9
1( −= as the optimal strategy )1,1,
3
1( 131211 === ppp if player 
2 is also playing his optimal strategy )1,
3
1,0( 232221 === ppp . However, if player 
2 changes his strategy to )1,1,0( 232221 === ppp , player 1’s pay-off will become 
3
1
1 −=E , which is worse; indicating that player 1’s strategy is counter-able in this 
case. Poor strategies are those that will lose to the optimal strategies and probably 
also those of other types as well. An example of such a strategy is given by 
)0,0,1( 131211 === ppp . These observations will help us to identify key features 
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to look out for when designing the co-evolutionary model. The model will need to 
be able to eliminate all poor strategies and discern the optimal strategy from those 
equally competent but exploitable ones e.g. intransitive strategies. 
 
3.4 Designing the game engine 
 
Several objects are necessary for the design of a poker game engine. They are the 
card, deck, player, a poker game, player AI, odds calculator and a Graphic User 
Interface (GUI).  
 
3.4.1 Basic game elements 
 
The card is an object that consists of a face value (A, K, Q, J, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 
2) of type integer and a suit of self-defined type (♠, ♣, ♥, ♦). An integer called the 
value is also included which is an enumeration of the face value and suit. A deck 
consists of an array of card objects in a particular arrangement. The deck needs to 
supply the function to shuffle the deck and to deal a card from the top of the deck. 
The player is an object that contains a hand of two cards, the player’s status 
(playing, folded, etc.), amount of money, fitness, name, A.I. type, history, etc. The 
player object needs to provide the functions to draw a card from the deck and to 
make a decision. A poker game object will handle all proceedings of the poker 
game. It contains a deck object, a number of player objects equal to the defined 
number of players, the pot amount, the bet amount and community cards. It needs 
to provide functions to start the round and to retrieve the winner of the round. 
Finally, a player AI object is a decision making model for the player. A player, if 
initialized with a particular AI object, will invoke a decision making function 
from its AI class whenever it needs to take an action. For an evolving AI, the AI 
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object will also need to receive feedback from the poker game so as to implement 
evolutionary procedures. Upon completion of the design for the various elements, 
the program was coded with Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 Express Edition. 
 
3.4.2 The odds calculator 
 
The odds calculator is an important component for the implementation of AI as far 
as poker is concerned. It is used to calculate a player’s chances of winning if the 
player is to reach showdown stage with the current objective information available. 
This encompasses information about the cards in the player’s hand, community 
cards, game stage and number of players. The calculator will transform the above 
information into a probability value from 0 to 1, whose magnitude represents the 
player’s chance of winning. With such means, a computer player will be able to 
interpret pieces of complex information. Due to its high usage, it is crucial to write 
an efficient odds calculator.  
In terms of the actual implementation, a separate odds calculator is written 
for each stage of the game. This is due to different number of community cards at 
different stages of the game. In the Preflop stage, online calculation of odds is 
very intensive as very few cards are revealed. This would also mean that there are 
as much as 169 possible combinations which each player could have. Calculation 
through the enumeration technique is thus performed outside the program and the 
results are then hard-coded. When a player calls the Preflop odds calculator, a 
binary search is performed to find the odds corresponding to its hand cards from 
the table of odds. In the Flop stage, it is difficult to attain optimum memory-speed 
trade-off as pure online calculation is too slow and pure look-up table is too large. 
A mixture of the two techniques is used. For the turn and river stages, pure online 
calculation is used due to relatively faster computation. 
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3.4.3 Graphical User Interface 
 
A GUI was also developed for the game engine. Its primary purpose is to test and 
debug the program. As poker is a game that is visual in nature, having a GUI also 
makes it much simpler to detect and debug errors. When the program first starts, it 
will appear as in Figure 3.4, with three buttons - run, pause and step. Initially, 
pause is disabled. When run is clicked, the simulation starts and proceeds without 
interruption. Once the simulation is running, pause becomes clickable. If pause is 
clicked, simulation pauses (Figure 3.5) and the current game state e.g. generation, 
round of this generation, cards etc is displayed. The step button can be clicked 
when the simulation is paused to advance the simulation by one event, such as 
when the player performs the action “call”. With the completion of GUI, extensive 
testing was done on the game engine to ensure that it works correctly, efficiently 
and without errors using debugger program provided in Visual C++. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Initial state of the GUI 
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  Figure 3.5: The GUI at a paused simulation 
 
3.5 The co-evolutionary model 
 
With game theory providing the necessary guidelines, a co-evolutionary model – 
one where all the candidates play against and reproduce with one another after 
every round-robin tournament is formulated to evolve strategies that play close to 
the NE. In a round of tournament, each candidate in the population of 100 will 
play against every other for 100 rounds of poker so that individual fitness can be 
evaluated. Though a mere 100 rounds is considered small for eliminating the luck 
element in a game of chance like poker, a necessary trade-off is needed to reduce 
overall computational complexity. After fitness assessment, candidates are sorted 
according to their fitness levels. The top 10% are cloned and replicated in the next 
generation (Elitism). The remaining population is filled up with off-spring created 
from the current generation via a sequential process of selection, crossover and 
mutation. Selection is done using tournament selection, where pairs of candidates 
are randomly picked from the parent population of which the fitter in each pair is 
chosen to reproduce. From the pool of selected individuals, genetic variation is 
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introduced. In crossover, two randomly selected individuals will exchange traits 
such that the off-spring’s genes – which comprises of a number pair {fold, raise} 
thresholds, will be chosen from one of its parents with a 50-50 probability. After 
crossover, each gene is mutated with a 20% probability. If mutation does occur, a 
normally distributed random number with mean equal to the original value and 
standard deviation equal to 0.1 will be generated to replace the old raise and fold 
threshold values of that gene. A generation is deemed to have elapsed in the 
evolution sense whenever a new population of offspring is formed. 
 
3.5.1 Strategy model and chromosomal representation 
 
In Section 3.3, it is known from game theory that the history of players’ actions 
and their cards are two crucial pieces of information supplied to candidates. The 
ability to process such information becomes imperative for the candidates to make 
effective decisions. As both information types can well assume numerous values, 
it is practically impossible to consider all possibilities. Abstractions of information 
will have to be used instead. In the design of such abstractions, the ease of human 
interpretation is to be taken into consideration as well.  
To abstract the card combinations, the hand strength (HS) which reflects the 
likelihood of winning with the cards on hand is used. This ranges from 0 to 1 and 
is computed using the odds calculator as described earlier. In contrast to HS, the 
history of actions is a very complex piece of information, which represents the 
sequence of events from the start of game to a player’s turn, right down to every 
single detail. To make appropriate abstraction, some standard poker information 
such as the player’s position in the game, total raise (TR) and the fraction of raise 
made by the opponent e.g. opponent’s raise (OR) are used. As the poker variant 
used is for two players, a player’s position is not extremely vital and is discarded 
  57
to reduce the data size. Conversely, both TR and OR abstract, to a certain extent, 
information on the branches of the game tree that the game is currently moving on. 
Moreover, both pieces of information are also fairly interpretable by humans. In 
typical games played amongst human players, TR actually determines the pot size. 
The larger the pot, the more likely players will call than raise. OR can be used to 
determine how confident the opponent is of his chance of winning. The higher the 
value, the more likely a player should fold. Via the above information abstractions, 
a strategy model can then be formulated (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Strategy structure for Preflop/Flop 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Strategy structure for Turn/River 
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Multi-dimensional arrays are used to represent the structure of strategies in 
the model. HS and OR are divided into three equal intervals - low, medium and 
high. As the raise amount during Preflop and Flop (e.g. $2) is different from that 
during the Turn and River (e.g. $4), distinct structures are used. Intervals for TR 
are not evenly distributed as TR is more often low than high in a game of poker. 
The intervals are thus made smaller at the low end but greater at the high end to 
ensure that all slots will be looked-up in a more evenly fashion. TR is divided into 
two intervals - low and high in Preflop and Flop stages; and three intervals - low, 
medium and high for the postflop stages. Decision making is based on probability 
triplets in order to implement a similar optimal strategy as discussed in Section 3.3. 
In each slot, there are two numbers which represent the fold and raise thresholds 
respectively, of which, the prior is always smaller than the latter. In totality, the 
array size for Preflop and Flop is 36 and that for Turn and River is 54. 
Whenever a candidate is required to make any decision, it looks up his 3-D 
strategy table for the slot that contains the intervals which matches its HS, OR and 
TR. It then generates a random number from the uniform distribution U [0,1] and 
compare it with the fold and raise thresholds. The candidate folds if the number is 
smaller than the fold threshold, calls if it is between both thresholds and raises if 
otherwise. All fold and raise threshold values are randomly initialized at the start 
of simulation and subjected to changes during the course of evolution. 
 
3.5.2 Fitness criterion 
 
A fitness criterion is proposed to evaluate a candidate’s goodness using guidelines 
from the game theoretic analysis in Section 3.3. Every candidate starts off with 
zero fitness and after every 100 rounds of game play between a candidate pair, 
fitness of each candidate in the pair is updated. The candidate who lost will have 
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its fitness reduced while the one who won will have its fitness left unchanged. 
Reduction in the loser’s fitness is set to be the square of the amount of money it 









WUiF  (3.9) 
 
where Fi is the fitness of candidate i, 
           N is the total number of candidates, 











In this way, conditions necessary to achieve NE could be satisfied. Though 
an optimal player will not lose and has practically no weakness, it could well still 
lose within a mere span of 100 rounds owing to bad luck, though not by much. To 
distinguish these players from those that will lose exceptionally heavily to certain 
strategies, square of the money lost, rather than just the money lost is deducted if a 
player loses. This ensures that candidates with weaknesses are penalized heavily 
whilst those who lost due to bad hands are not penalized as much. In conjunction, 
as the optimal strategy is not meant to be a counter to any specific strategy, the 
amount of money that the winner wins is not added to its fitness. This prevents a 
player who is only good in beating certain players from having its fitness pumped 
up when it meets opponents that are vulnerable to exploitation by its strategy. 
This above is best verified by an example scenario. Let A denotes candidates 
that play with near-optimal strategies. Let B denotes candidates that draw with A 
but are very good against some other candidates and also has weaknesses against 
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others. Let C refers to players that are simply poor. In a population consisting of A, 
B and C, A will beat C and draw with B such that candidates of A will have 
fitness approximately equal to zero. Although B will beat C and also draw with A, 
some candidates from B will exploit others from B as well. Though the exploiter 
wins lots of money, its fitness is not increased as winnings are not added. The 
exploited, however, suffer a heavy drop in fitness due to a reduction in the square 
magnitude. Overall, fitness in order of the highest to lowest will be A, B and C. 
 
3.6 Preliminary study 
 
In this section, a preliminary study is conducted to verify the correctness of the 
proposed co-evolutionary model. In particular, the model is adjusted and applied 
to the simplified poker variant that is defined in Section 3.3. At the same time, 
several fitness criteria are also tested in order to determine the one which is most 
suitable for obtaining the NE. 
 
3.6.1 Strategy model for simplified poker 
 
The strategy model for the preliminary study consists of a two dimensional array, 
with one dimension denoting the card (1, 2 or 3) and the other representing the 
position (1st or 2nd). Inside each element, there is a real number between 0 and 1 
denoting the fold threshold (Figure 3.8). Whenever a player makes a decision, a 
random number is generated in the range 0 to 1. The player will fold if the number 
is smaller than the fold threshold and call if otherwise. With tournament and co-
evolutionary settings kept unchanged, several distinct fitness criteria are tested to 
examine their effects on the behavior of strategies which emerged. Comparison is 





Figure 3.8: Strategy array of the strategy model for the simplified poker 
 
 
3.6.2 Fitness criterion equivalent to winnings 
 
The first fitness criterion to be tested is one where the winnings of a poker player 








     (3.11) 
 
With this criterion, it is hypothesized that intransitivity will play a major role 
as a player with higher winnings will most likely be one who is able to counter the 
strategies of others. The experiment was carried out with a population of 100 and 
the following results are obtained after 500 generations (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). 
The figures depict plots of fold thresholds of the winners in each generation. As 
expected, 12f and 13f are 0, implying that a player holding card 2 or 3 at position 1 
should call with probability 1. In accordance to theoretical calculations in Section 
3.3, 21f and 23f are also found to be 1 and 0 respectively. 
 
Figure 3.9: Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 1, fitness criterion 1. 
11f  12f  13f  
21f  22f  23f  
Card value 
Position 











However, the values of interest e.g. 11f  and 22f  tend to exhibit fluctuating 
behavior as shown in Figure 3.11. From comparison, it is observed that both plots 
track one another closely. As 11f  increases, 22f  also increases several generations 
later, and as 11f  decreases, 22f  decreases likewise within the next few generations. 
This highlights the intransitive nature of poker. The average variance of 11f  from 
generation 400 to 500 is 0.065341 while that of 22f  is 0.066685. Also of interest is 
the mean of fluctuations - 0.66829 for 11f  and 0.59689 and 22f . These values are 
rather close to the calculated optimal strategy of 0.6666 and 0.6666 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Comparison of plots of 11f and 22f . 
 
3.6.3 Fitness criterion excluding winnings and deducting the 
squares of losses 
 
The second fitness criterion to be tested is the one originally proposed during the 


















The results, after 500 generations are shown in Figures 3.12 and 3.13. The values 
of 12f , 13f , 21f and 23f  are similar to those of the previous fitness criterion. Although 
signs of intransitivity are still observed, the fluctuations are of smaller magnitude 
this time. The average variances of 11f  and 22f  from generation 400 to 500 are also 
smaller at 0.037467 and 0.034844, implying that this fitness criterion does reduce 
the intransitivity element of the co-evolutionary process. Mean of 11f  is 0.67425 








Figure 3.13: Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 2, fitness criterion 2. 
 
 
3.6.4 Fitness criterion with higher power 
 
Due to encouraging signs from the previous fitness criterion, one of even higher 









WUiF         (3.13) 
Results after 500 generations are shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. The magnitude 
of fluctuations is further reduced, but only insignificantly. Average variances of 
11f  and 22f are 0.028717 and 0.024055. Their means are 0.67205 and 0.73729. 
 
 




Figure 3.15: Plot of fold thresholds of winner in each generation for position 2, fitness criterion 3. 
 
3.6.5 Discussion on preliminary findings 
 
As far as reduction of intransitivity in the co-evolutionary process is of concerned, 
it is found that the criterion where the fitness level is determined by the power of 
losses is better than the criterion where fitness is equated with winnings. On a side 
note, it is also found that higher power leads to greater reduction in the fluctuation 
magnitude. However, this reduction is inconsequential if compared to the amount 
of complexity that is introduced. Considering all factors, the originally proposed 
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fitness criterion with the power of two will be used for the subsequent simulation 
studies. Finally, it can be deduced that it is still possible to obtain optimal values 
for 11f  and 22f  by finding the average of fluctuations after many generations. 
 
3.7 Simulation results 
 
Upon confirmation from preliminary studies, the experiment is conducted on full 
scale Texas Hold’em using the game engine and co-evolutionary model defined as 
before. 271 generations are simulated on a shared server with two Xeon dual-core 
3.0GHz processors and 8GB memory. An attempt is made to actualize the Nash 
optimal strategy by averaging all winner strategies in the last 100 generations. The 
analysis of behavioral outcomes is presented in the ensuing subsections. 
 
3.7.1 Verification of results 
 
To verify the functionality of CEAs, some straight forward results are examined. 
From Figure 3.16, it can be observed that thresholds for high OR, low TR and low 
HS increases as the generation advances, indicating that it is best to fold in these 
situations, which is expected. If OR is high, the opponent is confident of winning. 
If TR is low, the reward for taking the risk of betting is poor. When HS is low, the 
chance of winning is bad. Combining all factors, we observe that CEA is accurate 
by folding in this situation. With high HS and zero TR, both thresholds decrease 
as the generation advances (Figure 3.17). This indicates that it is always desirable 
to raise in this situation. This is logically sound as a player with good HS would 
want to maximize its own winnings. With zero TR, the winning is very little and 
can only be maximized by raising the bet. 
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Figure 3.16:  Plot of fold and raise thresholds against generation when “Opponent Raise is high, 




Figure 3.17: Plot of fold and raise threshold against generation when “Total raise is 0 and Hand 
strength is high” for Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River (right). 
 
When TR is high, a player would want to call even if its chance of winning is low, 
as the amount that it could potentially win is worth the risk. However, the player 
would not want to raise in this situation to avoid losing even more. The strategy 
which is evolved by CEA also derives this accurately as seen from plots in Figure 
3.18 e.g. a high raise threshold coupled with a low fold threshold signify that the 
player should call. It is to be noted that fluctuations can also be seen. This is most 
likely due to the uncertainty in the nature of this risk and the intransitivity factor.  
 
   
Figure 3.18: Plot of fold and raise threshold against generation when “High opponent raise, high 
total raise and low hand strength” for Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River (right). 
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The above results certify the credibility of the co-evolutionary model; that the 
population gets better as generation elapses. The next subsection will attempt to 
analyze and explore insights of the evolved CEA strategy. 
 
3.7.2 Analysis of the evolved CEA strategy 
 
After 271 generations, a final strategy is determined by finding mean thresholds of 
winners in the last 100 generations. This evolved strategy is then analyzed. When 
TR is 0 e.g. a player first starts off a round, his decision is made primarily using 
the HS information. As of Figure 3.19, the strategy proposes unequivocal usage of 
fold and raise for low and high HS respectively in all stages - as shown by similar 
fold and raise threshold values. For a medium HS, differences in threshold values 





































Figure 3.19: Plot of threshold value against hand strength for Preflop/Flop (left) and Turn/River 
(right). Dotted line: raise threshold. Solid line: fold threshold. 
 
In the Preflop/Flop, the player alternates between calling and raise periodically 
since the probability of winning or acquiring a high HS in the subsequent stages, 
conditioned on a medium HS, is rather high. Such behavior could be spurred by a 
desire to boost the value of the empty pot. In contrast, winning in the Turn/River 
is mostly conditioned on having a high HS as much of the game would have been 
decided - most community cards are revealed by then. Based on independent use 
of HS information, it is intuitive that a player with medium HS and diminished 
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chance of winning should call if not fold, rather than raise, especially if the worth 
of the pot is not worth the effort to raise the bet 
Apart from the above, a myriad of other scenarios with various levels {low, 
med, high} of OR and TR are also explored in both the Preflop/Flop (Figures 3.20 
to 3.23) and Turn/River (Figures 3.24 to 3.29) stages. Strategy plots of threshold 
values against HS are shown below. A particular setting e.g. “OR is low and TR is 
med” is represented by a unique pair of lines where the higher and lower lines 
denote the raise and fold thresholds respectively. Pairs of lines that correspond to 
different settings are distinguished by dotted, solid or dashed lines. 
From the collection of figures, it is observed that the addition of information 
like OR and TR to HS in the decision making process allows the CEA to evolve a 
multitude of strategy variants that exhibit much greater complexity when it comes 
to deciding whether to fold, call or raise in different situations. Unlike the case 
where TR is 0, it is no longer simply about folding if HS is low and raising if HS 
is high. Nonetheless, certain traits do remain unchanged in the considerably more 
sophisticated strategies. For instance, fold thresholds in all scenarios consistently 
display a decreasing trend as HS improves, indicating that the evolved strategy 
invariably folds less often as long as it acquires better chances of winning in any 
fixed scenario. The raise thresholds, on the other hand, undergo erratic variations 
across different scenarios e.g. the improvement in HS does not always entail a 
progressive decline in the raise threshold (Figure 3.23) and are apparently not 
correlated to any one decision information. Such irregularities would suggest that 
raising in poker is a decision that is complex to make in nature. Further insights 
into the behavioral aspects of the evolved strategy can be gained by analyzing its 
traits under different game stages. 
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3.7.2.1 Preflop/Flop strategies 
 
It is observed that the strategy almost never folds as long as it has acquired at least 
a medium HS during Preflop/Flop, regardless of OR and TR. This “Call and see” 
nature – as a majority of scenarios in Preflop/Flop proposes calling with a medium 
HS, spans from great optimism towards a possibility of achieving an even better 
hand in future stages. Such view is unshaken even in disadvantageous situations 
where the opponent is perceived as having better chances of winning or when the 
pot size is just too low for fruitful contention. For low TR, strategies across all OR 
values generally behave in tandem to HS, similarly to the results observed when 
TR is 0 - {fold, call, raise} for {low, med, high} HS respectively. The only minor 
deviation occurs when OR is low - since the opponent is perceived to have a low 
chance of winning (Figure 3.22). Given a low HS, the evolved strategy justifies an 
action to call instead of fold as there is an equally probable chance of winning.  
For high TR, the evolved strategy almost never folds in the face of a pot 
with potentially huge winnings. This is true across all possible combinations of 
HS and OR values. Another interesting point which is observable from the raise 
threshold is bluffing. For med OR, the evolved strategy tends to raise very often 
even if HS is low (Figure 3.23) - indicative of an attempt to bluff. However, such 
behavior is absent for the equivalent scenario when TR is low, since only a high 
TR warrants justification for taking the calculated risk of attempting to “scare” the 
opponent into folding with a raise. For high OR, the tendency to raise is greatly 
diminished at low HS in view of the larger perceived disparity in HS between the 
player and opponent as compared to med OR. From another perspective, the high 
possibility that the opponent will match up to any potential raise, owing to high 
confidence in his cards also deters the player from raising and risking a likelihood 
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of incurring more loses by doing so. In view of the large pot value, the player 
adopts a “Call and see” attitude instead of fold. The raise behavior is nonetheless 
shifted rightwards instead and exhibited for med HS. This signifies that the player 
is willing to adopt a bluff strategy only if his HS is not perceived to be too far off 
from his opponent’s. This will at least give the player a fair chance of winning in 
the event that the opponent did not fall for the bluff. When the player has high HS, 
the proposed strategy is to call and follow the opponent’s bet without signaling his 
confidence or weakness by raising or folding. This is similar for a player with med 
HS under med OR. The underlying stance is to get the opponent into subsequent 
stages before deciding whether to challenge him aggressively to the game. 
From Figures 3.20 and 3.21, it is observed that fold thresholds are generally 
lower if TR is higher, indicating that a player folds less frequent given a larger pot 
of potential winnings. No obvious relation of OR with the thresholds is observable 
when TR is low as bluff is triggered only if TR is high. This suggests that TR is 
more dominant than OR as a factor for triggering bluff. Once bluff is in place, it is 




















Figure 3.23: Plots of thresholds against hand strength for Preflop/Flop and high TR. 
 
 
3.7.2.2 Turn/River strategies 
 
As the game proceeds into the Turn/River, the evolved strategies generally exhibit 
behavioral traits which are rather different from those in the Preflop/Flop. Such 
change is largely due to the huge reduction in the game’s overall uncertainty since 
the opening of three community cards after the Flop and an additional one on the 
Turn. It is clear that the prior conviction of not folding with at least a medium HS 
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remains true only when TR is at least med during the “Turn/River”. Unlike the 
Preflop/Flop, however, a high HS is now strictly required to pursue a strategy of 
non-folding that is independent of OR and TR; since it gets increasingly harder for 
a player to alter his chances of winning when only one or no card is left to be dealt. 
As observed, HS is no longer the sole factor that affects decision making if there 
is only a fair chance of winning e.g. med HS. In such cases, it would make ample 
sense to proceed on with the game only when the rewards of the venture are worth 
the risks which the player has to undertake.  
Apart from TR, the decision making process in the Turn/River is also greatly 
affected by OR. As seen, the strategy almost never folds if OR is low, regardless 
of HS and TR (Figure 3.24). As it is improbable that the player’s hand quality will 
undergo major changes upon uncovering another community card, the likelihood 
of winning is largely determined by the opponent’s HS. This is inferred indirectly 
from the OR information which reflects the opponent’s confidence and chances of 
winning. A low OR signifies a heightened chance to win irrespective of a player’s 
current HS, which justify a strong tendency to carry on with the game. Another 
interesting behavior which is identified is the fact that the strategy always raises 
strongly if “OR is high and HS is high”, regardless of TR (Figure 3.26). This is 
different from Preflop/Flop where the strategy will tend to bluff by calling in the 
same scenario if TR is high. Given that the showdown stage is drawing nearer, the 
evolved strategy finds it beneficial to signal his true HS rather than concealing it. 
The reason for such a move is that the strategy would want to raise aggressively as 
a final attempt to deter the opponent with high OR from continuing the game. This 
move might at the same time also trick an opponent who is bluffing with a high 
raising history into folding.  
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When TR is low, the player’s decision is equally affected by both HS and 
OR, unlike the equivalent scenario in Preflop/Flop where HS exerts predominant 
effect. In general but with exception of “OR is med and HS is med”, the evolved 
strategy tends to raise if the player’s HS is higher or on par with OR and fold if 
otherwise. This shows that a relative comparison of the winning chances is crucial 
for decision making. As seen from a tendency to call under equivalent scenarios of 
med and high TR, the exception is due to the player’s unwillingness to risk losing 
more over a pot with low potential winnings. Exploring further, the strategy raises 
very often when OR is low. This presents an interesting emergent behavior which 
depicts that the strategy has a tendency to raise as long as the opponent’s chances 
of winning is perceived to be low (Figure 3.27). Whilst the desire to raise for med 
or high HS is justified as an action to boost the low pot value and acquire more 
winnings from the relatively weaker opponent, the same action clearly also has an 
ubiquitous element of bluff in the case of a low HS. By raising on a low HS, the 
player in fact tries to conceal his weak HS position by creating a confident image, 
in the hope of misleading the weak opponent to believe that the player has a good 
HS. The opponent, who in fact has comparable HS, might just be tricked to fold 
on account of the perceived image and a low pot size that is not worth to vie for.  
However, the CEA does not find it desirable to attempt such bluff for med 
and high OR due to anticipation that the opponent might easily match the raise. 
This is shown by the large tendency to fold. Apart from low OR, the strategy also 
raises very often when HS is high (Figure 3.27). The motivation behind such a 
raise is however very different from bluffing as the player is actually revealing his 
true position and relative confidence indirectly and using it as the basis to scare 
the opponent into folding. Overall, there are considerably more raises when TR is 
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low as the strategy figures that it is not likely to lose much from raising, judging 
from the low contributions which it has made to the pot thus far. In addition, the 
potential winnings can certainly be increased by raising. 
When TR is med, the tendency to raise when OR is low is weakened and the 
strategy calls more frequently in anticipation that the opponent will be tempted to 
match up to any raise on account of the higher pot value. Though the dominant 
strategy is still to fold when HS is low for OR is med or high (as in TR is low), the 
proposed action for a combination of HS is med and the same OR values is to call. 
In response to a higher pot size, the strategy is now willing to call more frequently 
for situations where its HS is on par (“OR is med and HS is med”) or even lower 
(“OR is high and HS is med”) than its opponent’s perceived chance of winning. 
With an even higher TR (e.g. TR is high), the temptation of calling against an 
opponent with higher chances of winning is further extended at HS is med, turning 
the tendency to call into a raise. Although the strategy still raises often when HS is 
high, another situation of bluff is detected when OR is med and HS is high (Figure 
3.28). As opposed to the previous bluff position when “TR is low, HS is low and 
OR is low”, the strategy attempts to conceal its high HS by simply calling. The 
idea is to lead the opponent with OR is med into the subsequent stages or even the 
showdown, so that higher winnings can be reaped eventually. With TR increasing 
to high for high HS, such deceptive behavior of calling against a weaker opponent 
of med OR continues to dominate, and with even higher probability.    
When TR is high, the proposed action is rather uncertain at HS is low, as 
seen from the close probabilities for fold, call and raise. This dilemma is probably 
due to conflicts between the rational action of folding against an opponent with 
higher OR on one hand and opposing action of calling on the game in view of the 
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large amount that has been contributed to the pot thus far. As opposed to the “OR 
is med and HS is low” scenario in Preflop/Flop where the temptation of a high TR 
induces the strategy to attempt bluff by raising, this is no longer so for Turn/River. 
This is because the opponent will tend to fold less often on account of the larger 
personal contribution and potential winnings that are at stake. However, consistent 
with Preflop/Flop, fold thresholds are generally lower if TR is high (Figure 3.29), 
indicating that a player folds less frequent given a larger pot of potential winnings.  
On the whole, the Turn/River entails more complex strategy combinations 
for different scenarios as compared to Preflop/Flop. With more certainty revealed, 
strategies no longer adopt the “Call and see” approach” by postponing concrete 
decision making to the future but are more cautious in their decisions to fold, call, 
raise or even bluff. In combination, the pot’s worth, opponent’s perceived chances 
of winning, the player’s HS etc all exert crucial impact on the decision making 
process as the game draws nearer to the showdown. 
 
 



























The strategies that were evolved by the CEA were benchmarked against the poker 
A.I.s from the University of Alberta, namely PSOpti and Poki. PSOpti is a poker 
playing agent which specializes in two-player Texas Hold’em. By formulating its 
strategy using a pseudo-optimal game-theoretic approach [107] that is non-
exploitive, PSOpti plays close to NE. Poki, on the other hand, is an agent which 
specializes in multi-player Texas Hold’em and employs opponent modeling [101] 
– [103] during game play. As a means of comparison, the evolved CEA player 
(named Evobot) was setup to play against PSOpti for a game lasting 2000 rounds 
after every generation of evolution. Figure 3.30 shows the resultant winning trace 
of Evobot across generation. The unit of winnings used is the small bet per hand 
(sb/h), calculated by dividing the money won by the small bet amount, which is $2 
in the program, by the number of rounds played e.g. 2000. From the plot, it is 
apparent that Evobot improves its overall performance and narrows the inter-
strategy score margin as the generation advances. Relative to PSOpti, performance 
of Evobot is slightly lower owing to the mere 3 by 3 by 5 array that was used to 
represent the strategy chromosome. This is a foreseeable outcome as it is unlikely 
for any optimum strategy that surpasses PSOpti, if there is really one; to be fully 
represented within the bounds of the much constrained data structure. Attempts to 
improve performance by increasing the structure size is greatly hindered by huge 
computational space and time that are involved in the poker simulation. Even so, 
close eventual performance of Evobot to PSOpti is, nonetheless, an indicator that 









Evobot was also setup to play against Poki after every five generations, with 
each game lasting 4000 rounds. Despite higher starting losses (Figure 3.31), the 
performance of Evobot is almost on par and only trails behind slightly. As in the 
winnings trace against PSOpti, losses of Evobot decrease as generation advances. 
Results signify that CEA is able to evolve strategies which are similarly adaptable 




Figure 3.31: Winnings of Evobot vs. Poki against generation of evolution. 
 
 
The evolved Nash optimal player is then played against both PSOpti and 
Poki for 10000 rounds each. Table 3.4 shows the overall winnings of the final 
average strategy. Though lower, the performance of Evobot is comparable to both 
its opponents. As a benchmark of comparison, it is known that a player who folds 
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every single hand will win by -0.75 sb/h. It is also found that a player who always 
call when playing against PSOpti and Poki respectively scores {-0.505, -0.537} 
sb/h while one who always raise scores a corresponding {-0.319, -2.285} sb/h 
[107]. In relative terms, Evobot’s respective performance of {-0.2296, -0.1670} 
sb/h is significantly higher than the performance of these generic strategies. In fact, 
it is far from being bad when one considers the search limitations that are imposed 
by the constrained strategy structure on the CEA. 
 
Table 3.4: Winnings of Evobot and several conventional strategies against PSOpti and Poki 
 PSOpti Poki 
Evobot -0.2296 sb/h -0.1670 sb/h 
Always Fold -0.75 sb/h -0.75 sb/h 
Always Call -0.505 sb/h -0.537 sb/h 




Figure 3.32 shows the plot of the time taken against generation. At the start of 
simulation, the time taken to complete all the games in one generation is relatively 
small. This is largely due to the random strategies that the candidates tend to adopt. 
As more generations elapse, the candidates start to adopt better strategies which 
inevitably cause a typical game to last much longer. The time taken per generation 
eventually stabilizes at around 9000 seconds. At this rate, it takes approximately 
27 days to reach 271 generations where the evolution process stabilizes. This 
constitutes a limitation as to why a large data structure is not used to represent 
strategies. Despite the fairly long process time that is taken to evolve competent 
strategies which is typical for games of such nature, it is to be noted that no expert 
knowledge e.g. opponent modeling, is injected at all throughout the entire process 
of evolution. This is perhaps one aspect that the CEA can value-add to the existing 









This chapter demonstrated the possibility of applying CEAs to the development of 
a competitive computer poker player that specialized in Texas Hold’em. Game 
theory was first applied to analyze a simplified version of the game. Knowledge 
gained from the analysis was used as guidelines to design a co-evolutionary model 
for the purpose of achieving strategies that play at NE. From analysis, the player 
that was evolved by CEA not only displayed strategies that are logical, but also 
reveal insights that are not easily comprehensible. Some of these insights include 
bluffing indicators. An attempt to attain the Nash optimal strategy was made by 
finding the average of strategies from generation 172 to 271. This strategy, named 
Evobot, was benchmarked against existing poker A.I.s PSOpti and Poki. Despite 
the much constrained representation for the strategy chromosome, differences in 
score margins between Evobot and the opponents were low, signifying that CEAs 
are good at exploiting the structure of the problem to attain near NE solutions. 
Though CEA tends to take a fairly long time to evolve a stable strategy, no expert 
knowledge is required at all throughout the entire evolution process. CEA is able 
to adapt and develop good strategies by simply playing continuously over time. 
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Chapter 4 
Adaptation of IPD strategies 
 
Apart from its application in games like poker, game theory is widely used to 
study interaction in many social contexts. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) 
[4], in particular, is an abstract mathematical game that is widely used to model 
numerous aspects of behavioral interaction in reality, when conflicts of interest 
arise between two or more groups of entities. Though conceptually simple, this 
classical problem in game theory presents a useful tool to study human behavior 
in various social settings and has contributed insights to areas like engineering, 
science, economics, analysis of social network structures [113] and psychology.  
To this note, CEAs, apart from the ability to evolve poker strategies which 
perform close to Nash optimality, presents a useful tool for finding good strategies 
and observing interactions in the study of IPD as well. Adding on to contributions 
made in this realm of discipline, the core issue considered in this chapter pertains 
to the adaptation of IPD strategies to different environments. Existing works had 
showed that evolutionary schemes are highly successful in discovering effective 
adaptation methods to rich situations [114] – the evolved strategies adapt well to 
specific environmental settings and are capable of defending against defectors and 
cooperating with cooperators [89], [115], [116]. While most works are concerned 
with the generalization ability of evolved strategies [117], the focus of this chapter 
is on the adaptability of evolved strategies to diverse environmental setups. 
Learning, similar to evolution, is another paradigm that is extensively used 
to adapt strategies in many game theoretic problems [93], [118], [119]. According 
to Hingston and Kendall [120], it is crucial for creating adaptive IPD strategies 
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which thrive well in competitive settings by exploiting non-adaptive strategies. 
Learning presents a scenario similar to one where knowledge accumulated from 
the past rounds of game play is used by IPD players in future. As the pattern of 
decision making is rarely constant [121] but highly dependent on the environment 
and complex interaction among competing strategies, adaptation is important to 
ensure good performance. Although evolution facilitates information exchange 
between strategies, it is limited by poor exploitation abilities. Creation of new 
individuals is more of a trial and error process [122], which often produces naïve 
strategies upon convergence. Learning, on the other hand, causes large variance in 
performance among strategies as a result of the diverse learning experiences [123] 
and is also prone to premature convergence [124]; although it allows strategies to 
make spontaneous decisions as the environment changes. 
In view of the above, this chapter considers the development of a memetic 
adaptation framework [125] for IPD strategies to exploit complementary features 
of evolution via a CEA; and learning via a double-loop incremental learning (IL) 
methodology that incorporates classification, probabilistic update of strategies and 
a feedback learning process. Despite the widespread use of memetic adaptation in 
optimization [126] - [129], little work has been done to illustrate its applicability 
to IPD. Combining the two forms of adaptation schemes introduces a fair degree 
of realism, especially when it is used to model the behavioral aspects of players. 
Simulation is performed for us to gain insights into the complexity and intricacies 
of interaction between evolution and IL; and in the process demonstrates how 
adaptive strategies are created via the memetic scheme.  
Organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.1 presents an overview 
of IPD and Section 4.2 formally introduces the adaptation models. Section 4.3 
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presents the proposed IL methodology. Section 4.4 highlights the implementation 
details of adaptation strategies while Section 4.5 describes the simulation tests and 
evaluates strategy performance via a series of case studies. Section 4.6 concludes 
the chapter with a summary of discussions on the simulated results and also areas 
where future work can be embarked on. 
 
4.1 Background study 
 
The IPD is a classical game-theoretic [93] problem which encompasses the study 
of complex decision making – balancing the short term rational decision for self-
interest against the long term decision for overall interest. Each player has the 
option to COOPERATE (C) or DEFECT (D) in each round and the outcome of 
interaction is governed by a Payoff Matrix and its binding conditions (Table 4.1 
and 4.2). The single-round PD has mutual defection as its unique NE while the 
IPD has a single NE only if the number of rounds is known in advance [4]. 
Though the potential incentive to defect is higher in the short run, Axelrod [4] had 
showed that mutual cooperation is a better solution in the long run. Folk theorem 
further verified that the cooperative solution is found in the set of NEs of infinitely 
repeated rounds [130]. Even so, unconditional defection or cooperation is not the 
optimal strategy for a player as much depends directly on his opponent’s strategy 
[4]. Strategies can perform much better if they achieve cooperation with reciprocal 
cooperators, exploit unconditional cooperators, and resist defectors [131].  
The standard IPD is played repeatedly among competing strategies, each 
with its own set of behaviors. Some are memory-less while others base their next 
move on a history of previous moves [132]. For simplicity and in accordance to 
the default settings used in Axelrod’s tournaments [89], a finite memory of up to 
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three rounds is allowed. Always Defect (ALLD), Always Cooperate (ALLC) and 
Random (RAND) are examples of memory-less strategies while Tit-for-Tat (TFT), 
Pavlov and Tit-for-Two-Tats (TFTT) make use of past histories to make decisions. 
Some strategies are deterministic while others are stochastic. Each strategy has its 
own advantages and disadvantages; strong against some opponents but also weak 
against others. A brief description of the characteristics for some commonly used 
benchmark strategies is provided in Table 4.3.  
There are two basic setups - round robin or evolutionary tournament [132]. 
In the former, every strategy has a chance to play against all other participating 
strategies in the tournament and the population size of each strategy type is fixed 
throughout. The latter is conducted on the basis of natural selection, where good 
strategies are favored by a proportionate increase in numbers while weaker ones 
experience a subsequent decrease in numbers. The process is repeated until certain 
stopping criteria e.g. substantial convergence in population sizes of all strategy 
types is attained. In this context, a good strategy is one that thrives for long 
duration and in large proportion. This setup is more applicable to situations where 
each strategy type has large number of players for effective evolution to occur. 
Complex issues like the group survival rate of strategies can then be investigated. 
 














 COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE 3,3 5,0 
DEFECT 0,5 1,1 
CONDITION 1 T>R>P>S 
CONDITION 2 T+S<2R 
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Table 4.3: List of some commonly used benchmark strategies  
Strategy Full Name Brief Description 
ALLC Always Cooperate Cooperates indefinitely.  
ALLD Always Defect Defects indefinitely. 
TFT Tit-for-Tat Cooperates initially but then repeats opponent’s previous move. 
Pavlov Pavlov (WSLS) If previous move is successful (T or R), increase the probability of executing the same move. Reduce the probability otherwise. 
TFTT Tit-for-Two-Tats Resembles TFT but forgives opponent for 1 defect. Strategy defects only after 2 consecutive defects by opponent. 
RAND Random Defects or cooperates with probability ½. 
STFT Suspicious TFT Defects initially but then repeats opponent’s previous move. 
 
4.2 Adaptation models 
 
Other than evolution, two other adaptation schemes - learning as well as memetic 
learning (ML), are proposed for the purpose of driving strategy improvements in 
the IPD. Each equipped with its own unique characteristics, these methodologies 
are presented and described in more details in the following sub-sections. 
 
4.2.1 Evolution  
 
Evolution, as an optimization model, is widely used to evolve IPD strategies [114], 
[133]. By retaining fitter strategies and discarding weaker ones cyclically, this 
population-based learning technique [134] facilitates the eventual convergence 
towards robust and effective strategies [117]. Numerous variants of evolutionary 
implementations have existed as of today e.g. in terms of representation, evolving 
strategies exist in binary forms [134], neural networks [135], probabilistic [134] 
and real number [136] coded strings or even FSMs [137]. The method of selecting 
good individuals comes in many forms as well - truncation selection [138], [139], 
(μ, λ) and (μ + λ) selection [22], [140] fitness-proportional selection [116], [120], 
[141]. Choice of variation operators also differs across implementations. While 
most EAs use a combination of crossover and mutation to evolve strategies [134], 
[142], [143], pure mutation operators are used by Hingston and Kendall [120]; and 
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well as Chong and Yao [22] for their co-evolutionary [144], [145] framework to 
analyze various aspects of the IPD. Other evolutionary means involve the use of 
speciation or niching to maintain genetic diversity [146] and elitism to avoid loss 
of good individuals from the mating pool. Despite differences, the fundamental 
framework is essentially similar and can be broadly summarized as a sequential 


















The learning methodology can be progressive [147] or reactionary [148]. The 
former includes hill-climbers and gradient-based searches which are commonly 
applied to static environments where conditions are fixed and notion of optimality 
is well defined. The latter is applicable to a dynamic setting where the notion of 
optimality is always changing or simply non-existent. Notable examples include 
probabilistic Pavlovian Learning [149] and stochastic searches. In its classical 
form, learning has no facility for any communication and only affects individual 
strategies. It functions as a local search operator and drives agents to traverse the 
direction which is deemed more “favorable”. Learning agents typically exploit 
domain information available at hand to improve performance based on some 
form of heuristics. Since the pattern of decision making is rarely constant for any 
iterated game set but highly dependent on agent interaction, learning should be 
performed incrementally, with partial memory [150] of past experiences. This 
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more accurately models the IPD, where players are capable of making complex 
decisions spontaneously using some finite memory of past actions.  
 
4.2.3 Memetic Learning 
 
ML is a hybrid adaptation technique that unifies learning and evolution [151] in 
one algorithm. As far as the IPD is concerned, the notion of evolving strategies 
memetically is less studied compared to learning and evolution. Two widely used 
variants of ML are the Baldwinian [152], [153] and Lamarckian [129] models. In 
the former, offspring do not inherit learned abilities from their parents but merely 
experience an added ability to learn skills that are acquired by the ancestors [154]. 
In the latter, however, desirable traits acquired by parents via learning are passed 
down to the offspring who will inherit the traits directly [155]. Despite differences, 
the underlying framework is similar. As opposed to learning, evolution in ML 
facilitates information exchange among agents and allows the knowledge acquired 
through learning to propagate to future generations. This stabilizes and reduces 
performance variance across learning agents. Learning, on the other hand, is used 
as a form of directed search to guide evolution in attaining convergence towards 
an optimum strategy if it exists. The "Meta-Pavlov Learning" [156] that integrates 
evolution and Pavlovian Learning is an example of Baldwinian-based ML strategy. 
By harnessing the synergy between learning and evolution, ML strategies should 
be able to acquire better performance than evolutionary and learning strategies. 
 
4.3 Design of learning paradigm 
 
In this section, an IL scheme that integrates classification into the decision making 
process of strategies is presented. This is adopted by all IL and memetic players in 
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the IPD tournaments and is characterized by a framework that identifies nature of 
opponent strategies, conducts strategy revision and allows players to recover from 
mistakes through double loop IL. This breeds good strategies that can respond and 
adapt well to different opponents. 
 
4.3.1 Identification of opponent strategies  
 
According to Axelrod [4], discrimination of others is among the most important of 
abilities as it allows an individual to handle interactions with many individuals 
without having to treat them all the same. With the above motivation in mind, a 
simple classification heuristic is formulated based on the correlation between the 
received payoffs and opponent’s likelihood to execute defection and cooperation. 
Opponents are classified into three broad categories, strategies with a tendency to 
exploit others (Exploiters), strategies which reciprocate cooperation (Reciprocals) 
and strategies that are likely to cooperate unconditionally (Cooperators). Nature of 
each new opponent is mapped out according to the sum of payoffs received in the 
first three rounds of game play. The range of scores (0-15) is divided into three 
equal intervals, each corresponding to an opponent class as shown in Table 4.4. 
This classification process acts as a basis for the player to gain a rough insight into 
the nature of unknown opponents, so as to facilitate the adoption of an appropriate 
strategy during the subsequent game play with that opponent.  
 
Table 4.4: Identification of opponent strategies 
 
 
4.3.2 Notion of “success” and “failure”  
 
Inspired by John Nash’s [3] idea of a NE, it is conceptualized that every pair of 
competing strategies, despite their complexity and nature, can have a desired state 
SCORE RANGE 0 - 4 5 - 10 11 - 15 
NATURE OF OPPONENT EXPLOITERS RECIPROCALS COOPERATORS 
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at each round of game play, where both execute their relative best responses [2]. 
With the same argument, each opponent classification can give rise to an attached 
desired response. This is defined for Exploiters, Reciprocals and Cooperators by 
means of a Taxonomy Matrix in Table 4.5. This Matrix effectively dictates and 
maps out the direction for local search during the process of learning. 
Each IL strategy is represented by a string of bits - each encoding the action 
to be taken when a distinct sequence of past three moves is made by both player 
and opponent. As a basis of IL, outcome of using a bit is classified into “success” 
(S) or “failure” (F) trials. An S trial occurs when interaction outcome from using a 
strategy bit coincides with the perceived nature of opponent as the desired reply is 
played while an F trial denotes otherwise. Rules for updating S and F trials are 
characterized by the Taxonomy Matrix. S count is incremented when the "desired" 
outcome is achieved for the opponent's assumed strategy type, and the F count is 
incremented when any other payoff is achieved. Overall, the process of updating 
counts indicates how good a strategy bit is from time to time and is used as a form 
of IL heuristics to determine whether the encoded action should be revised or left 
unchanged. The Taxonomy Matrix and underlying notion of S and F are proposed 
to refine the Performance Matrix used by Pavlov - S is defined as receiving the 
Temptation (T) or Reward (R) payoff and F as being awarded the Punishment (P) 
or Sucker (S) payoff. This is not necessarily a good way to define the matrix due 
to the following set of reasons: 
 
1)  Receiving P in the context of exploiters which defect perpetually is considered 
good as the player is not exploited. 
 
2)  Receiving R in the context of unconditional cooperators is considered bad as 
there are opportunities for exploitation. 
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3)  Receiving T in the context of reciprocals is not the best policy as it can well 
lead to endless cycles of retaliation.   
 
S and F hold a fuzzy meaning when payoff is P, R or T. As there is no 
knowledge about the opponent, uncertainty is involved during IL - strategies that 
are good against one opponent might be bad for another. As the notion of S and F 
is crucial for determining the “goodness” of IL and exerts great impact on strategy 
performance, it is not predetermined in advance but dynamically updated based on 
the opponent’s perceived nature as the IPD game proceeds.  
 




     Opponent  
 
 
4.3.3 Strategy Revision 
 
In the proposed IL scheme, replacement of weaker strategy traits with stronger 
ones is devised via the S and F counts accumulated over the entirety of the game. 
Fitter bits have larger S counts to indicate that they are performing desirably 
against opponents while weaker bits have larger F counts. Unused bits contain a 
zero for both counts. The action that a strategy bit encodes is updated (changing C 
to D or vice versa) only when the following conditions are met 
 
           Swap (True) iff FT / (ST + FT) > Ps AND ST + FT > L       (4.1) 
 
where FT and ST are total F and S counts respectively. Ps is a threshold that can 
be adjusted to suit the desired level of failure tolerance – amount of failure that an 
IL player is willing to take on before strategy revision. This affects the willingness 
to learn implicitly e.g. a higher Ps makes a player less likely to revise its strategy. 
 COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE RECIPROCALS COOPERATORS 
DEFECT - EXPLOITERS 
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The minimum learning threshold, L - defined by the minimum number of 
rounds which a bit is played before strategy revision is considered, affects the 
sensitivity of a player’s response to environment changes e.g. a large L delays IL 
but in turn allows the goodness of a bit to be assessed from a wider observation 
window. An inherent tradeoff arises between the need to react spontaneously to 
changes in opponent’s pattern of game play (so that payoff is maximized regularly) 
and the need to maintain a sizable window of past experiences before performing 
strategy update (so that well-informed choices can be made). Prior simulation tests 
are conducted using the proposed IL strategy and an empirical set of opponents to 
select appropriate values of Ps and L for the update criteria. S and F counts of a 
bit are reset to zero when updating of that bit occurs and also upon meeting new 
opponents. This prevents past histories from affecting the current performance of 
the bit. The above ensures that strong and desirable strategy bits are more likely to 
remain intact while weaker ones are more susceptible to change.  
 
4.3.4 Double-loop Incremental Learning 
 
The double-loop IL is a reclassification and relearning process that draws parallel 
to human’s way of learning through perceiving, reasoning, self-evaluating and 
readjusting. A scenario when the inferred opponent is perceived incorrectly during 
classification is remedied via a separate IL cycle which involves reclassification 
of opponent and re-mapping of best response. This cycle is triggered when the 
accumulated F counts for all bits used within the game exceed a value of f; of 
which the notion of S and F will be changed and a new perceived best response 
adopted. If this corresponds to the actual best response, increase in F counts will 
be reduced to indicate that the right strategy has been used against the opponent. 
Otherwise, reclassification and relearning continues until the perceived and actual 
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best responses coincide. While inner-loop IL allows players to form perception 
models of the opponents, outer-loop IL facilitates evaluation and readjustments of 
each model. The feedback mechanism allows players to learn, adapt and realign 
their strategies dynamically to changes in the opponent nature through formation, 
evaluation and revision of perceptions. Via the process of learning and relearning 
[157], strategies learn to perceive each opponent accurately despite insufficient 
knowledge initially. Unlike absolute reactionary IL, the integrated double-loop IL 
can prevent chances of entering into a loop of endless updating and subsequently 
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Performance of the adaptation frameworks; evolution, IL and ML are investigated. 
They are represented by a GA, incremental learning strategy (ILS) and memetic 
algorithm (MA) respectively in the context of IPD. Each strategy is represented by 
a 67-bit binary chromosome (Figure 4.3). The first three bits encode the condition 
for triggering the first three moves at the start of every iterated game set while the 
remaining bits denote 64 (26) possible histories of 6-bit memory configurations 
that correspond to different combinations of previous three moves of both player 
  93
and opponent. For ILS and MA players, accumulated S and F counts for each bit 
are recorded as the basis of IL. Each strategy also encodes an independent 6-bit 
memory of round histories that are used to decide the player’s next move. As each 
derives its fitness from the scores attained by playing with others, GA is basically 
a CEA which evolves strategies by co-evolutionary learning. As far as the chapter 
is concerned, MA adopts a Lamarckian learning scheme - retains genome changes 




1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 … 0 1
0    1 2    3    4 5    6 7    8     9 65   66
 
Figure 4.3: Strategy representation of a typical player 
 
 
The initial populations of all the adaptation schemes are randomly generated. 
Fitness, given by the sum of payoffs accumulated throughout the game play, is 
assigned after each complete tournament. Niching with sharing distance (defined 
by the genotypic similarity between players) of r is used to encourage growth of a 
diverse repertoire of strategies. Two strategies are alike if the number of identical 
genes between them exceeds r. By and large, the mechanism evaluates similarities 
between individuals and penalizes fitness of those that are too alike. This is crucial 
so that the evolving strategies would not, due to inability to adapt after substantial 
level of strategy convergence is reached, lose out in terms of performance. This 
also ensures fairer comparison among GA, ILS and MA. Results from preliminary 
simulation have verified that GA performed worse off in the absence of niching as 
premature convergence does set in at a very fast rate, compromising GA’s search 
capability unduly. From experimentation, r is selected to avoid an overly fast or 
slow convergence rate in the midst of preserving the search capability of GA.  
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After niching, elitism is implemented so that the strategies which are above 
average in both fitness and niche counts are selected into the next generation 
without genotypic changes. Depending on the proportion of individuals that are 
above average, number of elites varies but is limited to a maximum of the top 10% 
of the population. After which, tournament selection is performed to select the 
remaining population based on overall fitness that is accounted for by niche scores: 
 
Overall Fitness = (game scores)/(1+niche scores)        (4.2) 
 
From above, it can be garnered that the larger the degree of similarities between 
an individual and others in the population, the larger is the penalty on its original 
fitness. Selected individuals will then undergo uniform crossover and binary bit-
flip mutation. The new generation of strategies is formed jointly by the elites and 
individuals that have gone through the variation process. To summarize important 
procedures involved, the general overview of the flowcharts for GA, ILS and MA 
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Figure 4.6: Simple flowchart depicting the operations of the MA algorithm 
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4.5 Simulation results 
 
Simulations are carried out using the Visual C++ development kit. A summary of 
the parameters used in simulations is shown in Table 4.6. Three case studies are 
simulated to examine the synergy between evolution and IL in different settings. 
For all case studies, number of players for each strategy type, is always set as p, to 
avoid any bias towards any type. The population size, n thus varies for different 
test cases, according to the number of strategy types used e.g. for a case study that 
involves three strategies, n = 3*p. 200 rounds [4] is played in a pair-wise manner 
amid the competing players in each iterated game set. A round robin tournament is 
completed when each player has played against all others.  
The order of opponent strategies during round robin tournament is decided 
randomly e.g. a strategy will not know the nature of opponent it will be facing in 
the next game as this is picked randomly from the pool of strategies that have yet 
to play. This will allow the performance and adaptability of IL and evolution to be 
assessed in a more generalized setup, where overall performance is independent of 
the order of appearance of opponents. In all runs, evolution is triggered after each 
round robin tournament (which denotes one generation) while IL is performed 
throughout the course of game play. Based on Chong and Yao [135], each run is 
conducted for 600 generations to ensure convergence of result and to track the rate 
of improvement for all adaptation strategies. Parameter values are aptly chosen 
based on good players’ performance after several rounds of preliminary runs. A 
brief summary of the case studies to be simulated is depicted in Table 4.7. 
  
Table 4.6: List of parameter values used in the simulation runs 
 
Tournament Parameters Values 
No. of rounds in an iterated game set between two players, α 200 
No. of generations used to carry out each simulation run, g 600 
Population size of all players in the tournament, n Variable 
Size/Number of players for each strategy type, p 30 
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Evolution parameters Values 
Size for carrying out tournament selection, s 2 
Rate for performing uniform crossover, c 0.8 
Rate for performing binary bit-flip mutation, m 0.05 
Niche radius in terms of number of identical strategy bits, r 30 
Incremental Learning parameters Values 
Bit failure ratio, Ps 0.3 
Minimum learning threshold, L 10 
Threshold of failure counts to trigger reclassification, f 15 
 
 
Table 4.7: Brief summary of case studies to be conducted 
Case Study Tests Strategies Used Objective 
A MA, GA, ILS, TFT, ALLD, ALLC 
1 
B 
MA, GA, ILS, TFT, ALLD, 
ALLC, PAV, RAND, STFT, 
TFTT 
Assess performance and adaptability of 
MA, GA and ILS when each plays 
against different combinations of 
opponent strategies. 
 
C MA, GA, ILS 
2 D 
MA, GA, ILS, TFT, ALLD, 
ALLC, PAV, RAND, STFT, 
TFTT 
Assess performance and adaptability of 
MA, GA and ILS when playing among 
themselves and other opponent strategies. 
 
3 E 
MA, GA, ILS, opponents 
strategies that are changing 
every {1, 10-20, 100-150} 
generations 
Assess performance and adaptability of 
MA, GA and ILS in dynamic 
environments, where nature of the 
opponents is changing from time to time. 
 
4.5.1 Case Study 1: Performance against benchmark strategies 
 
The first case study compares individual performance of MA, GA and ILS as each 
plays with fixed pools of benchmark strategies (Table 4.3). The chosen strategy 
subsets contain a mix of cooperators, defectors and reciprocals, to which a player 
has a distinct, best response to maximize its payoff against each opponent type. 
Two different tests (A and B) are setup and simulated to evaluate the performance 
of the adaptation strategies in small and large strategy subsets using generation 
payoffs, cooperation ratios and performance box plots. In both test scenarios, each 
unique strategy type has a total of p players. 
 
4.5.1.1 Test A: Performance against ALLC, ALLD and TFT 
 
To assess performance against a common group of opponents, MA, GA and ILS, 
each in a separate milieu, is set to play against ALLC, ALLD and TFT in the same 
tournament. The normalized average generation score per round (AGS) – sum of 
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payoffs in one generation over the total rounds played; and average cooperation 
ratio (ACR) – proportion of total rounds for which cooperation is played; of each 
strategy type are plotted for different test configurations (Figure 4.7). Results are 
averaged over 20 runs to minimize effects of large statistical deviation due to any 
one run. On average, AGS plots showed that all adaptation strategies are robust 
against reciprocals, defectors and cooperators as indicated by their ability to 
outperform deterministic benchmark strategies (Figure 4.7a). Despite the use of 
diverse adaptation mechanisms, both GA and ILS are comparable in their eventual 
performance, except for the path taken to reach convergence. Both AGS and ACR 
for ILS are constant but gradually increasing and decreasing respectively for GA.  
Whilst the GA strategies are evolved with more room for exploration, the 
exploitative nature of ILS accounts for the fact that TFT fares slightly better than 
ALLD with GA but worst off with ILS. The similarities in performance between 
GA and ILS do not, in any way, constraint the performance of MA to the AGS 
attained by either of them. In contrast, inheriting the synergetic blend of evolution 
and IL allows MA to achieve significant score advantage over GA, ILS and the 
benchmark strategies. The existence of this notable score disparity between MA, 
GA and ILS, despite uniformity in their ACRs around 0.4 (Figure 4.7b), illustrates 
that the key to attain good performance depends not so much on the overall extent 
to which a strategy cooperates or defects, but more on its ability to do so at the 
right time, according to the nature of his interacting opponent. 
The strategy specific AGS and ACR plots in Figure 4.8 reaffirm the claims 
made above. The fluctuating dynamics introduced by co-evolutionary learning in 
MA and GA are conspicuously dissimilar from the fairly stable AGS and ACR 
traces of ILS. Inherent consistency or stagnation in the performance of ILS across 
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generations arises due to premature convergence. Exploitation is emphasized over 
exploration as players react spontaneously to the opponent strategies by seeking 
incremental improvement in a certain direction via a common set of IL heuristics. 
Co-evolutionary learning allows more opportunities for players to explore and 
attain continual improvement, but possibly at the expense of a slower learning rate 
and larger dynamics - owing to disparity in AGS of evolving population between 
successive generations. The potential advantage of exploration is clearly depicted 
in Figures 4.8c and d, where GA surpasses ILS eventually, despite starting with a 
lower AGS as a result of random initialization of strategies. The collection of plots 
showed that ILS and GA perform well in different settings. ILS players are able to 
attain higher payoffs than their GA counterparts by being more cooperative with 
players of their own type (Figure 4.8a) and defecting against ALLC (Figure 4.8d). 
Conversely, GA surpasses ILS players by cooperating and defecting to a larger 
extent against TFT and ALLD respectively (Figures 4.8b and c). The sum of each 
score advantage constitutes their equivalence in overall performance (Figure 4.7a). 
 


























































































































































































































Figure 4.7: (a) AGS and (b) ACR for MA, GA and ILS when each plays with TFT, ALLD and 
ALLC over 20 runs 
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With both IL and evolution employed, MA’s performance outdoes GA and 
ILS for all strategy types. Despite similarity in ACR (Figure 4.7b), MA is able to 
secure a considerable lead over GA and ILS, by cooperating and defecting aptly 
with the right opponents - attaining AGS {2.7, 2.5, 0.95, 5} and ACR {0.8, 0.65, 
0.05, 0} for {itself, TFT, ALLD, ALLC}. In entirety, MA maintains the closest 
performance to a hypothetical ideal player who attains AGS {3, 3, 1, 5} and ACR 
{1, 1, 0, 0} if playing against the same corresponding strategy types in that order.  
On top of the statistical plots, an alternative performance measure to assess 
the goodness of a strategy pertains to the score deviation between members of the 
same population. For example, even when the top player belongs to a particular 
strategy, it is unfair to claim that the strategy is good when there is large score 
variance among players using that strategy; since not everyone is doing as well. 
To have a convincing claim, performance should be measured on the collective 
rather than individual basis. With this yardstick, a strategy is considered good only 
if those playing it are able to perform uniformly well throughout the tournament.  
Performance box plots which depict the distribution of mean, variance and 
minimum AGS within each strategy group are presented across 20 runs (Figure 
4.9). MA has the highest mean AGS followed by GA and ILS – both of which are 
comparable (Figure 4.9a). As compared to ILS, It is evident that the mean AGSs 
of MA and GA vary over a much wider range. The stochasticity and differences in 
the environments across distinct runs signify that the mean performance of an 
evolving population in any run is closely correlated to the settings in that run e.g. 
strategy initialization, sequence of opponents encountered etc. By adhering to a 
fixed set of heuristics, the performance of ILS tends to be more consistent and less 
affected by such stochastic difference across runs. 
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Figure 4.8: Strategy specific AGS and ACR for MA, GA and ILS as each plays with (a) itself, (b) TFT, (c) ALLD and (d) ALLC over 20 runs 
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ILS, however, suffers from a much larger mean score variance among its 
players as compared to GA and MA (Figure 4.9b). A low variance of variance 
implies that the performance disparity across ILS players is consistently large in 
every run. Compared to GA which attains similar mean AGS, a likely reason for 
the large variance is due to the diverse experience of different ILS players as each 
embraces independent IL. Unlike GA players, knowledge acquired by each ILS 
player is not conveyed or shared among other players. Due to lack of information 
exchange, improvement as a group is much harder for ILS as players differ widely 
in both performance and nature of their learnt strategies.  
Evolution reduces score variance in the GA population as weaker strategies 
adopt good traits from stronger ones by means of collective learning and periodic 
exchange of information during each evolution cycle. This ensures that all GA 
players progress and improve on a collective basis. These observations shed new 
light to the advantages of evolution and IL. The former evens performance of a 
population of players within each run; while the latter ensures consistency and 
stable performance across different runs. Fusing the benefits of both mechanisms 
allows MA to attain the highest mean and minimum AGS (Figure 4.9c) without 
compromising its ability to perform well as a cohesive group e.g. attains score 
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Figure 4.9: Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) minimum AGS in the 
MA, GA and ILS populations as each plays with TFT, ALLD and ALLC over 20 runs  
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4.5.1.2 Test B: Performance against seven different benchmark strategies 
 
Extending from test A, MA, GA and ILS, each in a separate tournament, is setup 
to play against the set of all seven strategies {TFT, ALLD, ALLC, PAV, RAND, 
STFT, TFTT}. The complexity in the nature of interaction is increased as more 
strategy types are added. This is reflected by a reduction in the AGS difference 
among various strategy types (Figure 4.10a). It is more difficult for any strategy to 
maintain a large score advantage, on average against other strategies as each is 
required to score well against more opponents of diverse nature. Tradeoffs are 
probably incurred as a strategy that is good against a certain opponent type might 
not be necessarily good against all others. 
It is apparent that the performance of GA and ILS has degraded - no longer 
the best in their respective environments; with the former overtaken by PAV, and 
the latter by both PAV and TFT. AGS of ILS has decreased slightly to 2.44, 
though it still remains relatively stable across generations. Despite starting with a 
lower AGS, the two phase improvement of co-evolutionary learning - exponential 
followed by gradual increase in fitness, allows GA to overtake ILS and TFT in 20 
and 200 generations respectively; only to be marginally surpassed by PAV. This 
shows that evolution; with its ability to explore and adapt on a collective basis, 
allows players to perform well against a fixed pool of opponents that are largely 
deterministic. Fusing IL with evolution enhances the players’ ability to perform 
well against a large pool of unknown strategies. Corrective actions are made in the 
course of game play when evolved strategies are not aligned with the opponent’s 
nature. With the Lamarckian mode of social IL, all the learnt traits and beneficial 
changes are preserved and acquired directly by offspring during evolution, thereby 
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enhancing the rate of co-evolutionary learning. This form of guided evolution 
allows MA to gain a substantial score margin above GA and ILS. 
Inference can be drawn from the traces about the fact that IL predominates 
in the initial stages as it provides evolution with a substantial boost during the 
phase when the MA population is experiencing an exponential improvement in 
fitness. This gives MA an early score advantage to start with. Subsequently, IL 
plays the role of maintaining the population’s overall performance against a fixed 
set of opponents. Further improvement in performance is gradual and largely due 
to evolution, whose effect sets in much later and lasts throughout the generations. 
As MA’s ACR is between GA and ILS (Figure 4.10b), results suggest that being 
too cooperative or defect-oriented does not ensure good performance, but rather 
the ability to strike a balance by cooperating and defecting suitably.  
Comparing the strategy specific AGS and ACR (Figure 4.11) in the current 
setting, it is perceptible that GA tends to perform better relative to ILS on average; 
attaining higher AGS when playing against itself, TFT, PAV, STFT and TFTT. 
This indicates that the GA strategies are fairly good at reciprocating cooperation 
while ILS on the other hand performs better against cooperators, defectors and 
random strategies, due to its exploitative nature. Though co-evolutionary learning 
is a slow process of improvement – players learn on a collective basis only when 
each evolution episode is triggered; the ability to explore constantly is a valuable 
asset to GA as it enables a possibility for further improvement. More importantly, 
it allows cooperation to evolve when players are adapting against a large pool of 













































































































































































































































































































































































Strategies used in previous setting/ New strategies introduced in current setting 
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Figure 4.11: Strategy specific AGS and ACR for MA, GA and ILS as each plays with (a) itself, (b) 
TFT, (c) ALLD, (d) ALLC, (e) PAV, (f) RAND, (g) STFT and (h) TFTT over 20 runs 
 
A balance between exploration and exploitation allows MA to preserve its 
trend of dominance over both GA and ILS for all strategies except TFTT - to 
which GA replicates strategies that closely resemble the ideal strategy of 
alternating between cooperation and defection. This is probably due to the tradeoff 
involved when IL disrupts the actual usage of evolved strategies by altering them 
from time to time; as strategy fine tuning is most probably triggered when vastly 
different opponent types are encountered in consecutive game play. Save for this 
isolated case, MA essentially still exhibit robust performance.  
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Even so, comparison between the current and previous settings indicates that 
the performance of all adaptation strategies are adversely affected following an 
increase in complexity within the environment e.g. AGS of MA against itself and 
ALLD has decreased despite improvement against TFT. Similarly, performance of 
GA has improved when playing against itself and TFT but declined for ALLD and 
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Figure 4.12: Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) minimum AGS in 
the MA, GA and ILS populations as each plays with 7 benchmark strategies over 20 runs 
 
 
It is clear from the box plots (Figure 4.12) that MA still secures the highest 
mean and minimum AGS, followed by GA then ILS. The advantages of evolution 
actually outweigh those from IL. Variance of mean AGS across the runs remains 
larger for MA and GA (Figure 4.12a). Exploration though beneficial, entails score 
deviation between evolved populations across runs. This highlights the inherent 
stability that IL introduces. Absence of information sharing, however results in 
large score variance among ILS players, which inevitably lowers the performance 
of the population (Figure 4.12b). In all, evolution coupled with IL is crucial for 
stabilizing the performance across a population of strategies and to attain good 








4.5.2 Case Study 2: Performance against adaptive strategies 
 
The second case study assesses the effectiveness and adaptability of MA, GA and 
ILS as they are set up to play against one another in absence (Test C) and presence 
(Test D) of other benchmark strategies across 20 runs. As strategies are constantly 
adapting to one another, interaction is actually more complex than the previous 
case study where strategies are largely fixed. The relative strategic dominance of 
evolution, IL and ML are evaluated using generation payoffs, cooperation ratios, 
niche counts, learning ratio - proportion of total rounds with IL taking place, box 
plots and statistical tests. In both tests, each unique strategy type has p players. 
 
4.5.2.1 Test C: Relative performance of MA, GA and ILS 
 
To assess relative performance, MA, GA and ILS are configured to play against 
one another within the same tournament, but in the absence of other benchmark 
strategies. Figure 4.13a depicts that MA maintains a sizeable score margin above 
GA and ILS, attaining a mean AGS of ~2.7 and ACR of 0.52 (Figure 4.13b). As 
opposed to previous test cases, ILS – with an AGS of 2.1, took the lead over GA 
in this setup. Since IL tends to be exploitative, defect-oriented traits of ILS are 
clearly still present. Adaptive opponents also results in a substantial amount of 
fluctuation in GA’s ACR as there is a tendency for the best responses to these 
strategies to be constantly shifting until a stable equilibrium is reached after some 
mutual adaptation phase. The huge performance disparity among strategies despite 
similarities in ACR between MA and GA; and uniformity in niche counts of MA, 
GA and ILS reiterates the importance of cooperating and defecting at appropriate 
times (Figure 4.13c). Learning traces showed that evolution disrupts IL only in a 
minor way (Figure 4.13d) - by undoing some of the learnt changes; so much so 
that MA is seen to exhibit similar level of IL as ILS from time to time.  
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Figure 4.13: (a) AGS, (b) ACR, (c) niche count and (d) learning ratio as MA, GA and ILS play 




The strategy specific AGS plots (Figure 4.14a) show that both MA and ILS 
are able to attain scores that are close to the mutually rewarding payoff with GA; 
whereas GA is unable to do so vice versa – achieving an AGS that is as low as the 
punishment payoff. This indicates that the efficacy of IL takes precedence over 
evolution for a setup with fixed pool of adaptive strategies. In this context, GA is 
exploited by MA and ILS through their ability to learn, revise strategies and react 
spontaneously to changes amid the evolutionary episodes. This is the prime cause 
for the low performance of GA, other than its inability to cooperate exceptionally 
well with other GA players. The difference in the performance of MA and ILS is 
distinguished by the added ability of MA to cooperate better with players of the 
same type, though both perform just as well against each other. Quantitatively, 
MA attains AGS of nearly 3.0 compared to a mere 1.8 for ILS. Evolution opens 
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up opportunities for exploration and helps to propagate the evolved cooperative 
traits throughout the population via strategy exchange. Both steer the MA players 
towards mutual cooperation with one another.  
Some distinct characteristics of each strategy are evidently shown in the 
compositional ACRs (Figure 4.14b). The fixed nature of the GA strategies amid 
evolutionary episodes is visibly marked by consistent ACR traces for all strategies. 
Absence in dynamism and flexibility in performing strategy revision in the course 
of game play compromises the adaptability of GA extensively, especially when 
strategies are dynamically changing. In contrast, ILS players have the ability to 
discriminate among diverse opponent types and revise their strategies accordingly. 
Whilst players perform better against the adaptive opponents than their evolving 
counterparts, IL tends to channel more efforts towards exploitation, apart from the 
lack of knowledge exchange and performance comparison on a collective basis. 
This result in an independent set of learnt strategies which are largely defect-
oriented against all opponents; indirectly reduces the innate capability to adapt. 
MA population depicts the best performance among the group by exhibiting an 
ability to cooperate well with like players and defect against players of other types.  
As opposed to the previous case study - where the adaptation strategies play 
against deterministic ones, a setup with adaptive strategies favors IL to evolution, 
as reflected by the higher mean AGS of ILS over GA (Figure 4.15a). A mixing of 
evolution and IL still ranks MA as the best in terms of the average and worst 
performances (Figure 4.15c) among GA and IL. Even so, the possible conflicts 
between IL and evolution have led to large variance in mean AGS of MA across 
the runs. Though IL is still marked by large mean score variance among players, 
variance of score disparity across runs is much larger (Figure 4.15b) than before. 
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Lower group variances of MA and GA highlight the importance of collective 
learning and information exchange in ensuring the consistency of intra-group 
performance across runs. The mean score variance among players is particularly 
low when both IL and evolution are used concurrently.   
To reinforce our conclusion that MA performs better than GA and ILS, a 
paired T-Test is conducted between all paired combinations of the three strategies. 
The null hypothesis denotes the proposition that the mean AGS of two matched 
populations are equal while the alternative hypothesis denotes otherwise. The test 
determines how different or alike two strategy populations are. Using a statistical 
significance level of five percent, results of T-Test for strategies in each individual 
run, computed over the span of all simulated runs, confirm that strategies shaped 
independently by evolution, IL or ML are substantially different from one another. 
GA and MA evolve to be similar like ILS in just 1 out of the 20 runs (Table 4.8), 
indicating that any performance differences among the three adaptation strategies 
are indeed significant and non-trivial.  
 















































































































































































































































































































(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 4.15: Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) minimum AGS in 




Table 4.8: Proportion of runs that a row-wise strategy is better, similar and worse than a column-
wise strategy 
 
 Better (>) Similar (≈) Worst (<) 
 MA GA ILS MA GA ILS MA GA ILS 
MA NaN 0.95 0.90 NaN 0.00 0.05 NaN 0.05 0.05 
GA 0.05 NaN 0.05 0.00 NaN 0.05 0.95 NaN 0.90 
ILS 0.05 0.90 NaN 0.05 0.05 NaN 0.90 0.05 NaN 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Test D: Performance of MA, GA and ILS in setup with 10 strategy types 
 
To verify results from test C, performance of MA, GA and ILS are now evaluated 
in the presence of other benchmark strategies. The tournament comprises of MA, 
GA, ILS and seven benchmark strategies. Figure 4.16a shows that MA continues 
to preserve a large score margin above all strategies - duly achieved when IL and 
evolution complement and compensate each other’s strengths and weaknesses. 
Compared to MA’s AGS of 2.7, ILS attains an AGS of 2.4, ranked 3rd on the 
overall - just below TFT and above PAV. In the same order as test C, evolved GA 
strategies, with an AGS of 2.0, are strategically inferior to MA and ILS when 
exposed to both adaptive and deterministic strategies. Compared to test B, large 
fluctuation in GA’s AGS is due to a need to adapt recurrently to the changing MA 
and ILS strategies. As part of the environment, they influence how GA strategies 
evolve and play a contributory role in lowering GA’s performance with respect to 
benchmark strategies. Increase in complexity with the addition of seven strategies 
is indicated by a considerable rise in learning ratios for MA and ILS. Compared 
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against the results of test C – the frequency of learning and relearning increases as 
more diverse strategy types are encountered during game play (Figure 4.16b). 
Possible conflicts between evolution and IL also cause a distinctly higher learning 
ratio for MA over ILS during strategy improvement. 
 

































































(a)  (b) 
 
 
Figure 4.16: (a) AGS and (b) learning ratio obtained when MA, GA and ILS play with one another 
over 20 runs 
 
Similarities between results observed in the performance box plots and those 
from test C ascertain the strategic dominance in descending order of MA, ILS and 
GA for a setup with adaptive strategies. Though GA also suffers large variance in 
mean and minimum AGS (Figures 4.17a and c) across runs, players still maintain 
a low intra-run AGS variance, suggesting that evolution is indeed important to 
smooth out score differences across players in the population. Results show that 
MA and ILS are still the dominant sources of influence, as the added benchmark 
strategies only exert trifling impact on GA’s performance. As the role of evolution 
is to adapt strategies to their environment, traits of GA strategies are closely tied 
to the domain of interaction. As varying strategies emerge in distinct runs, diverse 
inter-run performance in the GA population is inevitably entailed.  
ILS attains on average, a consistently huge intra-run score variance among 
players across the runs, suggesting that the ILS players perform differently despite 
learning under the same learning framework. The performance of IL strategies is 
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not significantly different from that of several other strategy types according to the 
results of paired T-test (Table 4.9 and 4.10). With the exception of ALLC and 
RAND, ILS perform in close similarity to strategies {MA, GA, TFT, ALLD, PAV, 
STFT, TFTT} respectively for {10, 15, 60, 15, 40, 5, 20} % of the runs. This huge 
intra-run disparity in performance is due largely to differing learning experiences 
that shape the traits of ILS strategies independently from one another. The 
absence of evolutionary pressure in correcting the large score differential between 
the ILS players presents a likely reason why ML surpasses IL in performance 
uniformity among players in the population. 
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Figure 4.17: Box plots depicting distribution of (a) mean, (b) variance and (c) minimum AGS in 
MA, GA and ILS as each plays in the presence of benchmark strategies over 20 runs 
 
Despite so, the higher mean and minimum AGS of ILS with consistently low 
variance across different runs indicates that IL is crucial for preserving good 
performance in the presence of adaptive strategies (Figure 4.17). An ability to 
perform strategy revision makes players more adaptable to the changing strategies 
of opponents. Observations show that MA attains the highest mean and minimum 
AGS and lowest intra group score variance (Figure 4.17). Variances for the above 
are also middling between GA and ILS. The sets of T-test results further verify the 
significance in the scale of difference across strategy scores. In combination with 
the box plot results, MA is notably different to other strategies at 5% significant 
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level. Overall, the collection of results depicts that ML breeds good strategies with 
fairly consistent performance across runs. 
 
Table 4.9: Proportion of total runs that row-wise strategy is better than column-wise strategy  
 
 MA GA ILS TFT ALLD ALLC PAV RAND STFT TFTT 
MA NaN 1.00 0.90 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GA 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.10 0.45 0.25 0.20 
ILS 0.00 0.85 NaN 0.15 0.85 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.95 0.65 
TFT 0.05 1.00 0.25 NaN 0.85 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.95 
ALLD 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.15 NaN 1.00 0.05 0.90 0.50 0.20 
ALLC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PAV 0.00 0.70 0.25 0.35 0.80 1.00 NaN 1.00 0.85 0.50 
RAND 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.00 
STFT 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.10 0.95 NaN 0.15 
TFTT 0.00 0.80 0.15 0.05 0.80 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.85 NaN 
 
 
Table 4.10: Proportion of total runs that two strategies are similar according to paired T-test 
 
 MA GA ILS TFT ALLD ALLC PAV RAND STFT TFTT 
MA NaN 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA 0.00 NaN 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.00 
ILS 0.10 0.15 NaN 0.60 0.15 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.20 
TFT 0.00 0.00 0.60 NaN 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ALLD 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ALLC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PAV 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.15 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.05 0.30 
RAND 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NaN 0.05 0.00 
STFT 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 NaN 0.00 






In all, test D validates that MA players with the ability to evolve and learn at 
the same time, indeed perform better than GA, ILS and all other strategy types. 
Problems pertaining to the inability of GA players to cope with the increasing 
complexity of the environment and large score variance among ILS players have 
been aptly addressed by the synergy between evolution and incremental learning.  
 
4.5.3 Case Study 3: Performance Assessment in Dynamic Environment 
 
After assessing the performance of MA, GA and ILS in setups with a fixed pool of 
deterministic and random benchmark strategies in case study 1 and also adaptive 
strategies - case study 2, the final case study investigates the performance profile 
which arises when strategies are subjected to opponents that resume varying traits 
and characteristics constantly. The dynamic nature of the environment constitutes 
a good testing ground to validate whether strategies are resilient enough to cope 
  117
well on the whole. Relative adaptability of MA, GA and ILS in a dynamic setting 
can then be aptly addressed. In this study, MA, GA and ILS are setup to play with 
an opponent that changes its type probabilistically after every 1, 10-20, 100-150 
generations. The sequence of change is made identical for MA, GA and ILS so as 
to ensure the existence of a common platform for comparison of results. Similar to 
MA, GA and ILS, the pool of dynamic opponents has p players. 
 
4.5.3.1 Test E: Performance of MA, GA and ILS against dynamic opponents  
 
From Figure 4.18a, the average performance of GA and ILS are actually on par 
despite the fact that GA does not have the luxury of altering the strategies in the 
course of each round robin tournament. MA’s AGS is consistently higher than GA 
or ILS, demonstrating its superior adaptability in the dynamic setting. In order of 
increasing duration length between strategy changes, the trend of progression in 
AGS varies from rapidly fluctuating profile – when distinct strategy types are 
encountered every generation, to one that undergoes mild variation – when the 
opponent resume a certain strategy type for at least 100 generations. Complexity 
in the setup is correlated with an increase in the frequency of change in opponent 
strategy type and degree where IL is embraced (Figure 4.18b). 
Zooming into a randomly selected run where the opponent changes every 
50-100 generations, it is clear that the synergic blend of evolution and IL still 
confers the best performance, followed by IL and evolution (Figure 4.19a). As 
opposed to a fixed pool of opponents, good performance in the current setup 
comes with the ability to react spontaneously and appropriately to drastic changes 
in the nature of the environment. The poor adaptability of GA is due largely to a 
slow improvement rate and reaction of evolving players to the diverse nature of 
changing opponent types. In the absence of a guiding force like IL, it is unlikely 
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that evolution will find the optimum strategy to the changed opponent type in a 
short time amidst the trial and error search process. Innate ability to explore and 
adapt closely to changes in the environment across generations – as illustrated by 
a more fluctuating AGS profile, however, allows GA to surpass ILS when playing 
against some opponent types. Poor adaptability of ILS is due to onset of premature 
convergence and over-exploitation. Disparity in performance of IL players also 
contributes, in large parts, to the low performance of the population. Its ability to 
adjust dynamically to changing opponents through double loop IL allows players 
to assume strategies that are vastly different from those acquired when playing 
against previous types. This, in a way, makes them less dependent on opponents' 
traits and ensures smooth adjustments and performance consistency even when the 
opponent population transits between two widely different strategy types. 
On the whole, MA depicts the most promising results by being able to attain 
full cooperation - AGS of 3.0, with players of its own type (Figure 4.19b) and 
performing best against all distinct opponent types that appeared in succession 
(Figure 4.19c). In summary, IL allows MA players to reevaluate their performance 
constantly during the game play. Any drastic change in the opponent’s nature is 
captured by double loop IL, which introduces adequate variation to allow players 
to derive significantly different strategy traits, even when many have acquired 
considerably similar genotypes after numerous evolution cycles. As compared to 
random mutation in GA, IL makes changes more explicit. The search space to 
hunt for better strategies is expanded via the varying learning experiences of each 
MA player. Evolutionary pressure then comes into play to allow weaker players to 
adopt traits from those which have developed good strategies against the new 
opponent population. As long as a sizeable portion of MA population has acquired 
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the right perception about the desired response against the opponent strategy, this 
information is propagated quickly to other members of the community and overall 
strategy traits of the entire population are adjusted almost instantly. In summary, 
evolution supplements IL to improve the performance of each player over time, 
and eventually helps the entire MA population to adapt well on a collective basis. 
 




































































































































































































Figure 4.18: (a) AGS and (b) learning ratio for MA, GA and ILS as each plays with an opponent 
that changes dynamically every 1, 10-20 and 100-150 generations 
 


























































































































(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 4.19: AGS attained as MA, GA and ILS play separately against (a) itself and opponent, (b) 
itself and (c) the opponent, when opponent’s nature changes every 50-100 generations 
4.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the performance and adaptability of evolutionary, learning and 
memetic strategies are assessed in various IPD settings. Evolutionary strategies 
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are realized by GA based on co-evolutionary principles and learning strategies by 
a double-loop incremental learning scheme, ILS that incorporates classification, 
probabilistic update of strategies and a feedback learning mechanism. A memetic 
adaptation framework, MA is also developed to harness the synergy of evolution 
and learning. In this framework, learning assists the evolving strategies to acquire 
good strategy traits and react spontaneously to changes in the environment, while 
evolution provides an avenue for knowledge exchange between players so that the 
disparity in performance between learning strategies is minimized.  
The comparative case studies that are conducted for different environmental 
conditions showed that the players adapted by MA exhibit superior performance 
relative to GA and ILS. GA is found to be slow to react to environment changes 
and its performance also deteriorates against adaptive opponents. ILS, on the other 
hand, suffers from diverse learning experiences among individuals and a tendency 
to over-exploit which undermine the performance of the entire population. The 
combination of incremental learning and evolution, however, allows MA players 
to balance the tasks of exploration and exploitation of diverse strategies while 
preserving its trend of dominance consistently. It is gathered from the chapter that 
both incremental learning and evolution are essential elements of adaptation in the 
IPD game. Their concurrent interaction is crucial for the formation of strategies 








Modeling Civil Violence 
 
After verifying the ability of CEAs to evolve competent strategies in both poker 
and IPD, and give insights about the respective problems via meaningful analysis, 
we shift our attention to model and analyze interesting social phenomenon. Civil 
violence, in particular, is widely used in the context of modern society to describe 
associated acts of violation and destruction, which are carried out as a sign of 
defiance against a central authority or between opposing groups. It is manifested 
in many forms and categorized according to the nature, degree of involvement and 
severity of conflict. These can range from small-scale riots and demonstrations to 
large-scale revolutions such as civil and ethnic wars. Researchers have sought to 
interpret the causes and effects from various perspectives. In social conflict theory 
[158], sociologists consider unrest as the result of socio-economic instability [159]. 
Economists adopt an opportunist’s viewpoint by relating rebellion to profits [160]. 
Political scientists question the motives and attribute upheavals as the result of 
resource or political deprivation [161], [162].  
The perspective of associating civil violence with pent-up grievances has 
varied widely. Collier and Hoeffler [163] have looked at possible economic causes 
while Regan and Norton [164] have regarded it as a function of mass mobilization. 
Substantive differences are also identified in both ethnic and non-ethnic motivated 
violence [165], [166]. Since “each war is as different as the society producing it” 
[167], causes should be analyzed using the nature of conflict. Despite compelling 
differences in views, the underlying structure of conflict remains similar with 
respect to widespread, collective, random movement of crowds and interactions 
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between people [168]. Empirical models of social conflict in the form of riot 
games [169], game theoretic models [170], [171] and social networks - simulated 
to offer statistical, spatial-temporal analysis [172] of conflict and its role playing 
dynamics [173] in crowds, generate emergent social phenomena such as behavior 
clustering [174], mass-mobilization [175] and massive conflicts [159], which are 
indisputably a reflection of real-life conflicts. Although these models provide a 
good avenue to study strategies for managing civil violence [176], none actually 
accounted for the autonomous behavioral evolution of agents, which is consistent 
with the fact that humans learn and adapt.  
The chapter focuses on the design and development of a spatial Evolutionary 
Multi-Agent Social Network (EMASN) to simulate and study the macroscopic-
behavioral dynamics of civil violence, as a result of microscopic game-theoretic 
interactions between goal-oriented agents in various situational settings. Inspired 
by evolutionary computation, agents modeled from multi-disciplinary perspectives 
[177] have their strategies evolve over time via co-evolution [64], [178], [179] and 
learning. Experimental results reveal some fascinating emergent phenomena and 
interesting patterns of agent movement and autonomous behavioral development 
[180]. The results analysis establishes micro-macro [159], [181] interconnections 
between the attributes of conflict and provides new insights into the rich dynamics 
which arise from unrest. Collectively, the EMASN framework facilitates the study 
of autonomous emergent behavior and serves as an avenue to gain a more holistic 
understanding of the fundamental nature of civil violence. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: section 5.1 presents a short 
literature review of existing works and the general framework of EMASN. Section 
5.2 introduces the model specifications. Section 5.3 focuses on the discussion of 
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the evolutionary and learning mechanisms that drive the autonomous behavioral 
changes in agents as they move and interact in the model. Section 5.4 evaluates 
the series of simulation results based on different model extensions to analyze the 
effects of various parameters on the behavioral response of the model. Section 5.5 
presents a broad summary of discussion, highlighting the significant results while 
Section 5.6 concludes the paper with an overview and some comments on areas 
where future work can be embarked on. 
 




The popularization of game theory saw a widespread usage of agent-based [177] 
approaches to model human entities as rational utility maximizers. Applications 
can range from the study of cooperation in the IPD to the modeling of investors’ 
behavior in stock markets [182]. There is also a paradigm shift from the traditional 
top-down approach to a bottom-up approach [183] of studying emergent system 
behavior through the collective microscopic interaction among individual agents 
within complex multi-agent systems.  
Numerous empirical-based computer simulations have been constructed over 
the years to model complex dynamic systems [184], [185] across many disciplines. 
The procedure involves decomposing complex verbal theories and then translating 
them into semi-mathematical equations which are integrated systematically into 
the model design. Developed models are simulated over time to create meaningful 
trends and patterns for the purpose of analysis and drawing of conclusions. The 
same approach was also taken by Epstein [173] to model decentralized rebellion 
against a central authority and communal violence between two ethnic groups. By 
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virtue of its simplicity, the elegant agent-based computational model was able to 
replicate salient features of violence dynamics through simple empirical rules and 
equations. The MANA model [176] then extended Epstein’s model by introducing 
specific movement strategies which were aimed at correcting the purely random 
agent movement. Situngkir [159] also modeled the phenomena of massive conflict 
by invoking its analogy with the macro-micro link in Sociological Theory. 
 
5.1.2 EMASN Framework 
 
Inspired by existing models [173], [175], [176], and concepts in EGT [36], [186], 
the proposed EMASN framework consists of a civil violence model (CVM) and 
an evolutionary engine (EE) (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
                      : Behavioral Evolution












Figure 5.1: Framework of the Evolutionary Multi-Agent Social Network  
 
As agents interact game theoretically, their strategies are evolved via independent 
learning and collective co-evolution using a CEA. Overall, EMASN attempts to 
model events of conflict by integrating the complexity of human behavior and 
random nature of crowd movement. Emphasis is placed on the modeling of agents 
and their interactions through behavioral rules at the microscopic-level, so as to 
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recreate the macroscopic-emergent outcomes that agree well with contemporary 
views. Descriptions of components and functionalities of the CVM and EE will be 
provided in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.1.3 Game theoretic interaction 
 
The CVM models interaction using features of a spatial IPD game [89], [187]. 
Though simplistic, this approach deals with complex issues of decision-making 
and self-interest [89], where the underlying concepts are subtle but far-reaching. 
Analogy between the CVM and IPD frameworks can reveal interesting dynamics 
on how agents maximize their benefits in view of situational changes [188]. 
 
1) General game play: A total of three different agent types are specified in the 
model. They are specified and denoted as follows: 
 
• Quiescent Civilians -  
• Activists -  
• Cops -  
 
At any time instance, movement is subjected to the spatial constraint of a 2D-Grid 
and only cops and activists are allowed to interact. Each agent establishes game 
play with every other opposing agent (e.g. cops and activists) within the vision 
radius in a pair-wise manner. No interaction will take place between agents of the 
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2) Payoff matrix: In view of the possible strength differences between opposing 
agents in any spatial neighborhood, the CVM adopts a payoff scheme that varies 
in accordance to the situation of encounter. A set of three payoff matrices which 
correspond to the scenarios where the number of cops is equal to, more than or 
less than the activists are shown respectively (Table 5.1a-c). Each player has the 
option to Cooperate or Defect. An analogy is drawn between the meaning of 
Cooperate and Defect in the IPD and CVM. This differs for each agent type. 
Adapting from the MANA model [176], activists cooperate by not challenging 
cops, revolting aggressively or instigating civilians to revolt, and accept peaceful 
settlements; and defect otherwise. Cops cooperate to protect civilians and defect to 
pursue rebels. Each group has conflicting goals that involve tradeoffs. Activists 
aim to create havoc and garner support from the quiescent civilians to fuel the 
ongoing unrest while avoiding arrest. On the contrary, cops aim to maintain order 
within the regime while fulfilling their role as protectors by minimizing casualties.  
 
Table 5.1: Payoff matrix when number of cops is (a) equal to, (b) greater than or (c) less than the 
activists in sight 
 
                                                 Activists  
  COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE 3,3 0,5 Cops DEFECT 5,0 1,1 
(a) 
 
                                                 Activists  
  COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE 1,4 2,2 Cops DEFECT 3,3 4,1 
(b) 
 
                                                Activists  
  COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE 4,1 3,3 Cops DEFECT 2,2 1,4 
(c) 
 
3) Rationale for different payoff: The matrices are constructed based on the goal 
of each agent group to maximize its benefit and minimize casualties in different 
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situations of contact. Consider the scenario when cops outnumber activists in a 
particular spatial area of interaction.  
 
a. If both groups Defect, cops will gain the upper-hand due to their superiority in 
numbers. Their successful intervention to stem the unrest should be rewarded 
the temptation payoff (T). Activists, due to huge casualties should be rewarded 
the sucker payoff (S). 
  
b.  If both groups cooperate, payoffs reverse in favor of the activists as cops have 
missed a good opportunity to make arrest while deciding to protect the general 
population. For the activists, Cooperate paid off as they successfully avoided 
conflict with the massive cop population.  
 
c.  If cops Cooperate and activists Defect, both groups get the Punishment payoff 
(P) as cops should have Defect to confront activists while activists should have 
Cooperate in order to avoid challenging the domineering law enforcers openly 
and inviting casualties.  
 
d.  If cops Defect and activists Cooperate, a logical equilibrium is attained as the 
majority exerts dominance over the minority whilst the latter avoids direct 
conflict. This is the best situation as the benefits of both groups are accounted, 
justifying reward payoff (R) for both.  
 
Assuming symmetric game-play, the above settings are considered in the reverse 
manner when activists outnumber cops. Despite the addition of two new matrices 
to account for strength disparity between cops and activists, the goal of agents in 
the CVM is similar to players in the IPD as each seeks to maximize the eventual 
payoffs through its interaction in different setups. 
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5.2 Civil violence model 
 
The CVM consists of multiple agents interacting and coexisting in an artificial 
society; a computational structure where new social theories can be verified or 
developed [189]. It is composed of three distinct inherent components: The agents, 




Agents form the crux of the CVM. Accurate modeling of their attributes is crucial 
for a close-life depiction of human behavior in situations of civil upheaval. In the 
CVM, the quiescent civilians are neutral members of the community who thrive 
amidst unrest and hardship. They pose no danger to the central authority but do 
respond to internal and external stimuli from time to time. They remain peaceful 
and law-abiding but turn active if conditions are favorable to express their anger 
and frustration publicly. Cops maintain order in the regime by arresting activists 
and play a crucial role in determining the success of violence control strategies. 
 
1) Basic attributes: In line with Berdal and Malone [190], CVM models grievance 
and greed [191] as the two idealized components which collectively measure the 
tendency of joining the revolt. Apart from the heterogeneous perceived hardship 
[173] that is modeled endogenously as Hendo = U(0,1), the definition of hardship is 
extended to account for its correlation with the level of unrest via an exogenous, 
homogenous attribute. The rationale is that civilians face the added burden and 
psychological trauma of fear due to looting, pillaging and repression from the 









= +  (5.1)
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where AΣ  and AΣ  refer to the number of activists and quiescent civilians present in 
the CVM. The overall hardship experienced by a typical civilian is formulated as: 
 
0.5 0.5overall endo exoH H H= ⋅ + ⋅  (5.2)
 
Legitimacy L = U(0,1) refers to the perceived legality of the central authority [173] 
and is uniform for all agents. Grievance (G) is defined as a function of Hoverall and 
L in the form shown in (5.3) where Hexo accounts for the possible changes in G as 
the condition of unrest changes from time to time. 
 
)1( LHG overall −⋅=  (5.3)
 
 
Greed (0,1)Gr U= is the perceived opportunity to gain wealth. In economic 
perspectives, Gr will be much dependent on how lucrative the revolt is. When 
viewed psychologically, a greedy agent will have a high tendency to rebel even if 
opportunistic gain is small. According to Collier and Hoeffler [191], G triggers a 
revolt while Gr sustains it. Tendency to revolt (Rev) is formulated as 
 
Re (1 )f fv T G T Gr= ⋅ + − ⋅  (5.4) 
 
 
where [0,1]fT = , as shown in (5.5) is a time factor that is inversely related to the 
active duration adT of a rebel: 
 
 




Besides G and Gr, the decision to revolt depends on the net risk that an 
agent is exposed to. This is modeled from three dimensions – the inclination to 
take risk, probability of getting caught and the jail term to serve upon arrest. Risk 
aversion, RA = U(0,1) is an agent’s willingness and capacity to subject itself to 
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danger. Likelihood of arrest, Pa depends on the agent’s vision radius, VR(Ag) and 









Figure 5.3: 8-Directional Agent Vision Radius 
 
 
Information is local in the CVM and decisions regarding revolt, direction to 
move etc are governed by information available within the agent’s field of vision. 
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⋅ ⋅ +  denote the number of cops, 
activists and cop-to-activist ratio within the vision radius. kb introduces a bias such 
that cops have 90% of making a successful arrest in a one-one situation with an 
activist. Jail term, J is defined as the number of time episodes that an agent is put 




















Jmax is the maximum jail penalty, JH is the number of times an agent is caught 
formerly while JHmax is the maximum number of times tolerable for the repetition 
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of crime in society’s view. In a variable jail term formulation, the fixed part is the 
minimum sentence while the variable part accounts for the increasing penalty for 
repeated offenders. Imax is a large number denoting life imprisonment. In a fixed 
jail term formulation, J is constant. The net risk N, perceived by an agent with an 
intention to revolt is modeled by (5.9) where Jα determines the deterrent effect of 




A aN R P J α= ⋅ ⋅  (5.9)
 
 
2) Game theoretic attributes: Apart from basic attributes, a different set of traits is 
set out in Table 5.2 to account for the results of game-theoretic interactions.  
 
Table 5.2: Summary of Game Theoretic Agent Attributes  
 
Parameters Description 
Agstrategy 14-bit binary string that encodes the behavior of an agent. 
Payacc Effectiveness of an agent strategy over the course of simulation. 
Paygen Effectiveness of an agent strategy over the previous generation. 
GHacc Number of games played over the course of simulation. 
GHgen Number of games played over the previous generation. 
GSlost Number of lost game sets over the last generation. 
Rco Ratio of cooperative games to the total games played.  
Rdef Ratio of defection games to the total games played. 
SH Number of “successful trials” accumulated over the previous generation.  
FH Number of “unsuccessful trials” accumulated over the previous generation.  
 
5.2.2 Empirical rules 
 
Empirical rules govern agent interaction and ensure proper functioning of CVM. 
They are crucial to the formation of desired simulation outcomes that depict close 
replicas of unrest vividly described in numerous literatures on revolution and wars.  
 
1) State Transition Rule: Civilians turn active when NAI = Rev - N is larger than 
a predefined threshold (Athreshold) and stay quiescent otherwise. A summary of state 
transitions is presented (Table 5.3). Cops are assumed to be loyal to the cause of 
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the regime and insusceptible to any form of bribery e.g. state transitions will only 
occur between activists and quiescent civilians. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of State Transition 
 
Current State NAI - AT State Transition 
Quiescent > 0 Quiescent Æ Active 
Quiescent ≤ 0 Quiescent Æ Quiescent 
Active > 0  Active Æ Active 
Active ≤ 0  Active Æ Quiescent 
 
2) Jail Release Rule: In contrast to the MANA model [176] where jailed agents 
revert to the active state after release, the CVM allows transition to the quiescent 
or active state with a certain probability. This takes into account the possible onset 
of rehabilitation – high chances of converting jailed agents back to law-abiding 
citizens and also the curse of the minority – a low possibility that persistent rebels 




Prevert = 0.1Pconvert = 0.9
 
 
Figure 5.4: State transition flow diagram between different agent states 
 
 
3) Movement Rule: The movement of agents between consecutive episodes is 
modeled using a set of simple update rules, such that the position of each agent in 
the next time episode is determined by its current position and existing states of all 
cells within its vision radius. In particular, these rules are adapted from John 
Conway’s Game of Life, which states that a cell with one or no neighbor dies of 
loneliness while one with four or more neighbors dies due to overpopulation. Only 
those with two or three neighbors survive. By treating dynamic agents in the CVM 
as subjects of concern e.g. cells; and drawing an analogy between loneliness and 
isolation as well as overpopulation and overcrowding, simple rules (Table 5.4) are 
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devised to govern movement on the grid. The underlying rationale is that isolated 
agents are likely targets of attack by opposing agents and they prefer to move to 
safer spots if like agents in the vicinity is low. Likewise, densely packed agents 
tend to move towards sparsely filled regions to avoid the danger of losing sight of 
the situation. The destination cell that an agent moves to is randomly chosen from 
the set of vacant ones that are adjacent to it. On top of these basic rules, each 
agent type also has its own preference movement strategies as shown in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.4: Basic movement rules in the CVM 
 
Movement Rules Description 
Rule 1 An agent will remain in its original position at the next time instance if the number of neighboring agents within its vision radius is 2, 3 or 8.    
Rule 2 An agent will move to a new position at the next time instance if the number of neighboring agents within its vision radius is 1, 4, 5, 6 or 7. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Preference movement strategies for different agent types 
 
Movement strategies Agent Type Description 
Avoid the Cops Activists Activists attempt to minimize contact with cops in order to lower the chances of arrest. 
Stay if favorable Activists Activists prefer to stay put rather than venture out into the unknowns if the current location is safe.  
Eradicate the Civilians Activists Activists take initiative to root out and eradicate any unarmed civilian in sight. 
Pursue Activists Cops Cops take initiative to arrest activists. 
Protect Civilians Cops Cops take initiative to protect the general population from the threats of activists. 
Run from Activists Quiescent Quiescent civilians run for their lives when activists are on a killing spree. 
 
4) Arrest Rule: An arrest is made at any episode when a cop wins an IPD game 
set against an activist in the neighborhood of interaction. Taking into account the 
onset of group effect, cops will have higher chances of apprehending activists if 




The environment defines an N x M space where all agents move and interact. 
Coupled with global and situational parameters, it allows access to information 
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about the state of unrest and an overview of the spatial interaction between agents 
on both global and local scales. 
 
5.3 Evolutionary Engine 
 
Following the CVM formulation, it is crucial to devise channels for agents to 
better their performance in the stochastic model. This is achieved by improving 
their strategies over time through evolution and learning. The two processes allow 
agents to shape their behaviors and react aptly to unforeseen circumstances. This 
ability gives rise to interesting behavioral dynamics and provides insights into the 
autonomous behavioral development of different agent types. 
 
5.3.1 Evolution of Agent Behavior 
 
At the start of each generation, CVM passes agents to the EE where co-evolution 
of strategies takes place (Figure 5.5). Groups are evolved independently by the EE 
(Figure 5.6). This framework has since been used to implement search heuristics 
[192], generate pursuit and evasion behavior [193], analyze population dynamics 
[194] and study cooperation in EGT models [195], [196]. In recent literatures, this 
approach gained further significance via a finding where co-evolution improves 
computational performance in fitness prediction [197] as well as a successful 
attempt to measure generalization performance in co-evolutionary learning [198]. 
In the proposed model, co-evolution is conceptualized in analogy to the exchange 
of ideas, in reality, between members of the same group. Through the multi-
directional flow of information, agents with weaker strategies learn from stronger 
ones by adopting some of their better traits. Overall fitness of each group is raised 
as more competent strategies are discovered with each elapsed generation. This 
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added dimension of realism will enable the analysis of interesting outcomes in 







Population of evolved agents
Y1 = [y11 , y12…y1Q ]
Y2 = [y21 , y22…y2A]
Y3 = [y31 , y32…y3C]
Population of agents
X1 = [x11, x12…x1Q]
X2 = [x21, x22…x2A]
X3 = [x31, x32…x3C]
 
 












Figure 5.6:  Co-evolution of different agent groups 
 
 
1) Chromosomal Representation: Each agent is defined by a 14-bit binary string 
which encodes the strategy bits (“1” – Cooperate or “0” – Defect) used in different 
situations (Figure 5.7). The next move will be decided based on previous moves 
made by both the agent and his opponent. In the absence of move history, this is 
determined by bits encoding initial conditions. 
 
 









number of allied a gents
is outnumbered  by
opposing agents.





Figure 5.7: Binary encoded genotype for agent strategy 
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2) Fitness Representation: Effectiveness or fitness of each strategy is defined in 
terms of the normalized payoff per game over the previous generation. This is 
mathematically given by (5.10). To ensure that fitness evaluation is meaningful, 
only agents that have played at least one game set in the previous generation are 








=   (5.10) 
 
3) Elitism: Elitism is employed to ensure that strategies that perform substantially 
well are adopted by agents in the next generation. The average generation fitness 
(AGF) of each population is used as the level for implementing elitism. This is 
given mathematically in (5.11). Strategies with payoffs larger than AGF are given 
priority for reuse so that the population can continue to benefit from them in the 
next generation. These above average strategies serve as a benchmark for others to 


















4) Selection: The EE performs a dual-stage selection. The first stage uses binary 
tournament selection without replacement to avoid multiple selection of a strategy 
at expense of others. The second stage is analogous to a local search operation 
where agents are selected arbitrarily and subjected to slight perturbation [199] to 
allow preservation of good genes of inferior strategies.  
 
5) Genetic Operators: Uniform crossover is performed to simulate knowledge 
exchange between strategies which are propagating to the next generation. This 
ensures that desired traits of good strategies are passed on to the offspring in an 
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attempt to create even better strategies in the subsequent generations. Binary bit-
flip mutation is also implemented to introduce diversity into the population.   
 
6) Algorithmic flow: The new offspring population will constitute a collection of 
evolved strategies that will be used in game play as agents move and interact over 
the next generation. A generalized algorithmic workflow of the evolution process 











































Learning is a form of local search operation that is carried out by agents to better 
their performance based on some form of heuristics which uses domain-specific 
information available on hand. In contrast to evolution, learning is performed 
independently without exchange of information.   
 
1) Significance of Learning: In the absence of information sharing, man is a good 
instance of an entity that is capable of acquiring knowledge and making complex, 
independent decisions. In a dynamic CVM, the analogy applies as agents learn on 
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the go and react to unforeseen circumstances by altering their strategies on a 
timely basis. Learning is typically performed based on partial memory [150] of 
past experiences. In addition to performance enhancement, learning also facilitates 
the autonomous behavioral development of agents and brings out the interesting 
dynamics that will be insightful to the study of human behavior in different setups. 
 
2) Design of Learning Heuristics: In the absence of information exchange and 
collaboration, agents are simply entities which are required to learn independently 
by making use of information they perceive. In view of the variegated situations 
encountered by agents, diverse learning experiences will inevitably be entailed. 
Good learning strategies in general, are those which respond and adapt well to 
opponent strategies, and in the process achieve maximization of overall payoff. 
The basis of learning adopted in the paper is devised by keeping a record of the 
number of successful and unsuccessful trials accumulated by all strategy bits in 
the course of game play. This is determined by a set of three performance matrices 
which corresponds to the three payoff matrices used in the CVM (Tables 5.6–5.8).  
 




















 COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE Success Failure 
DEFECT Success Failure 
 COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE Failure Failure 
DEFECT Success Success 
 COOPERATE DEFECT 
COOPERATE Success Success 
DEFECT Failure Failure 
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The heuristics are conceptualized based on Pavlovian Learning, where T is 
considered “success” while S is considered “failure”. R and P are considered as 
“success” and “failure” respectively. The number of “success” and “failure” trials 
indicates whether a strategy bit should be revised. Intuitively, better strategy bits 
have larger “success” than “failure” count while the weaker ones have a larger 
“failure” count. Bits which are not used have zero for both counts. The search 
process only revises a strategy bit if the following criterion is met. 
 
10 lostSH FH GS< + ⋅  (5.12)
 
The number of Lost Game Sets (GSlost) is introduced as a means to penalize the 
strategies which are losing consistently. This ensures that the strong and desirable 
strategy bits are likely to remain intact and weaker ones are susceptible to change. 
Learning is performed incrementally in an iterated game set after every k games, 
where k is a variable learning parameter. In general, a lower k value results in a 
larger number of learning cycles and higher learning rate. For simplicity, k is fixed 
in CVM. Incremental learning is used to correct undesirable traits of the current 
strategy and allows better adaptation to the environment of opponent strategies. 
 
5.4 Simulation results 
 
Simulation runs are carried out using Microsoft Visual C++. A summary of the 
parameter values used is depicted in Table 5.9. In all runs, size of 2D environment 
is fixed to ensure uniformity in the result analysis across different case studies. A 
mean of 200 games is played in a pair-wise manner between any two opposing 
agents which are one square radius from each other at any instance. Simulation 
duration is set at 1000 or 5000 episodes while the number of agents and initial 
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population composition vary according to test scenarios. All agents have a vision 
radius of one and quiescent civilians turn active beyond a threshold of 0.2. On jail 
release, agents turn quiescent and active with probabilities 0.9 and 0.1 respectively.  
Evolution is triggered every 5 episodes and learning every 20 games. Model 
extensions of varying complexity are introduced in the following sections to track 
behavioral development in each agent population. Due to the stochastic nature of 
CVM that arises from the disparity in interaction pattern of agents over different 
episodes, it is crucial to conduct several simulation runs to obtain more consistent 
depiction of the outcome. This serves to minimize stochastic variation and verify 
consistency of any behavioral trends that are observed across the runs.  
 
Table 5.9: List of parameter values used in the simulation runs 
 
 
CVM  Parameters: Values 
Size of 2D Grid, Szgrid 20 x 20 squares 
No. of games in an iterated game set, α 200 
Total number of simulation time episodes, Tmax 1000 or 5000 
Total number of agents, AgΣ  variable 
Agent vision radius, VR(Ag) 1 square radius 
Active Threshold, Athreshold 0.2 
Probability of successful rehabilitation, Pconvert 0.9 
Probability of reverting back to active state, Prevert 0.1 
Tournament selection size, Sztournament 2 
Perturbation probability, Pperturb 0.02 
Crossover rate, Pcrossover 0.8 
Mutation rate, Pmutate 0.05 
No. of time episodes per evolution cycle, g 5 
No. of games played per learning cycle, k 20 
 
5.4.1 Basic CVM Dynamics 
 
This section validates the correctness of the CVM by comparing its basic response 
with the dynamics that were observed in Epstein’s model. This is paramount as it 
lays the foundation for the development of more complex extensions and serves as 
a standard to which the results in subsequent models can be compared with. 
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Simulations are performed when number of cops, NC = 60 and J =100 for a 
civilian population of 180. Agents are interacting vis-à-vis a game theoretic setup 
and subjected to periodic cycles of evolution and learning. Success of arrests in a 
spatial neighborhood depends on the relative competency of the cop and activist 
strategies. With activists adopting Avoid the Cops and Stay if favorable and cops 
using Pursue Activists, the resulting active ratio - denoting ratio of activists to 
civilians, is plotted in Figure 5.9. The characteristic plot depicts a fluctuating 
waveform which is persistently plagued by short term instances of unprecedented 
up-shoots. This coincides with Epstein’s notion of a “Punctuated Equilibria” - 
which states that long periods of relative stability are punctuated by outbursts of 
rebellious activities. From this, it can be clearly inferred that peace and stability is 
a dynamic equilibrium which emerges from the interaction between agents rather 
than a static equilibrium itself. Any factor that alters the mode of agent interaction 
or movement will cause changes in the macroscopic temporal response. Presence 
of such features serves as a preliminary step towards verifying the validity of the 
CVM. More intuitive substantiation will be done in the upcoming sections.   
 


























5.4.2   CVM Response under varying NC 
 
Besides verifying the consistency and soundness of the CVM, its response can be 
studied from other perspectives. This section investigates the effect of varying NC 
on aspects of its temporal and spatial dynamics. Interesting emergent behaviors 
are explored, followed by an analysis and discussions on salient CVM attributes.  
 
1) Impact of NC on basic temporal dynamics: The active ratios for NC = [0, 20, 60] 
are plotted. The long term profile with 0 cops is analogous to a step response that 
starts with a steep rise in rebel activities and ends with 58% of the population on 
revolt - maximum amount of rebel activities that can occur with the pre-defined 
Athreshold (Figure 5.10a). The short term profile fluctuates about the long term mean 
with considerable regularity. As NC is increased to 10, the plot undergoes milder 
long term variations, encompassing a steady drop in active ratio followed by some 
notable changes and transitions (Figure 5.10b). The system response is unstable 
due to insufficient cops to suppress the rebel activities within a stable equilibrium 
level. With 60 cops, peak and settling ratios are reduced and a substantial degree 
of stability is attained since added cops are able to perform the task of arrest more 
effectively (Figure 5.10c). The characteristic waveform, nonetheless, gets more 
fluctuating as discerned by occurrences of instantaneous outbursts with significant 
peaks occurring over shorter intervals. The resulting equilibria are “punctuated” 
with frequent alternation between periods of unrest and stability.  
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(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 5.10: Temporal response for (a) 0, (b) 10 and (c) 60 cops 
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Figure 5.11 shows the overview of simulated profiles corresponding to different 
NC. An inverse relationship between active ratio and NC is correctly established as 
verified from the collection of temporal response curves. The decline in both peak 
and settling ratios gets less significant with more cops, indicating presence of a 
saturation level – where help rendered by each cop addition decreases as NC gets 
larger. The drop in marginal contribution implies that further reduction in active 
ratio will have to come from other aspects of improvement. 
 
 

























Figure 5.11: Family of temporal response curves for different NC 
 
 
2) Impact of NC on basic spatial dynamics: The spatial response of the CVM 
provides an overview of the 2D environment with its interacting agents, allowing 
observations to be made from both global and local viewpoints. This facilitates the 
task of tracking movement patterns of agents and through the process, uncovers 
fascinating emergent phenomena. Analysis of the microscopic interaction can also 
offer micro-macro explanations of temporal responses at the macroscopic scale. 
This is examined for configuration setups with different NC.  
 
• Local Outburst: A closer examination of the spatial interaction suggests that 
the presence of unprecedented up-shoot is largely due to spontaneous occurrence 
of outburst in regions of low cop density (Figure 5.12a). In these areas, cop-to-
  144
activist ratio is low enough for mildly aggrieved agents to turn active concurrently 
(Figure 5.12b). These initial spatial correlations of activists act as a catalyst to 
elicit further outbursts by drawing more quiescent civilians into the revolt (Figure 
5.12c). As stated [173], “when the mob is already very big relative to the cops, the 
level of grievance and risk taking required to join the revolt is far lower”. This can 
be explained by the “Seeding” effect – an initial pool of rebels is able to seed out 
potential but less aggrieved activists in the vicinity to add to the severity of unrest.  
A quiescent agent will feel safer to join a rebellion and display its discontent 
publicly if there are already a lot others doing it. This reiterates Mao Tze Tung’s 
view that “a single spark can cause a prairie fire” [200], [201] and reinforces the 
concept of mass-mobilization – a crucial mechanism for triggering civil violence 
and fuelling growth of small-scale protests into larger ones [175], [202]. Once the 
outburst of rebel activities gets very large, a resulting mob usually fuels its growth 
and is by and large self-sustaining. A proposed plan [173] is to curb freedom of 
assembly by imposing curfews that restrict chances of collation among activists. 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 5.12: Spatial response depicting local outburst with 40 cops at episode (a) 1, (b) 2 and (c) 3 
 
 
• Group Clustering: Spatial interaction of agents also depicts group clusters - 
collection of connected agents in 8-connectivity space, amidst evolution of agent 
movement (Figure 5.13). Activists collate as a form of collective behavior to 
create regions of low cop-to-activist ratio e.g. “safe havens” [173] as this reduces 
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the chances of arrest and prolong the unrest considerably. Le Bon proposes in his 
theory that “crowds seem to be governed by a collective mind, and that contagion 
causes members to experience similar thoughts and emotions” [203]. Sigmund 
Freud [204] further reinforces the fact that “individuals are able to satisfy basic 
needs for membership, hostility and so on by joining crowds.” In reality, activists 
seek collective identity and group belongingness, the direction to vent their anger, 
protesting strength and safety, all of which are present among crowds in areas of 
low cop density. These psychological and behavioral needs often account for the 
conglomeration of scattered activists into small groups and amalgamation of small 
clusters into large ones (Figure 5.13). Since it gets harder to arrest rebels in huge 
clusters, duration of unrest is lengthened unless effective strategies are used. 
A common challenge posed to the cops in crowd management is to disperse 
clusters before they turn into massively large mobs that are beyond control. An 
effective cop strategy is one that places cops in strategic positions (Figure 5.14). 
As seen, a burgeoning cluster between two activist groups is dispersed by cops in 
an attempt to form a line of defense that cuts through possible points of assembly. 
Similar to the partitioning of two warring groups [205], the above crowd control 
strategy seeks to lessen the severity of civil unrest by thwarting attempts made by 
activists to crowd together. The breakdown of large clusters facilitates the process 
of arresting activists, which would tend to appear very much in scattered numbers. 
                            
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 5.13: Spatial response depicting group clustering with 10 cops at episode (a) 3, and (b) 4 
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(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 5.14: Spatial response of crowd dispersing with 20 cops at episode (a) 4, (b) 5, and (c) 6 
 
 
• Deceptive Behavior: One salient feature of human behavior lies in the ability 
to put on a false front when dangerous encounters are imminent. Such deception is 
illustrated where two privately aggrieved agents appear ostensibly quiescent in the 
presence of cops but turn active if adjacent cops move away (Figure 5.15). This is 
due to a fall in cop-to-activist ratio within the local spatial neighborhood, which 
results in the reduced risk of arrest and higher tendency to revolt. Though subtle in 
nature, the display of such behavior is paramount to the study of human entities.  
Famous military strategist, Sun Tzu [206] quoted that “Warfare is the art of 
deceit” [207]. An element of surprise which precedes any attack e.g. in Guerilla 
Warfare, is a pertinent factor that led to the success of numerous revolutions and 
uprisings. Deception is simply one of the most vital tools of biological survival 
[208] that is used by living entities in their adaptation to different environments. 
Many forms of military tactics are also mirrored and portrayed in nature - decoys, 
camouflages, diversions, disinformation, dazzles, disruptive coloration, disguise. 
By practicing the art of deception, activists conceal their emotions by appearing to 
be law abiding. This allows them to avoid any detection and arrest while waiting 
patiently for the right opportunity to strike. This has far-fetching repercussions as 
it lengthens the duration of the actual unrest and is a causal factor that makes the 
task of apprehending active remnants increasingly difficult. 
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                    (a)                            (b) 
 
Figure 5.15: Spatial responses illustrating deceptive behavior with 80 cops at episode (a) 1 and 
(b) 2 
 
3) Impact on active ratio: To extend the discussion, the emergence of deceptive 
behavior in the proposed co-evolutionary framework is examined in greater depths. 
Deceptive acts are revealed in the decision to stay quiescent despite favorable 
conditions to rebel. It is fascinating to understand the onset of such behavior for 
different NC. In Figure 5.16, perceived active ratio denotes the typical active ratio 
while actual active ratio refers to the perceived ratio after all deceptive activists 
are accounted. This reflects the true state of unrest, which can be more severe than 
what cops perceived, as they can only spot active rioters.  
Interestingly, Mao Tse Tung noted that revolutionaries “swim like fishes 
in the sea” [209], making them indistinguishable from the quiescent population. A 
full blown revolt may actually be brewing despite seemingly mild state of unrest. 
As the unrest follows its natural progression through time, deviation between the 
two ratios is observed as deceptive behavior emerges after substantial interaction 
between the activists and cops. Following the initial arrest of numerous activists, 
the remaining minority started to hide their discontent so as to avoid detection and 
arrest, causing a rise in deception level. The profiles of actual and perceived active 
ratio tend to be shaped similar, thus implying that deceptive behavior is exhibited 
largely by a small and unswerving group of activists. 
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Figure 5.16: Actual and perceived active ratios for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops 
 
4) Impact on population dynamics and cooperation ratio: The variation of NC 
also has sizeable impact on the population composition and cooperation profile of 
agent groups. Strong correlation is seen between the two (Figures 5.17, 5.18). For 
low NC, the population dynamics of activist experiences large fluctuation (Figure 
5.17a). The observed peaks are due to the mass release of jailed agents where a 
considerable number revert to the active state almost instantaneously due to low 
number of cops on patrol. This further dampens the cop-to-activist ratio in these 
neighborhoods, making the ambience superseding for activists to express their 
anger publicly. This in turn gives rise to a defect-oriented profile for the activist 
population (Figure 5.18a). With more cops and arrests, the activist population size 
became more stable as tension built up across the group is reduced (Figure 5.17b).  
 


















































Figure 5.17: Population dynamics for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes 
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Figure 5.18: Cooperation ratio for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes 
 
 
Higher cooperation ratio is seen as activists contemplate more before deciding to 
riot (Figures 5.18b). There is also a concurrent dip in the cooperation level of cops 
as there are more occasions where the sizeable NC justifies a pro-active strategy to 
pursue activists. A large NC thus serves as an indirect form of deterrence. 
 
5) Impact on average grievance and greed: The effects of NC on both grievance 
and greed (Figure 5.19, 5.20) are also explored. Grievance is notably higher for 
activists across the plots since it is vital for transition to the active state. Overall, 
grievance profile is limited to a fairly low vacillation level while greed variation is 
contrastingly more pulsating (Figure 5.20). Although activists have high grievance 
in general, greed levels vary widely. Rapid fluctuation is due to the cyclical arrest 
and release of greedy and persistent activists. The quiescent greed profile is less 
susceptible to variation due to absence of exceptionally greedy agents.  
Since an increase in NC places the persistent activists in captivity and also 
reduces the mean population greed concurrently, it can be deduced that subversive 
activists are largely greedy. This effectively validates the nature of grievance as a 
primary, stable component that sparks off unrest and the nature of greed as a 
crucial factor to fuel the continual willingness of persistent activists to revolt. 
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Figure 5.19: Average grievance level for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes 
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Figure 5.20: Average greed level for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes 
 
6) Impact on active history and duration: Active history depicts the degree of 
behavioral switching – the frequency that each agent type switches between the 
quiescent and active states. Active duration tracks the distribution of activists 
across time episodes that they have rioted since the last release. As NC increases 
(Figure 5.21), a rising active history is observed for activists owing to the large 
degree of switching from the quiescent to active state following more arrests. This 
indicates that activists comprise persistent rioters who refuse to learn from their 
old ways. In contrast, the quiescent group undergoes less behavioral switching. 
Observations are consistent with the active duration plots (Figure 5.22). For a 
small NC of 10, variance in active duration is large e.g. [0, 4700] – more activists 
riot for long periods. With NC = 60, the variance is reduced e.g. [0, 2000] with 
concentration of activists in low frequency bins. 
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Figure 5.21: Active history for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over a span of 5000 episodes 
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Figure 5.22: Active duration distribution for (a) 10 and (b) 60 cops over 5000 episodes 
 
5.4.3 Active defectors and charismatic leaders: Effects on 
quiescent civilians  
 
In this case study, the CVM is extended to account for the influence of activists on 
their neighboring quiescent civilians. Two classes of activists – the defectors and 
leaders are defined. Defectors are those that exert influence by demonstrating bold 
acts of defiance while leaders influence the crowds charismatically in more subtle 
ways. It will be interesting to explore the effect of each group on the actual unrest. 
In order to model the effect of influence, NAI is rewritten in (5.13), where 
)( dVR AA  and )( dVR LA  denote the number of defectors and leaders respectively 
within the vision radius of an agent. Each actively demonstrating defector will 
contribute 0.02 while each leader adds 0.05 to the NAI of each neighboring agent, 
increasing the probability to revolt. 
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05.0)(02.0)(Re ⋅+⋅+−= dVRdVR LAAANvNAI  (5.13) 
 
Effects of incorporating influence are analyzed using active ratio, population 
dynamics, cooperation ratio and active duration. Active ratio variations, with and 
without influence, are plotted in Figure 5.23 for NC = 40. The dynamics of the first 
1000 episodes are superimposed. As shown, influence tends to cause more severe 
outburst of rebel activities in initial stages and gives rise to higher peak, mean and 
settling active ratios, since defectors and leaders induce more quiescent agents to 
revolt. Assimilation of these activities on the micro-scale led to outbursts on the 
macro-scale. There is more deviation between actual and perceived active ratios in 
the short run, indicating that influence promotes deceptive behavior (Figure 5.23b). 
The rationale is because the increased interaction between the activists and cops 
creates fundamental behavioral changes in the activist community as the members 
learn of the high opportunity cost for revolting against an overpowering police 
force. Intuitively, an act of deception - staying dormant to avoid detection presents 
itself as the best alternative. As seen in Figure 5.24, influence also creates greater 
fluctuation in the population dynamics for quiescent civilians and activists. 
A momentous change in the cooperation profile of activists is also shown in 
Figure 5.25. Following an upsurge of rebel activities in initial stages, the activist 
population, by virtue of its sheer size breeds defect-oriented behavior as reflected 
by a low initial cooperation ratio. In the absence of influence, cooperation ratio of 
the activists rises rapidly and fluctuates about a mean level (Figure 5.25a). With 
influence, more civilians are instigated to revolt. This dampens cop-to-activist 
ratio in various localities, translating extensively to a tendency to adopt defect-
oriented strategies - slow rise in cooperation and a lower mean when the dynamics 
stabilizes (Figure 5.25b). The gap between mean cooperation levels of cops and 
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activists is larger as well. Influence also reduces the duration that activists can 
roam about freely. A leftward skew of the active duration distribution histogram 
(Figure 5.26) is induced by the increased number of less aggrieved agents who 
turn active momentarily and possibly also due to more frequent arrests.  
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Figure 5.23: Actual and perceived active ratios (a) without and (b) with influence over 5000 episodes 
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Figure 5.24: Population dynamics (a) without and (b) with influence over a span of 5000 episodes   
 
 











































Figure 5.25: Cooperation ratio (a) without and (b) with influence over a span of 5000 episodes 
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Number of Agents vs Active Duration
 




















Number of Agents vs Active Duration
            (a)                               (b) 
 
Figure 5.26: Active duration distribution (a) without and (b) with influence over 5000 episodes 
 
Changes in the dynamics of unrest can also be explored when influence is 
introduced at different times. It is clear that early influence causes a sharp dip in 
the perceived active ratio (Figure 5.27a). Even if defectors and leaders are able to 
stir up emotions of hatred towards the central authority, such sentiments tend to 
subside after the cops initiate pursue and arrest. Instead of inciting more agents to 
revolt, early influence actually invokes massive arrests, creating strong deterrent 
effect indirectly which spurred more activists to exhibit deceptive behavior. This 
effect wanes off when influence is introduced much later (Figure 5.27b).  
 
















































Figure 5.27: Actual and perceived active ratios of introducing influence at (a) 20th and (b) 2500th episode 
 
Injecting influence in the early stages also introduces greater dynamics to 
the long term active profile by allowing a gradual build up of tension across the 
population. This translates to sudden outbursts (Figure 5.27a) that are absent when 
influence is injected at later stages (Figure 5.27b). Findings are fairly consistent to 
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reality as it is easier to kindle feelings of hatred if emotions are still vacillating 
and the spirit of revolution is high amidst the activist regime. Behavioral changes 
occur over a considerable period and early instigation does assist in encouraging 
the development of rebellious behavior within the active community. 
 
5.4.4 CVM Response under varying jail terms 
 
Besides deterrence from cops, jail duration also constitutes a major vitiating factor 
to the willingness to revolt. The nature of punishment is crucial in shaping the 
behavioral profile of activists. This section examines the effects of both fixed and 
variable jail terms on the dynamics of unrest. In the prior, a jail sentence of fixed 
magnitude is imposed on any arrested activist. The latter entails an increasing 
penalty for repeated offenders until life imprisonment is reached.  
 
1) Impact on active ratio: The active ratio for fixed jail terms of [5, 500] and 
variable jail term of maxmax )/(1 JJJ HH ⋅+  for 300max =J , 3max =HJ  are plotted 
in Figure 5.28. A large fixed jail term lowers the mean level of rebel activities 
(Figures 5.28a-b), similar to a large NC. The decline is due to long periods which 
the activists spent in captivity. Accompanying this is a reduction in the scale of 
fluctuation and outbursts, as the long jail term makes it less likely for activists to 
be released simultaneously. Deceptive behavior is also reduced. Compared to a 
large fixed penalty, imposing a low jail penalty and increasing it incrementally 
(Figure 5.28c) for repeated offenders achieves a low and more stable profile. As 
employed in societies, the variable penalty balances the punitive aspect – desire to 
punish offenders and rehabilitative aspect – aim to reform criminals, of law. It 
denotes a fair system of justice where mistakes of initial offenders are tolerated 
while heavier punishments are meted out for repeat offenders. 
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Figure 5.28: Actual and perceived active ratios for fixed jail terms of (a) 5, (b) 500 and (c) variable jail 
term  
 
2) Impact on cooperation ratio: Changes in conviction period also affect the 
cooperation profile of activists. Low jail terms breed low cooperation (Figure 
5.29a) owing to ever presence of activists. Higher fixed jail terms (Figure 5.29b) 
places the jailed activists in captivity for longer periods, causing the outnumbered 
remnants to favor more cooperative strategies after continual interaction with cops. 
Excessive penalty however reduces the cop-to-activist contact and in turn impedes 
autonomous behavioral development as jailed agents have less chance to interact, 
exchange knowledge, learn and evolve. Many remain persistent activists, unlike 
the case of a large NC. As depicted in Figure 5.29c, cooperation is still increasing 
initially when most of the activists are convicted for short periods. As more and 
more are sentenced to life imprisonment, defection sets in for the residual activists, 
invoking further aggression and arrests. As rationalized, the increasing jail term is 
thus an efficient and effective means of isolation and tends to lower the unrest by 
minimizing contact among activists. 
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Figure 5.29: Cooperation ratio for fixed jail terms of (a) 5, (b) 50 and (c) variable jail term  
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3) Impact on active history and duration: Active history increases as higher jail 
penalty is imposed (Figure 5.30). With more activists convicted for considerable 
periods, residual ones are mildly aggrieved and sensitive to changes in the state of 
unrest. By virtue of this nature, a large degree of behavioral switching is portrayed. 
Consistent with this, the active duration is lowered as seen by a leftward skew of 
the histogram distribution (Figure 5.31). This reflects the lengthier period which 
activists spend behind bars. The dynamic range of active duration is less affected 
as opposed to the varying of NC since any reduction in the range of active duration 
is largely due to the higher efficiency which is introduced when more cops are 
deployed to apprehend activists. 
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Figure 5.30: Active history for fixed jail terms of (a) 5 and (b) 500 over 5000 episodes 
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5.4.5 Casualty Model 
 
The final section integrates the knowledge and insights gained from prior sections 
to create an empirical casualty model to investigate a scenario case study where 
harm is inflicted by one group on another. This encompasses the deliberate and 
often systematic elimination of an entire national, racial, political or cultural group 
[210] by distinct ethnic groups or coalitions [211] due to hatred [212] and distrust 
for one another. Examples include the Nazi-Jew holocaust, Hutu-Tutsi Rwanda 
genocide etc. The fundamental nature of such events can be better understood by 
probing into the underlying emergence dynamics.  
In this model, cops assume the role of peacekeepers while activists are 
perpetrators. There is no state transition e.g. perpetrators and quiescent agents do 
not cross their own ethnic boundary. Quiescent agents adopt Run from Activists, 
perpetrators use Eradicate the Civilians while the peacekeepers espouse Pursue 
the Activists to arrest perpetrators and minimize casualties. Interaction only takes 
place among peacekeepers and perpetuators. Arrest is made if the prior wins; else, 
a randomly sited civilian is removed. The learning heuristics of perpetrators is 
altered to include GSwin- game sets won. Tactics revision occurs if 
 
 
        winlost GSGSFHSH *10.10 −+<  (5.14)
 
Each run takes 1000 episodes and the objective is to investigate effectiveness of 
increasing peacekeeping size and jail penalty in minimizing number of casualties 
after each simulated window.  
 
1) Situation without peacekeepers or jail terms: The situation of unrest, in the 
absence of peacekeepers or jail term, is simulated with perpetuators constituting 
10% of the total civilian population. Both active ratio and population dynamics 
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(Figure 5.32) show rapid annihilation of the quiescent group when no intervening 
force is present to manage the unrest. The escalating increase in active ratio and 
sharp plunge in civilian population indicates that a small pool of perpetrators is 
capable of eliminating a much larger group within a short time. A spatial overview 
(Figure 5.33) depicts the exponential drop in the quiescent group. Almost half the 
population had suffered casualty by the 10th episode. Total annihilation is seen by 
the 57th episode, which denotes the extinction time – time taken to wipe out an 
entire group with a distinct identity.  
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Figure 5.32: (a) Active ratios and (b) population dynamics for the first 250 episodes  
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 5.33: Spatial interaction between perpetrators and civilians for episode (a) 0, (b) 10 and (c) 57 
 
 
2) Impact of varying peacekeepers: Peacekeepers are now added to alleviate the 
severity of unrest. Fixing jail term at 100 episodes, Figure 5.34c showed that the 
presence of more peacekeepers raise survivals after the first stable point ([83, 136, 
140]) but excessive peacekeepers cause a sharp dip in quiescent group due to 
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overcrowding. The effectiveness to track, pursue and make arrest is lowered as 
peacekeepers impede each other’s movement. This is analogous to the concept of 
“carrying capacity” [213], where a system can only accommodate limited number 
of agents. Excess ones die off or introduce some form of inefficiency to its innate 
workings. The results indicate that more peacekeepers are needed to manage the 
simultaneous presence of perpetrators and minimize casualty initially. Once the 
unrest stabilizes, excessive peacekeepers proved to be a con more than a pro. This 
claim is further substantiated in Figure 5.35c as perpetrators start to roam freely 
beyond 100 time episodes when the peacekeeping force gets too large. Introducing 
excessive peacekeepers to a constrained environment in this context thus hinders 
progress of arrest and results in the rapid elimination of the quiescent group. 
 
3) Impact of varying jail terms: The jail term is now varied to analyze its effects 
on the unrest for a fixed peacekeeping size of 40. From the drastic dip in survivals, 
it can be garnered that isolating perpetrators is crucial in the short run to prevent 
excessive eradication of the quiescent group. As observed in Figure 5.36, a long 
period of captivity reduces the number of downward stepwise transitions in the 
quiescent population and preserves more survivals. Nonetheless, altering the jail 
term does not affect the initial decrease in the quiescent group, unlike the variation 
of the peacekeeping size. Survivals after the first stable point are similar for both 
jail terms of 100 and 500 episodes, as only a fixed number of peacekeepers are 
present to carry out pursuits and arrests. This places a fundamental limitation on 
the ability to curb the unrest as a time lag is present where sizeable casualties can 
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Population Composition vs Time Episodes
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Figure 5.34: Population dynamics for peacekeeping force of size (a) 40, (b) 80 and (c) 120 
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Population Composition vs Time Episodes  



















Population Composition vs Time Episodes
      (a)                                 (b) 
 
Figure 5.36: Population dynamics for fixed jail terms of (a) 100, and (b) 500 episodes 
 
5.5 Findings and discussions 
 
Interesting findings are revealed via the co-evolutionary simulation. The temporal 
response of the model showed the presence of “Punctuated Equilibria” and affirms 
peace and stability as a dynamic equilibrium that emerges from agent interaction. 
The spatial responses portray spontaneous local outbursts, group clustering but 
notably, a display of deceptive behavior. Increasing the number of cops has shown 
to promote deceptive behavior and drives activists to embrace cooperation. High 
grievance in activists is found to be the primary cause of triggering unrest while 
high greed levels is responsible for fueling the continual willingness of persistent 
rebels to revolt. Greater behavioral switching is also exhibited with more arrests.  
The addition of influence triggers a severe upsurge of activists in the initial 
stages and high mean active ratio as mildly aggrieved agents are incited to revolt. 
The tendency to use defect-oriented strategies is increased, which paves the way 
for the development of deceptive behavior over time. Introducing influence in the 
early stages of unrest yields greater dynamics by allowing the gradual build up of 
tension across the population, which translates into unprecedented occurrence of 
outbursts at a later stage. Increasing the jail penalty reduces the mean active ratio 
and dampens both the scale and frequency of outbursts. An excessive jail term 



















































minimizes the chances of contact for arrested agents and triggers defect-oriented 
behavior. The dynamic range of active duration is less affected, however, as the 
efficiency of arrest depends largely on the number of cops. Finally, the casualty 
model deduces that peacekeeping size and jail term affect the long term and short 
term profiles of unrest respectively. Though a large peacekeeping size is typically 
desired, excessive peacekeepers, nonetheless, worsen the prevailing state of unrest. 
Balance of both an adequate peacekeeping force and jail penalty is essential to 




The chapter showed that interesting macroscopic emergent dynamics are obtained 
through the microscopic autonomous behavioral development of agents under a 
co-evolutionary inspired framework which encompasses a hybrid combination of 
evolution with learning. Studying how the underlying behavioral dynamics evolve 
under different situational setups is crucial for the holistic understanding of the 












Public Goods provision under asymmetric 
information 
 
Though interesting, the modeling of civil violence in the previous chapter still 
adopts a pair-wise scheme of interaction among agents, similar to that in classical 
IPD. Nonetheless, much of the interaction in the real world occurs simultaneously 
among multiple parties, giving rise to a situation of dilemma which is commonly 
known as “The Tragedy of the Commons” [214]. Similar in essence to a multi-
player IPD, the dilemma - which finds its presence in scenarios ranging from the 
overgrazing of land to overconsumption of public resources, is typically attached 
to situations that involve the provision of public goods (PG) [29], [215]. We will 
shift our attention to focus on PG provision for the last chapter of this work. 
 The challenge of PG provision has always been a core economic issue in 
societies throughout the changing times. Unlike private goods [216], common 
pool resources [217] and club goods [218], the intrinsic characteristics of non-
excludability and non-rivalry [29], [219] in the consumption of PG ascertain that 
its provision can confer positive externalities [220] which are collectively shared; 
but for which there is practically no efficient way of excluding non-contributors 
from enjoying. Coupled with the fact that PG provision involves the joint action of 
many individuals [221], misalignment of individual contribution with collective 
welfare [222] entails low incentives to contribute. This explains why the voluntary 
provision of PG [223], both local [224] and global [225], is extremely susceptible 
to market failure [226], so much so that supply of PG often falls short of Pareto 
Optimal [227] in the absence of government intervention [228]. 
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 Across contexts that are as diverse as assurance contracts [229], peer-to-
peer networks [230], retail [231], drug imports [232] and welfare economics [233], 
the emergence of free-riders [234] has been identified as a prevalent cause of 
inefficiency. A major purpose of experimental literature on PG provision is then 
to assess the magnitude of free-riding and variables that affect it [235]. In game 
theory, the study of free riding is approached from the behavioral perspective of 
rational agents [236], by means of a PG game [237] where players form groups to 
decide how much to contribute to a PG using available information. In the iterated 
PG game (IPGG) [238], the game is played over many rounds. The level of PG 
provisioned is decided by the collective contribution [224]. Benefits derived are 
distributed evenly among all participating users, regardless of effort; but costs are 
born solely by those who played a part in provision according to efforts expended. 
This notion suggests that the expense of individual effort does not translate to a 
sole enjoyment of benefits but improves welfare indiscriminately.  
Intuitively, a group does best if everyone contributes, as the eventual level of 
PG will be higher, with greater remuneration for all. However, this does not arise 
as individually rational players tend to free ride on others’ contributions - social 
loafing [215]. In the same line of thinking, players are likely to dismiss a decision 
to contribute to avoid exploitation by free-riders. Players thus, do better on the 
whole by contributing zero regardless of the others’ actions [29]. This is the Social 
Dilemma [222] – a paradox in social decision making where joint contribution is 
needed to attain shared goals, but an individual’s rational choice is simply to free-
ride. As considerable benefits can be enjoyed by all for every additional unit of 
contribution, there is potential for huge Pareto improvement in welfare if everyone 
embraces cooperation. While some may argue that this problem can be solved by 
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using an intermediate regulatory body to fund PG provision indirectly via taxes; 
such involuntary means can be inefficient at times since hidden costs are typically 
involved. It is in the interest of policy makers and economists alike to design 
mechanisms and functional models that provide insights into how the prevalent 
effects of Social Dilemma can be alleviated in diverse settings so as to allow the 
efficient voluntary PG provision to take place.  
This chapter presents a co-evolutionary framework [239] to simulate and 
analyze the outcomes of PG provisioning under asymmetric information [5], [240] 
- [243]. Via an ACM, boundedly rational agents are conceptualized to interact in 
an N-player IPGG. They adapt to the dynamic environment by co-evolutionary 
learning in the course of game play similar to that of an N-player IPD [244]. The 
impact of information type, population and group sizes, rate of interaction, the 
number of available choices, the nature of provision and selection schemes, are 
studied under various settings. Simulated results reveal interesting dynamics in the 
strategy and usage profiles, welfare plots and evolution of cooperation. Analysis 
of these results offers a holistic understanding of collective action and insights of 
how the predicament of Social Dilemma can be mitigated, if not averted, in favor 
of the efficient voluntary provision of PG.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents preliminaries of the 
IPGG and overview of the model design. Section 6.2 highlights the game theoretic 
fundamentals that are essential to formulate and appreciate the IPGG. Section 6.3 
formally introduces a list of asymmetric agent types and their respective genotypic 
representations while Section 6.4 focuses on the significance of co-evolutionary 
learning and simulation. Section 6.5 evaluates and analyzes outcomes of simulated 
interaction in different settings of PG provision. Section 6.6 summarizes major 
  167
findings of the simulation study. Finally, Section 6.7 will conclude with a broad 
summary of discussions and areas for future research. 
 
6.1 Iterated public goods game 
 
Originating from experimental economics [245], the IPGG has striking similarities 
as the IPD [246]; with parallelism closely drawn between the study of contribution 
and cooperation [89] respectively. Mutually beneficial cooperation is threatened 
by unilateral strategic behavior as players are individually rational but collectively 
irrational. The IPGG also encompasses variants like the optional PG games [247], 
evolutionary games [248] with replicator dynamics [247], as well as games with 
punishment [238] and commitment [249]. Mechanisms like voting, peer effects 
and mobility [224], reputation and penalty [250], signaling and trust [251] can 
then be explored; together with their impact on contribution.  
Most models have concentrated on the ideal scenarios where agents exhibit 
unbounded rationality [252] and interact under complete and symmetric [236] 
information e.g. using Nash [253] and non-Nash [254] inferences, and Bayesian 
Learning [255] to determine an optimal agent strategy set. Such approaches are 
unrealistic since individuals do not actually possess perfect information about the 
environment in reality. Even in the case where information is readily available, it 
will not be used entirely for decision making as players have clear preferences for 
particular information types [256] e.g. those which are most relevant and in line 
with their contribution strategies. To some extent, players are also not attributed 
with advanced information processing capacities – which traditional theoretical 
analysis would require them to have; to capitalize and take into account all the 
information available to them. 
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6.1.1 IPGG with Asymmetric information 
 
In order to address the above modeling deficiencies and incorporate behavioral 
imperfection, players in the proposed IPGG will use their preferred information 
type for the basis of decision making. By doing so, the effects of framing [257] – 
in which a scenario can be interpreted differently by players in accordance to the 
perspectives they adopt, are accounted for e.g. contributions are likely to be higher 
if a PG game is framed as a community social event than when it is framed as an 
economic investment [258]. Framing an option as a cost versus an uncompensated 
loss also affects whether that option is chosen [259]. Other than a more realistic 
and interesting way to model PG provision, studies have also shown that different 
information types do affect the inherent dynamics of cooperation [249], [256]. 
With players formulating different contribution strategies, the proposed model 
offers another perspective to analyze the IPGG via the assessment of strategies 
and interaction outcomes that emerge from the use of diverse information types. 
 
6.1.2 Mathematical formulation 
 
The agent-based IPGG models an artificial society, UN ,,,, ASIE = , which 
comprises a population of N players, set of information, I about the global state of 
game play, set of N decision strategies, { })((( 21 Nt)tt N21 S,...,S),SS =  that dictates 
the players’ responses to stimuli in the external environment, set of all possible 
actions, { })(( 21 Nttt N21 A),...,(A),AA = for players and a utility function, U  which 
determines the payoffs awarded to players in all interaction outcomes. For all the 
above attributes, components of the set { }Nttt ,...,, 21  refer to types of players 1 to 
N respectively. E can refer to any generic organization where PG is provisioned 
collectively by N players. As opposed to a typical IPGG [230] where all players in 
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the population are participating in the provision of a common PG, the proposed 
IPGG models a situation in which the task of PG provision is decomposed and 
assigned in parts to ],[ maxmin MMM ∈ smaller groups, of size [ ] Nnnn ⊆∈ maxmin ,  
[256], such that sum of players in M groups totals N. The portion of task allocated 
to each group scales proportionally to its size. Players assigned to the same group 
will only contribute to the portion of total PG that they are tasked to provision. 
This setup can be drawn in analogy to a global PG that is funded collectively by 
several communities via taxation schemes. Entities in each community will decide 
whether to contribute or to evade taxes. The scenario can also be employed in a 
corporate setting where large projects are split into distinct parts and assigned in 
fair proportions to different teams of personnel. Each person in effect contributes 
to the part of project which his team has been assigned to. 
In every iterated round of game play, players are required to decide the 
contribution amount or cooperation level towards PG provision within the group. 
Decision output of player i, in group gj with type tij, is derived via strategy )( ijtijS . 
This maps the type-dependent information subset, ),( jij gtiI  - selectively chosen 
by player i from the information superset, )( jgI  - accessible by all in group gj; to 
an action Cij(tij), denoting the desired effort level out of all the possible choices in 




jjij ttCggt ij ij
S
i AII ij ∈⎯⎯ →⎯∈  (6.1)
 
 
Since the nature of IPGG involves the collective action and decision making 
of multiple parties, outcome of PG provision is not determined unilaterally by the 
contribution of any one player, but rather by the sum of individual contribution 
from each member. The level of PG provisioned within a group, gj, of nj players, 
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Collectively, the total amount of PG which is provisioned by M groups of players 
















21 )()(),...,,(  (6.3)
 
 
The payoff of PG provision, which is derived by a player i in a group, gj that 
consists of nj players is specified by the equation for the Voluntary Contribution 












                
Σ  (6.4)
 
where )(..)()(..)()( 111111 jnjnjijijijijjijij jj tCtCtCtCtC +++++= ++−−−−Σ  is the collective 
contribution of all in group gj, less the contribution of player i, )( ijij tC . UBasic is the 
payoff which a player gets if no public good is provisioned. This occurs when 
everyone in the group decides to free-ride. In the context of each player, all efforts 
would be channeled solely to provision a private good that yields a default, non-
zero payoff which is higher than that attained if all others free-ride on the player’s 
contribution. jj ngP /)(  is the payoff that a player derives when the welfare from 
PG provision is evenly distributed among all within the group. )(iCost j  denotes 
the cost that is incurred by player i for contributing. Assuming that cost correlates 
positively with contribution, the more a player contributes, the larger is the effort 
expended and the higher will be the resulting cost incurred. For simplicity, cost is 
expressed mathematically as follows: 
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)/()()( factorfactorijijj RCtCiCost ⋅=  (6.5)
 
where factorfactor RC /  is the proportionality ratio which denotes the value of a unit of 
contribution cost, factorC , relative to a unit of the provisioned resource, factorR  e.g. 
factorfactor RC / = 0.5 meant that 50% of any effort that a player commits to provision 
will be expended as personal cost; thus effectively only generating a net collective 
welfare value equivalent to the residual 50% of effort. Overall welfare enjoyed by 















The average welfare e.g. amount of PG enjoyed by a typical player is given by: 
 
 
NNWW SocietyIndividual /),...,2,1(=  (6.7)
 
 
It is to be noted that ),......,2,1( NWSociety  is different from ),...,,( 21 MTotal gggP as the 
prior refers to the net benefits derived by society after accounting for contribution 
costs. In essence, IndividualW  denotes the net average welfare that each individual 




• Players are boundedly rational and have finite computation power [62]. They 
do not have full and perfect knowledge about their environment of interaction 
- types of players in the group, NEs in the game etc. Each uses limited, local 
information [261] which is selected according to type and preference to decide 
the amount to contribute in the next round. 
• Every action is available to all players e.g. homogeny of action space where 
)(...)()( 2211 NjNjjjjj ttt AAA ===  regardless of group or type. However, the 
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actual action taken by a player depends on the nature of its type and strategy. 
• All players have the same capacity to generate PG - with the same amount of 
effort put in; the quantity of PG generated will be the same for any player. 
• Value of the provisioned PG is identical, in terms of its worth, to all players. 
• No contribution amount can saturate the total maintenance benefit which is 
derived from the PG e.g. each unit of provisioned PG will always yield much 
higher returns than the unit of contribution that is put in towards its creation. 
• Similar to the IPD, a situation where players free ride on the contribution of 
another is considered worst off, from the perspective of the exploited player, 
as compared to the situation where there is totally no provision of PG.  
• The PG of concern in the proposed study is deemed finitely and discretely 
decomposable e.g. it can be split into smaller parts for easy delegation and 
segregation of provision tasks among groups.  
• To an individual player, it is not the total benefits derived collectively by the 
team that is important, but the welfare solely enjoyed by himself ultimately. 
• The effect of framing is assumed in the context of the IPGG. All players do 
not change their types or beliefs over time and tend to look at all scenarios 
with the same perspective e.g. information type. Constraining players to the 
same beliefs allows the flexibility to study which information types are more 
dominant in promoting cooperative strategies. 
• All players will only choose to adopt strategies that are aligned with their own 
beliefs, of which, they will maximize their payoffs given the constraint of the 
fixed strategy structure. 
• All players improve their strategies constantly so as to seek an eventual 
increase in their welfare over time. 
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6.2 Game theoretic fundamentals 
 
The IPGG in essence, is similar in spirit to an N-Player IPD game where players 
have a temptation to defect (D) – free ride at the expense of other players. This 
depicts a situation where individual interest is in conflict with group interest - that 
is for players to cooperate (C) and contribute towards PG provision. Although D is 
the dominant strategy [89] when approaching from the perspective of individual 
rationality, it becomes collectively irrational if all players in the group choose to 
free-ride, since no PG is provisioned and no welfare is derived. Everyone can be 
better off by playing the dominated strategy C, which explains the existence of 
dilemma. To preserve the essence of this dilemma in the context of a 2IPD game 
( 2=n ), two conditions [262] must be satisfied. Firstly, the temptation payoff (T), 
reward payoff (R), punishment payoff (P) and sucker payoff (S) are assigned in 
descending order of their values ( SPRT >>> ). Secondly, alternating between 
T and S does not reward each player as much as if both players embrace repeated 
cooperation ( RST <+ 2/)( ) between themselves. 
Similarly, the payoff function of the proposed IPGG, where ( 2>n ), is 
formulated such that the following equivalent conditions are satisfied during the 
actual game play. In all three conditions, ijC  and 
'
ijC  are two distinct levels which 
individual i in group gj can contribute at. 
 
1)  Bounded individual rationality – Defection is better 
• Given that )()( ' ijijijij tCtC <  and a fixed )( ijij tC −−Σ , 
)),(),(()),(),(( ' ntCtCUntCtCU ijijijijijijijij −−−− > ΣΣ                         (6.8) 
 
2) Bounded collective rationality – Mutual Cooperation is better than mutual 
Defection 
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• Given that )()( ' ijijijij tCtC ≤  and )()( ' ijijijij tCtC −−−− < ΣΣ , 
))(),(())(,)(( '' ijijijijijijijij tCtCSocietytCtCSociety
WW
−−∑−−∑
<                (6.9) 
 
3) Coordinated alternation between Defection and Cooperation does not pay  
• Given that )()( ' ijijijij tCtC <  and )()( ' ijijijij tCtC −−−− < ΣΣ , 
)}),(),(()),(),(({5.0)),(),(( '''' ntCtCUntCtCUntCtCU ijijijijijijijijijijijij −−−−−− +> ΣΣΣ   
   (6.10)  
 
6.3 Information asymmetry 
 
One main objective of this paper is to model, simulate and analyze the outcome of 
IPGG interaction under information asymmetry. This seems to be a more realistic 
representation for many real world situations [5], [241], [263], [264]. Players are 
fundamentally driven by different beliefs when making decisions on the extent to 
contribute e.g. one may prefer to use a certain information type over another. 
Asymmetry also accounts for the fact that information may be incomplete e.g. 
players are allowed access to different pieces of information for the same scenario. 
 
6.3.1 Asymmetric player types 
 
To capture the notion of asymmetry in the IPGG, a collection of NTypes = 4 player 
types },,,{ 4321 TTTT=T , each differing in the type-dependent information used, is 
conceptualized in the proposed IPGG. For instance, a player i of type 1T  will only 
select information subset ),( 1 jgTiI from superset, )( jgI in group jg as the basis of 
decision-making during game play. In a population of size N, type tij of player i is 
such that ∀∈  Tijt jni ,...,2,1=  where jn  is such that 2/10/ NnN j ≤≤ . Possible 
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types which a player can assume are shown in Table 6.1. All information listed is 
obtained from the previous round of game play. As stated earlier, the type of a 
player does not change over time. 
 
Table 6.1: Asymmetric Information Types used in the IPGG 
 
 
Type Information used Value Symbol Notation 
1T  Number of players in group n  (―) NP 
2T  Average contribution of group ngP j /)(  ( Δ ) AC 
3T  Total contribution of group )( jgP  ( ◊ ) TC 
4T  Payoff received in the previous round of game play )(iPayoff j  ( * ) PR 
 
6.3.2 Genotypic representation 
 
Chromosomal representations of all the possible types are shown in Table 6.2. The 
genotype of player i, in essence, represents its strategy, )( ijtijS , that creates a non-
linear mapping from the set of information that it uses, to a possible contribution 
level, )( ijij tC  within the totality of its action space )( ijij tA  e.g. it will encompass a 
set of rules that informs the player on the amount to contribute for all possible 
scenarios of interaction. The first gene in each of the genotypes encodes the initial 
cooperation level, CI that a player adopts when he interacts with others for the first 
time. This occurs when new groups are formed – either at the start of simulation 
or when players switch groups in the course of game play. CI provides insights 
about the propensity that each type is willing to initiate cooperation on the first 
move against an unknown opponent. The remaining genes depict outcome-action 
pairs, where the next action at any round is determined solely by the outcome of 
one preceding it e.g. information relevant to a player’s type is extracted from the 
previous round and used to map onto a contribution level which he will thus play 
in the current round. Accordingly, the inclusion of memory can result in higher 
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average cooperation even under asynchrony [265].  
As seen from Table 6.2, genotype representations of players differ according 
to their corresponding information types e.g. given that [ ]10,2∈n , genotypes of 
type 1T  are structured such that all discrete possibilities in the information space, 
which in this case denote every possible values of n ranging from 2 to 10, are 
covered. Each of these unique possibilities will then map on independently to a 
contribution level which the player will adopt for use in PG provision. 
 
Table 6.2: Genotypic Representation for Different Information Types 
 
 
Type Genotypic Representation 
1T  
n  I.C. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
)( ijij tC  CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
2T  
ngP j /)( I.C. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 … 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 
)( ijij tC  CI C0.0 C0.1 C0.2 C0.3 … C4.7 C4.8 C4.9 C5.0  
3T  
)( jgP  I.C. 0 1 2 3 … 47 48 49 50
)( ijij tC  CI C0 C1 C2 C3 … C47 C48 C49 C50 
4T  
)(iPayoff j I.C. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 … 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 
)( ijij tC  CI C0.0 C0.1 C0.2 C0.3 … C6.2 C6.3 C6.4 C6.5  
  
6.3.3 Action spaces 
 
To explore how the number of available choices affects the nature and outcome of 
decision making among players in the asymmetric setting, two distinct types of 
action spaces, )(2 ijtijA  and )(
6
ijtijA , each with varied degrees of granularity in 
decision making, are considered. The prior allows players to contribute only at 
two extreme levels – full contribution or complete free-riding; while the latter 
splits the player’s contribution into six possible discrete levels (Table 6.3). Whilst 
)(2 ijtijA  is widely used in numerous theoretical studies as a means of simplifying 
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the analysis of obvious dynamics; )(6 ijtijA accounts for the more realistic fact that 
players can actually choose among multiple contribution levels to provision PG in 
the practical context. In tone with an earlier assumption, all actions that players 
make in the course of game play will always be drawn from action spaces that are 
identical in both the cardinality and range. Implicitly, this also assumes that the 
availability of choices is homogeneous throughout the entire population.  
 
Table 6.3: Types of Action Spaces used in the IPGG 
 
 
Type Possible discrete cooperation levels 
)(2 ijtijA  Full Defection (0) and Full cooperation (5)  
)(6 ijtijA  
Full Defection (0), Medium Defection (1), Mild 
Defection (2), Mild Cooperation (3), Medium 
Cooperation (4) and Full cooperation (5) 
 
6.4 Co-evolutionary learning mechanism 
 
In the proposed IPGG, each player starts off with an initial strategy and betters it 
over time through learning. Adaptation to the dynamic environment is by means 
of co-evolutionary learning as players of the same type will evolve their strategies 
collectively, and independently of other types. This is because framing constrains 
the evolution of player strategies within the bounds of their corresponding strategy 
structures. During revision, players only switch to strategies which are in line with 
their beliefs. It is natural for players of the same type to collate and undertake 
group learning - exchanging of ideas. To remain relevant in the game, strategies of 
the same type compete in terms of their performance as evaluated against all other 
types. This enhances intra-type adaptation, and ensures that good strategies are 
constantly adopted in favor of the weaker ones. As more competent strategies 
emerged over time, players of asymmetric types also serve as harder opponents 
for one another. This aptly accounts for inter-type adaptability. As introduced in 
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Chapter 2, this elegant co-evolutionary framework captures three distinct aspects 
of learning within each evolving type, namely. 
 
1)   Learning by replication 
This learning type is analogous to selection in CEAs whose purpose is to 
ensure that good strategies are adopted in favor of the weaker ones when 
players decide to revise their current strategies. Implemented using binary 
tournament selection of size TS in the IPGG, this comes in two forms: 
 
• Strategy preservation – Among the players whose strategies are selected for 
propagation to the next generation; those who have derived outstanding welfare 
are likely to retain their strategies without modification - leaders. In reality, this 
can also be applied to players who are confident about their strategies or simply 
those change-adverse ones as well. 
 
• Elitism – There is a strong tendency for a random pool of Z players to revise 
their strategies by imitating the strongest Z players. As opposed to the prestige-
based transmission [266], this is undertaken by followers - players who do not 
devise their own strategies but merely perform a full-scale adoption of the 
strategies which are used by those who enjoyed the most welfare at the end of 
each cycle, encompassing GamesN  games of RoundsN . In the IPGG, Z constitutes a 
fixed proportion of the evolving population. 
 
2) Learning by social exchanges 
• This learning type is analogous to crossover in CEAs whose purpose is to 
create variations that will differentiate the adopted and original strategies; 
through the amalgamation of traits between the parent strategies. As opposed to 
leaders and followers who adopt their strategies wholesale from the previous 
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cycle, only parts of the original strategies are preserved when players learn by 
exchanging strategic knowledge and expertise. Such collective social learning – 
uniform exchange of strategy bits, occurs with probability Pcrossover in the IPGG 
and simulates the creation of possibly new, hybrid strategies.  
 
3) Learning by experimenting 
• This learning type is analogous to mutation in CEAs where players experiment 
with small adjustments to strategies to create new ones. Unlike social learning, 
players fine tune their strategies independently by infusing their own discretion 
by trial and error. In the IPGG, there is a small probability mutateP  that players 
will revise their strategies by switching randomly to new contribution levels for 
each possible outcome of interaction.  
 
After each successful phase of co-evolutionary learning – marked as one complete 
generation; the new set of evolved strategies will be adopted by players in the next 
interaction cycle. The process of co-evolutionary learning will continue until the 
maximum of GenN  generations have elapsed. 
 
6.5 Simulation results 
 
Simulations for the IPGG are carried out using Visual C++ development software 
kit. A summary of the important parameter settings used are shown in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: List of Parameter Settings used in the Simulation Runs 
 
Symbol Parameters Values 
TypesN  Number of different information types 4 
R  Number of simulation runs 20 
N  Number of players in the population {240, 960} 
M  Number of groups {[24, 120], [96, 480]} 
n  Size of each group [2, 10] 
RoundsN  Number of rounds played - duration of a game [1, 200] 
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GamesN  Number of games played – Duration of each interaction cycle {50, 100} 
EndP  Probability of ending after each iterated round of game play 0.00346 
BasicU  
Basic utility derived from private component when no PG is 
provisioned 2.0 
factorC  Value of contribution cost 2.5 
factorR  Value of PG provisioned for a player when full cooperation is embraced 5.0 
GenN  Number of generations simulated per run 600 
TS Tournament size 2 
crossoverP  Probability of crossover or knowledge exchange between players 0.8 
mutateP  Probability of mutation or independent learning by each player 0.02 
Z  Elitism size or number of imitating players 0.05*N 
 
 
To ensure consistency and eliminate errors due to stochastic variation, the 
simulation results are averaged over 20 runs, lasting 600 generations each. Every 
generation will last an interaction cycle of {50,100} games. In a game, players 
will be randomly collated in groups of 2-10 to play for 200 rounds. Groups of all 
sizes are equally likely – there will be approximately the same number of groups 
of each size. Taking into account that players can pull out of a group or a team 
project can end at any one time, there is a small probability that a game will end 
after each round. After a game ends, players will reshuffle to form new groups - 
similar to migration [267] and team switching, NGames times before strategies are 
revised through co-evolutionary learning. This allows time for players to assess 
their strategies over an accumulated window of experiences, so that well-informed 
strategy choices can be adopted eventually. 
 
 
6.5.1 Homogeneous vs Asymmetric game-play 
 
Simulation is carried out to compare interaction outcomes in both homogeneous 
[268] and asymmetric settings. The prior solely involves the interaction between 
players of the same type; while the latter may involve interaction between diverse 
types. The asymmetric case resembles reality to a much closer degree as being 
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dissimilar in beliefs and ideologies, heterogeneous players make different sense of 
the same situation and are likely to make varied decisions accordingly. An action 
space of )(6 ijtijA  is used for all types unless otherwise stated. Interesting insights 
of the player strategy and usage profiles, cooperation dynamics and welfare level 
are revealed in the following case comparisons. 
 
1) Performance of different player types: As depicted, the differences in mean 
welfare to each player - normalized average generation score per round (AGS) – 
Figure 6.1a and average cooperation level (ACL) – Figure 6.2a exist between 
groups that use different information types. For N = 240, NGames = 50, evolutionary 
traces for the homogeneous setting showed that (AC, NP) attained the highest and 
lowest (AGS, ACL) respectively after 600 generations. The disparity is due to the 
inherent differences in structure and nature of information e.g. amortization of 
group effort subjects AC to less variation and makes it much easier for players to 
forge cooperative relationships via strategies which are fairly stable to frequent 
changes in n. In comparison, it is difficult for NP players to sustain high (ACL, 
AGS) as their actions change in direct relation to n. AC also provides a clear 
indication of the effort which an average other contributes and thus the eventual 
welfare that one is likely to derive. Such knowledge helps to elicit cooperation and 
facilitates reciprocity – contributing as a positive function of others’ contributions 
[256], among players; as a player is generally willing to contribute conditioned on 
beliefs that others are doing so at similar levels [249]. This link is not as direct 
when it comes to other types e.g. TC does not signal about the expected welfare as 
much depends on n while PR varies with one’s contribution relative to the group’s 
average. Though it was claimed that evolution provides a simple and effective 
means to maintain cooperation in a group-structured population, depending solely 
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on population dynamics [269], the above suggests that the nature of information 
used does affect the tendency to cooperate. Similarities between the AGS and 
ACL plots indicate that the welfare enjoyed by players in a homogeneous setting 
is positively correlated to their cooperation levels. 
On the contrary, plots (Figures 6.1b, 6.2b) reveal a distinct reversal in the 
trend of performance for player types under the asymmetric setting. As illustrated 
by the negative correlation between the convergence traces of ACL and AGS, 
cooperative player types like AC are worst off in welfare than types adopting pro-
defection strategies e.g. NP; as the common environment of interaction effectively 
opens up opportunities for the latter types to reap a larger share of total welfare by 
exploiting the prior. This conjures the notion that it does not pay to contribute if 
others may not be subscribing to similar information types for decision making.  
The interdependency between types, as each evolves and adapts its strategies 
to those of more diverse nature, brings contributions and the ensuing welfare of 
different types closer together. Unlike the homogeneous setting where traces show 
signs of recovery after an initial dip, the monotonically declining temporal trends 
for all types signify further difficulties in achieving voluntary PG provision under 
asymmetry. Benefits of mutual cooperation do not appear explicit since beliefs of 
asymmetric players tend to be are misaligned and actions mis-coordinated [270]. 
Coupled with the prevalence of Social Dilemma, the inability to realize potential 
gains from contribution fuels development of defect-oriented traits and composes 
a bleak picture towards provision. Whilst NP players are perceived to enjoy higher 
welfare from free riding, this is clearly insufficient to offset the drop in welfare for 
other types. From a collective point of view, AGS under asymmetric interaction is 
compromised and lower than before. 
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Figure 6.1: AGS of various types for (a) homogeneous and (b) asymmetric game play  
 





























































Figure 6.2: ACL of various types for (a) homogeneous and (b) asymmetric game play 
 
2) Duration of interaction and number of players: Studies have shown that the 
amount of repeated interaction is an important factor which facilitates reciprocal 
play [271] and population size can also affect the emergent behavior of a group 
[272]. It is interesting to examine the impact of NGames and N on the dynamics of 
cooperation for different types. Following an increase of NGames to 100 (Figures 
6.3a, 6.4a), only slight changes are detected. Save for these, the traces remained 
closely similar; indicating that NGames is not a major factor which affects (AGS, 
ACL). Prolonged periods of contact do not induce significant behavioral change in 
this case as a substantial amount of interaction is already in place.  
However, increasing N to 960 (Figures 6.3b, 6.4b) showed otherwise. In the 
homogeneous setting, disparity in (ACL, AGS) among types widens as there is a 
distinct rise in (AGS, ACL) for (AC, PR); whose traces are notably higher than 
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(NP, TC). These marked differences are due to the presence of a large player pool 
that emphasizes and accelerates the adoption and propagation of existing traits. 
For (AC, PR), pressure is exerted for a more cooperative milieu in intra-group 
interaction as there are more players subscribing to information that induces 
cooperation. On the same note, the increase in (NP, TC) players highlights pro-
defection traits, causing (ACL, AGS) to fall. In contrast, disparity in (ACL, AGS) 
across types in the asymmetric case narrows. Given a proportionate rise in number 
of players for each type, a larger pool of less cooperative players accentuates and 
propagates the free riding cultures throughout the population by compelling the 
cooperative types that are freely exposed to dangers of exploitation to withhold 
contribution considerably to near full defection. Overall, players are worse off. 
 
3) Analysis of strategy and usage profiles: Strategy profiles give complete action 
plans of how players on average, contribute under various outcomes of interaction 
while usage profiles record the mean frequency of occurrence for all outcomes. 
Together, the two reveal interesting blueprints of frequency distribution for each 
action-outcome pair and offer insights into the contribution patterns of types.  
With homogeny, strategy profile of NP is by and large most defect-oriented 
(Figure 6.5a) as seen by the rapid decline of ACL from its highest at n = 2 to 
effectively zero at n ≥ 3 and the rightward skewing of usage profile. Besides the 
complexity in multi-player games which comes with expansion in the breadth of 
possible strategies [271], a study which similarly explored the effect of n on group 
cooperation [273] via an evolutionary framework [244] verified that the inherent 
dynamics for the outcomes where (n = 2) and (n > 2) are contrastingly different; 
given that full, eventual cooperation is achieved for the prior but not the latter. 
Although it is widely conceived that more PG is generated with large groups, this 
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does not equate to the enjoyment of more welfare per individual. Profiles of (AC, 
TC, PR) reveal more potential of attaining higher contribution as the players on 
average, adopt a diverse continuum of ACLs. Whilst (AC, TC) possess upward 
sloping strategy profiles that associate high contribution with high ACL (Figures 
6.5b, c), ACL does not peak where contribution is highest, indicating the existence 
of a desired effort level where players find most rewarding to contribute. Any 
contribution below it is too low to sustain stable collaboration while that above it 
will be high enough to tempt potential defectors to free ride. Alignment of long 
discrete lines in AC’s usage space to peaks in the strategy space denotes high 
recurrent contributions. Despite similarities, the usage profile is skewed leftwards 
if TC is used as a gauge of input effort, indicative of the pro-defection traits.  
PR’s strategy profile is interestingly U-shaped – the players react with high 
ACL when the previous payoff is low or high (Figure 6.5d). Other than a result of 
panic response from those who seek to raise AGS by raising ACL, the prior is 
attributed to the fact that good strategies do practice forgiveness even if previous 
contribution is exploited. The latter is possibly due to indirect reciprocity [274]-
[276] e.g. players may choose to repay the welfare derived from others’ efforts 
circuitously by maintaining high contribution levels towards PG provision. Unlike 
direct reciprocity [37], altruism can be possible among N-persons [277], [278]. 
Concentration of usage outcomes in the mid region of the strategy space - where 
ACL is low, implies a low tendency to contribute when the decision is made from 
the perspective of personal gains from other players. Many are tempted to free-
ride as a means to yield high personal payoff. 
In asymmetric interaction, the range of non-zero contribution for NP in 
groups beyond n = 3 is widened surprisingly (Figure 6.5a). This is in retrospective 
  186
of the fact that cooperative types do induce a willingness to contribute in types 
that are inclined to free-ride. Players tend to reciprocate contribution when shifted 
from a pro-defection environment to one where the likelihood of contribution is 
higher. Likewise, AC’s sparsely distributed usage profile is switched to one which 
concentrates usage in regions of low ACL (Figure 6.5b). The evolution of pro-
defection strategies arises in similar principle to NP but with the difference that it 
involves an exposure of cooperative types to defect-oriented ones. Pro-defection 
behavior for (TC, PR) is seen by the respective skews of their usage profiles 
towards regions of low ACL (Figures 6.5c, d).  
Usage distribution over a collection of outcome-dependent frequency bins 
for (AC, TC, PR) indicates that the players transit across a wider spectrum of 
contributions instead of just a few dominant ones (Figures 5b, c, d), suggesting 
possibilities for more diverse outcomes. Adding on to the strategy misalignment 
that occurs as n changes, absence of consistent/Nash contribution level is largely 
due to incoherent beliefs among types. Overall, asymmetry induces higher and 
lower ACL for types which are respectively less and more cooperative. There are 
also more varieties and assortment to the interaction outcomes as well as the ACL 
of various player types that led to their occurrence. 
 
6.5.2 Varied degrees of decision making and nature of PG 
 
After comparing PG provision under homogeneous and asymmetric information, 
this section explores effects of varied degrees in decision making and the nature of 
PG provision on asymmetric interaction outcomes. Scenarios where players can 
choose from two or six contribution levels are examined for the effects of coarse 
and fine granularity in decision making. The latter is studied in the previous 
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simulations while the prior involves a scale down of action space to )(2 ijtijA - where 
choices are restricted to only full contribution or complete free-riding. Subtle as it 
may be, this constraint has profound repercussions on the willingness to contribute 
as well as the effective welfare derived. 
The impact of free-riding is also explored in two forms of PG – VCM and 
provision point VCM (PPVCM) [279]. The prior denotes the scenario where PG 
available for consumption is scaled proportionally by the collective contributions 
of all within the group e.g. higher aggregate contributions entail greater welfare. 
In the latter, however, such correspondence does not apply with continuity as PG 
is provisioned only when a minimum threshold, T is met by the group’s mean 
contribution. Above which, characteristics of a continuous PG prevails but under 
which, no PG will be provisioned and players derive zero welfare. As an example 
of a real world analogy, commission is awarded to a team only if a minimum sales 
target is met. Below T, effort expended for PG provision is wasted and incurred as 
uncompensated cost. Using T = 3, payoff function for player i when provisioning 

































Similar in spirit to the case where input choices of players are constrained to two 
contribution levels, the threshold T restricts the eventual interaction outcome at 
certain levels of aggregate contributions, to one that involves provision or absence 
of PG. The prior influences inputs – action spaces while the latter affects the 
interaction outputs – derived welfares. Under the complex asymmetric interaction, 
the modifications considered may improve cooperation or worsen the prevailing 
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effects of Social Dilemma unknowingly. Fusing the above factors, four provision 
schemes {S1, S2, S3, S4} are devised in Table 6.5, simulated and analyzed to 
compare their relative benefits in promoting cooperation and improving welfare. 
Insights gained can then be used to understand how good the provision schemes 
are in alleviating the effects of free-riding. 
 




Scheme Degrees of Contribution Nature of PG Provision Action Space Payoff Function 
S1 6 VCM )(6 ijtijA  (4) 
S2 2 VCM )(2 ijtijA  (4) 
S3 6 PPVCM )(6 ijtijA  (11) 
S4 2 PPVCM )(2 ijtijA  (11) 
 
1) Analysis of AGS and ACL for different provision schemes 
   a) Homogeny of welfare distribution and contribution  
  Different schemes showed contrasting (AGS, ACL) plots (Figures 6.6, 6.7). 
Comparing S1 and S2, truncating the action space causes further convergence in 
the traces of different types; as the players effectively focus on just two radically 
distinct choices - contribute and free-ride. This eases the task of coordinating 
actions and raises the likelihood that players will contribute at similar levels 
despite type differences. In S1, intermediate options accentuate welfare disparity 
among various types by allowing the freedom to select diverse actions. In S3, 
homogeny of (AGS, ACL) traces for various types is also achieved (Figures 6.6c, 
6.7c) by constraining the interaction outcomes - as welfare variation only persists 
when contribution exceeds T. Players are motivated to contribute close to T – 
minimum ACL required to yield non-zero welfare, as players can avoid deriving 
zero welfare and yet prevent added contribution beyond T from being exploited. 
  189
Overall, imposing choice restriction or structuring a PG by PPVCM translates to 
greater strategic uniformity and equity in welfare distribution across player types. 
Combining the benefits of S2 and S3; S4 nonetheless, does not ensure close 
resemblance of ACL across types (Figures 6.6d, 6.7d). A liable reason lays in the 
limitations imposed on both the action and outcome spaces simultaneously. With 
choice restriction in S2, the exposure to risks of full exploitation is amplified. 
Cooperators tend to withhold contribution as non-zero payoffs can still be attained 
for contributions below T. Prevalence of such traits reduces the overall ACL but 
enhances uniformity across types. As for outcome restriction in S3, intermediate 
choices similarly allow players to reap non-zero payoffs by adjusting ACLs to 
levels close to T; so that all can benefit without contributing overly.  
With both constraints in place, free-riding is however not encouraged as the 
only way that players can derive non-zero payoffs is through full contribution. By 
virtue of the strong free-riding effects working against a need to contribute, NP’s 
ACL experiences an inevitable drift from those of other types, towards T. Despite 
diverging ACL traces, S4 entails the best welfare distribution as evident from the 
concurrence of AGS throughout the simulation. While it may be the goal of most 
provision schemes to ensure an even distribution of welfare by coercing dissimilar 
types to contribute at similar degrees, S4 goes a step further to attain the same goal 
by accommodating differences in contribution patterns. Such robust trait allows 
each type to preserve its own distinctiveness amid the pursuit of mutual fairness. 
This is one important aspect of a good provision scheme that is much overlooked. 
 
b) Overall welfare and contribution level 
Besides comparing homogeneity in (AGS, ACL), schemes discussed thus far 
also differ in overall (AGS, ACL) - ranked {S2, S1, S3, S4} in ascending order. 
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Though fewer choices [145], [262] is typically preferred to more choices in the 
2IPD, this is however, less definite as far as the multi-player IPGG is considered 
under asymmetric information. The situation of analysis is complex - depending 
on the provision setup, a restriction of choices can work both ways: encourage 
contribution or breed free-riders. In VCM, multiple contribution levels actually 
promote higher (AGS, ACL). While it may seem commonsensical to improve the 
overall welfare by coercing players to execute full cooperation through choice 
restriction - S2, immense risk is involved as defectors will free-ride fully. Due to 
its structure, changes in individual contribution translate only to inconsequential 
change in AGS especially for large n. Even if one risks exploitation, the group 
will only benefit marginally. Free-riding is a better choice as players stand to gain 
if a cooperator subsists in the group. As contribution is not sustained by incentives 
and its disincentives are not duly compensated by any counter-active measures; 
players will inevitably choose D over C, leading to a drop in (AGS, ACL). With 
multiple choices, S1 offers more opportunities to contribute at levels beyond full 
defection. This is imperative to facilitate the increase in (AGS, ACL) from S2.  
PPVCM schemes – (S3, S4), in contrast depict a clear trend of dominance in 
(AGS, ACL) over (S1, S2). Players, regardless of types, are more contributive and 
derive higher welfare. This is attributed to nonlinearity of introducing a provision 
point. With the notion that “either you get the PG or you don’t”, the opportunity 
costs of not contributing are increased. Players are spurred to raise contribution 
above T so that efforts expended will not be in vain. For a switch from S1 to S3, 
players are instilled the message “if an adequate level of contribution is not met, 
no PG is provisioned and everyone will get no share of the benefits”. This entails 
higher efficiency in staging the provision task, as players are factually compelled 
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to raise their contribution stakes or face the adverse outcome of deriving zero PG. 
This creates an upward pull in the overall ACL to levels where PG is provisioned 
in non-zero amount. Even so, ACL remains in the range [3, 3.5] as players do not 
have supporting incentives to embrace full cooperation as VCM sets in beyond T. 
To avoid over contributing, many players will find it more viable to contribute at 
mid levels below full cooperation.  
S4 addresses this issue via restricting choices. As the most stringent scheme, 
it expects all to “contribute to their best or risk provisioning no PG”. The message 
that conveyed a need to contribute is a much stronger one-given the same number 
of cooperators in S3 and S4, those in the latter will be restricted to play only full 
contribution. This accounts for the momentous rise in ACL for most types to [4, 
4.5], though NP still chooses to free-ride sporadically. Overall AGS is raised to a 
significant 3.3. Switching to PPVCM confers more benefits than simply restricting 
choices. The former changes the entire structure of what is provisioned [222], not 
just a tweak in the inner settings. Combination of both features is the best setting 
to encourage contribution and achieve efficient PG provision. 
 
c) Overall trend and slope characteristics/dynamics 
Eventual convergence of ACL traces (Figure 6.7) signifies the presence of 
evolutionary stable welfare levels that players of each type are willing to play so 
as to derive from. Even so, relation between ACL and AGS is no longer explicit - 
it cannot be ascertained whether a higher or lower ACL will yield higher AGS. 
AGS of each type will depend much on the nature of its information and strategies 
of others. VCM and PPVCM schemes are differentiated by dissimilarities in the 
trend of progression for (AGS, ACL) e.g. (S1, S2) exhibit a declining trend while 
(S3, S4) depict an upward moving one with generation. This is because for the 
  192
same strategy pool, ACL falls when the temptation to free-ride sets in for VCM, 
which fuels a drop in AGS for all types. For PPVCM, players are motivated to 
raise contributions above T or risk deriving no welfare. This translates to a rise in 
AGS over time. Overall, the PPVCM schemes are more effective in mitigating, if 
not eliminating the effects of Social Dilemma among varied types. 
 




















































































































































































 Figure 6.3: AGS of different player types for changes in (a) NGames and (b) N 
 





















































































































































 Figure 6.4: ACL of different player types for changes in (a) NGames and (b) N 
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Figure 6.5: Strategy and usage profiles for type (a) NP, (b) AC, (c) TC and (d) PR under 
homogeneous and asymmetric information 
 
3) Does a higher threshold trigger higher contribution? 
After ascertaining that the PPVCM schemes do work better in promoting 
contribution via a minimum threshold, T, that pulls mean contribution up; the next 
task is to verify how the size of T affects welfare and extent of free riding [235]. 
Does the influence pattern differ with number of available choices? These queries 
can be answered by studying (AGS, ACL) of (S3, S4) for T = {2, 3, 4} (Figures 
6.8, 6.9). At T = 2, both traces are lowest due to the low incentive to contribute. It 
is reasonably foreseeable that more players are driven to free-ride at low Ts when 
choices are limited, as it makes no sense to match maximum effort with a low 
contribution goal. One can enjoy more benefits by leveraging on cooperators to 
realize contribution levels that are just enough to fulfill the provision task. From T 
= 2 to 3, overall (AGS, ACL) for (S3, S4) rose. Increase in ACL for S3 is mild and 
translates only to a slight rise in AGS. In contrast, S4 experiences a large shift in 
ACL that pushes AGS beyond the level in S3, indicating greater sensitivity to 
changes in T. Probability that individual contribution determines provision or non-
provision of PG is raised [222]. More players switch to full contribution as it is no 
longer enough to depend on others for PG provision - it takes three cooperators at 
full contribution to cover two free-riders as compared to two cooperators at full 
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contribution to cover three free-riders previously. The fact that (AGS, ACL) of S4 
supersedes S3 from below signifies the potential to attain higher contribution via 
the synergistic blend of PPVCM and choice restriction, despite starting off low. 
   At T = 4, S4 continues to experience a steady but smaller step up in (AGS, 
ACL), but S3 a fall in AGS for corresponding rise in ACL. In conjunction with the 
less than proportionate rise in AGS from T = 2 to 3, the drop in AGS for S3 is 
primarily due to the assorted actions that varied types undertake in each group. 
Amplified by multiple choices, action coordination is much harder as many may 
prefer to contribute at intermediate levels. This can cause ACL of a typical group 
to fall short of T. Thus, despite the overall increase in ACL, a decline in AGS is 
observed as costs are expended without achieving benefits. S4 can realize the trend 
of increasing AGS as choice coordination is much clearer and players do have a 
tendency to contribute when deciding between the two extreme alternatives. 
Presence of a period for players to coordinate their actions exists under S4, 
as illustrated by the intersection for the family of S-curves (Figure 6.8b) – 150th 
generation. At T = 2, players can attain high AGS with their initial strategies but 
the inclination to free-ride tends to reduce overall AGS as actions are fully 
coordinated. For T = 4, overall AGS starts low as players are unable to fulfill the 
provision point requirement initially. The trend reverses when all are driven to 
coordinate their actions to attain higher AGS. The distinct S-shape is due to 
differences in the starting and ending AGS. The higher the value of T, the lower 
the initial AGS but the greater is the potential of attaining high eventual AGS. 
Overall, increasing T raises welfare by setting a high provision target to induce 
players to contribute, but this does not always hold as high T values are only 
beneficial when the players face limited choices. With multiple choices, the goal to 
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attain high contribution is likely to be hindered by a dilution of mean contribution. 
This can lead to a negligible increase or even a decline in overall AGS as T gets 
larger (Figure 6.8a).  
 
6.5.3 Multi-level selection: group vs individual reward 
 
After considering the means of improving contribution and welfare by restricting 
choices and altering the nature of PG provision, it is also of interest to explore the 
impact of varied selection schemes on the outcome of asymmetric interaction. 
Motivated by concepts of multi-level selection [280], [281] from evolutionary 
biology [282], it is known that different selection schemes can entail diverse 
outcomes. With supplement from the kinship theory [38] and reciprocal altruism 
[37], making a group the unit of selection [283] can provide explanation for the 
evolution of altruism [284], [285] and cooperation [286]. 
Consider a case where a firm wishes to reward its staff for past achievements 
and contributions. To ensure that corporate cultures of voluntary contribution and 
mutual cooperativeness continue to spread throughout the workforce in future; is 
it desirable to reward on an individual or group basis or a combination of both? 
Such a decision is crucial as it impacts the underlying organizational dynamics 
and sets the course that staff should work towards. When implemented correctly, a 
good reward scheme can raise the morale of deserving personnel, improves the 
overall efficiency of the work crew which leads on to ease of completing big-scale 
public projects by highly contributive individuals and groups. With the above 
objectives in mind, the last case study seeks to compare three different selection 





1)  SI   : Individual selection based on group effort  
Taking into account the fact that individuals are likely to switch groups from 
time to time, one is selected for reward according to mean accumulated effort 
per individual that is channeled by all groups that he has previously participated 
in for the PG provision. Since PG can refer to any community assignment or 
large-scale project where the payouts are not directly correlated to the effort 
expended by an individual, this performance measure helps quantify individual 
effort, which is usually hard to assess in a group context, owing to loafing and 
moral-hazard issues [287]. In simpler terms, the higher the amount of PG 
generated by groups that one was formerly a part of e.g. the more successful the 
past projects which one took part; the higher the chances of reward.  
 
2)  SG   : Group selection based on group effort  
Individuals are selected for rewards on a group basis, in accordance to the 
efficiency in generating PG. As opposed to SI, the unit of selection is the group. 
In essence, groups that can harness higher mean contribution per player will be 
in favor of being chosen; and upon successful selection, all individuals in the 
group are rewarded.  
 
3)  SM   : Multi-level selection based on group effort  
As the name suggests, reward selection is done at both the individual and group 
levels. Selection criteria are identical to both SI and SG, so as to verify whether 
a combination of the previous two schemes delivers the best mechanism for 
reward than when either of them is considered separately. 
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Figure 6.6: AGS for (a) S1, (b) S2, (c) S3 and (d) S4 with N = 240, N Games = 50 
 
 




















































































































































































(a) (b) (c) (d) 
 
Figure 6.7: ACL for (a) S1, (b) S2, (c) S3 and (d) S4 with N = 240, N Games=50 
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Figure 6.8: Overall AGS for (a) multiple and (b) two levels of contribution 
 
Figure 6.9: Overall ACL for (a) multiple and (b) two levels of contribution 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) 
 
Figure 6.10: AGS for (a) S1, (b) SI, (c) SG and (d) SM with N = 240, N Games = 50 
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   The schemes are simulated and outcomes of PG provision are analyzed 
(Figures 6.10, 6.11). Previous results for S1 which select individuals based on 
individual welfare in each group are used as the common basis of comparison. It 
is clear that all schemes that select using group contribution supersede S1. This is 
due to cost factoring when selecting based on individual welfare. A player that is 
selected based on high welfare level does not necessarily imply a cooperator by 
nature. In contrast, it turns out more frequently that he is either a free-rider that 
exploits the others’ contribution successfully or a weak cooperator that withholds 
contribution tacitly by leveraging on others’ effort. Selecting these players, to 
some extent, results in propagation and adoption of free-riding traits by players for 
the subsequent strategies. This inevitably imposes a limitation on the extent to 
which (AGS, ACL) can reach eventually.  
Comparing among schemes which reward on the basis of group performance, 
SI presents the highest (AGS, ACL) at the end of 600 generations, followed by SM, 
then SG. Although group selection can promote intra-group cooperation by raising 
the inter-group competition [287], this is not so in the context of IPGG. The 
downside rests on the fact that SG has no way of distinguishing effectively amid 
cooperators and free-riders. This is an essential point of consideration as a group 
that does well in generating high mean contribution per individual may comprise a 
mixture of very cooperative players as well as mediocre free-riders. An attempt to 
reward all players in a group regardless of individual contribution is bound to 
admit free-riders for an equal share of the reward pie; even if they did not play any 
substantial part in realizing the PG provision- e.g. benefits from success of project 
becomes public to all. By handing out rewards to free-riders on top of benefits that 
they have already gained by exploiting contributions, SG is clearly designed with 
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come elements of unfairness. Similar to S1, there is a possibility for the continual 
proliferation of free-riding traits in group selection. Apart from fairness, SG is also 
inefficient as iterated use of the scheme limits willingness to contribute at 3 and 
restricts mean welfare that each individual ultimately gets.  
   Unlike SG, SI projects a fairer and more efficient reward system. Although it 
is hard to capture individual contribution from group performance, amalgamation 
of achievements from all past coalitions that an individual had joined does piece 
up to provide a good clue and indicator. The entirety of an individual’s history of 
group contribution implicitly captures a good perception of his effort level e.g. the 
more group achievements accumulated over his history of participation in teams 
within a specific time frame; the greater will be the likelihood that the player is an 
important and substantial contributor to the success of all his teams. Using this 
form of performance measure as a basis to select individuals for rewards clearly 
provides a fairly good means of differentiating between efforts put in by each 
member. This not only achieves fairness by excluding exploitative personnel from 
a share of the reward, but more importantly, it provides an exceptional driving 
force to motivate existing free-riders to contribute to avoid losing out in future 
reward opportunities. (AGS, ACL) of SM is middling as it possesses the properties 
of both SG and SI e.g. the disadvantages of SG somehow dilutes the advantages 
introduced by SI. On the whole, SI leads to a clear dominance of contribution and 
welfare over all other schemes. 
 
6.6 Findings and discussions 
 
Interesting findings are presented in the course of the co-evolutionary simulation, 
which aids in the understanding of differences in PG provision in homogeneous 
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and asymmetric interaction. Verified from a myriad of settings, players’ beliefs 
are more aligned in the former, where certain strategies and outcomes tend to be 
strikingly more dominant. In the latter, a more diverse spectrum of strategies and 
outcomes is entailed due to misaligned beliefs. Though interaction amid dissimilar 
types leads to homogeny in welfare distribution, contribution certainly does not 
pay as efforts of cooperators are exploited by free-riders. This lowers mean 
contribution and welfare to all. Overall, free-riding is more pronounced in the 
asymmetric setting and players are generally worse off. While research has shown 
conclusive evidence that less choices is preferred to more in enhancing 
cooperation in pair-wise interaction, results of simulation studies have ascertained 
that this notion is less definite for an asymmetric setting with multiple players. 
Much depends on the structure of the provision scheme.  
Restricting choices truncates action spaces and helps to align contributions 
among similar types; while the PPVCM coerces players to contribute above a 
minimum provision point or risk deriving no welfare. A combination of limited 
choice and PPVCM – where large thresholds induce more contribution; offers an 
effective means of mitigating the Social Dilemma. However, this fact does not 
hold true for multiple choices; as the goal of attaining higher contributions is 
hindered by a dilution of average contribution when players contribute at different 
levels. Finally, although it seems fairer to reward individuals on a group basis - as 
only group performance can be accurately assessed; such scheme suffers an 
inherent drawback of not being able to discriminate among cooperators and free-
riders. Results have shown that contribution and welfare can be increased by 
rewarding on an individual basis, using the collection of group achievements for 




In conclusion, this chapter presents a co-evolutionary approach to model and 
implement an IPGG using ACM such that collective outcomes of PG provision 
under asymmetric information can be effectively simulated and analyzed. The 
simulated results reveal interesting interaction dynamics and added difficulties in 
achieving cooperation when information asymmetry is present among players. In 
general, the proposed framework provides a very useful platform to gain a better 
understanding of collective action and some insights into how the effects of Social 
Dilemma can be mitigated. This might in turn offer some ideas on how efficient 




















Co-evolutionary simulation modeling is the application of stochastic CEAs to 
simulate the process of evolution and adaptation in ACMs. It has been found to be 
an efficient and effective framework to model, simulate and further the analysis of 
strategic interaction from numerous perspectives, especially when conventional 
analytical and empirical approaches fail under their intrinsic constraints. Inspired 
by Nature’s evolutionary principles, where uncertainty is a common and inherent 
phenomenon, CEAs become a natural candidate to model realistic imperfections 
which mirrors and constitute real world interaction. As an optimization paradigm 
which functions primarily based on probabilistic and population-based searches, 
CEAs provide a dynamic framework that drives co-evolutionary learning and 
strategy improvement when agents interact in game theoretic settings – in which 
an absolute fitness measurement that reflects the underlying properties of games is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to formulate. Equipped with a myriad mix of 
desirable characteristics, it will be interesting to examine the use of CEAs as a 
viable alternative and complementary avenue to existing approaches, particularly 
as a means to facilitate the discovery of good game strategies, analyze collective 
interaction outcomes of and gain better insights into the underlying dynamics that 




This work contributes towards to the application of CEAs to model, simulate and 
analyze game theoretic interaction in several interesting contexts of study. Chapter 
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3 focuses on the development of a competitive computer player for the one versus 
one Texas Hold’em poker using CEAs. A Texas Hold’em game engine is first 
constructed where an efficient odds calculator is programmed to allow for the 
abstraction of a player’s cards, which yield important but complex information. 
Effort is directed to realize an optimal player which will play close to the NE by 
proposing a new fitness criterion. Preliminary studies on a simplified version of 
poker highlighted the intransitivity nature of poker. The evolved player displays 
strategies which are logical but reveals insights that are hard to comprehend e.g. 
bluffing. The player is benchmarked against Poki and PSOpti, which is the best 
heads-up Texas Hold’em A.I. to date and plays closest to the optimal NE. Despite 
the much constrained chromosomal strategy representation, the simulated results 
verified that CEAs are effective in creating strategies that are comparable to Poki 
and PSOpti in the absence of expert knowledge. 
Chapter 4 examines the comparative performance and adaptability issues 
of evolutionary, learning and memetic strategies in different environment settings 
in the IPD. Evolutionary strategies are realized by GA based on co-evolutionary 
principles and learning strategies by a double-loop incremental learning scheme, 
ILS that incorporates a classification component, probabilistic update of strategies 
and feedback learning mechanism. A memetic adaptation framework is developed 
for IPD strategies to exploit the complementary features of evolution and learning. 
In the framework, learning serves as a form of directed search to guide evolving 
strategies to attain eventual convergence towards acquiring good strategy traits 
while evolution helps to minimize disparity in performance among the learning 
strategies. A series of simulation results verify that the two adaptation techniques, 
when employed concurrently, are able to complement each other’s strengths and 
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compensate for each other’s weaknesses, leading to the formation of strategies 
that will adapt and thrive well in complex, dynamic environments. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the development of a spatial evolutionary multi-agent 
social network to study the macroscopic-behavioral dynamics of civil violence 
that culminates as a result of the microscopic game-theoretic interactions between 
the goal-oriented agents. Agents are modeled from multi-disciplinary perspectives 
and their strategies are evolved over time through collective co-evolution and 
independent learning. Spatial and temporal simulation results reveal fascinating 
global emergence phenomena as well as interesting patterns of group movement 
and autonomous behavioral development. Extensions of varying complexity are 
also used to investigate the impact of various decision parameters on the outcome 
of unrest. Analysis of the results provides insights into the intricate dynamics of 
civil upheavals and serves as a good avenue to gain a more holistic understanding 
of the fundamental nature of civil violence. 
 Chapter 6 presents a co-evolutionary, game theoretic approach to simulate 
and study the collective outcome of public goods provisioning in an agent-based 
model. Using asymmetric information as the basis for decision making, distinct 
groups are configured to interact in an iterated N-player public goods game, where 
co-evolutionary learning is used as the mechanism of adaptation to the dynamic 
environment. The impact of information type, number of players, group size, rate 
of interaction, number of available choices, nature of PG provision and selection 
schemes are studied over a variety of settings. Simulation results reveal interesting 
dynamics of strategy and usage profiles, level of derived welfare and the evolution 
of cooperation. Analysis of these attributes offers a more holistic understanding 
into the nature of collective action and some insights of how the effects of Social 
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Dilemma can be mitigated. This might provide a good guide to achieve efficient 
public goods provision in the practical context. 
 
7.2 Future works 
 
Although we have successfully applied CEAs to model game theoretic interaction 
and examined the outcomes of agent-based co-evolutionary simulation in different 
contexts, the series of works presented in this thesis barely scratched the surface 
of what is potentially left to be addressed. 
 The current poker model presented in Chapter 3 can be further improved 
from several perspectives. Better strategies could be evolved by simply increasing 
the precision of strategy parameters e.g. splitting hand strength information into 
finer intervals, or incorporating more parameters like position information in the 
model e.g. so as to account for scenarios with multiple players in a poker game. 
Such are, however, subjected to the availability of computational resources. The 
co-evolutionary process can also be sped up by injecting expert knowledge in the 
form of fixed non-evolving opponents. Though these players do not evolve, they 
do affect the fitness of evolving players and play a crucial role in shaping their 
strategies. On a side note, a better fitness criterion or tournament model can also 
be devised so that fluctuations due to intransitivity can be further reduced. 
 As far as the IPD study in Chapter 4 is concerned, possible improvements 
can encompass experimental simulation of the IPD game in the presence of other 
sophisticated benchmark strategies, deriving efficient learning methodologies as 
well as applying memetic learning to complex test settings through adding noise, 
devising complex payoff matrices and conducting evolutionary tournaments to 
analyze the interaction between strategies in terms of their growth rate and group 
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performance. A thorough research study to investigate complicated situations like 
the above-mentioned would be useful in providing us with greater insights into the 
intricacies and complexity involved in the IPD. 
 In the aspects of civil violence modeling presented in Chapter 5, additional 
research work can be carried out to study how the specific movement strategies of 
various agent groups are evolved over time, impact of vision radius and situational 
awareness on the performance of agents as they negotiate their way through the 
environment of interaction, extending the proposed spatial IPD model by adopting 
an N-player mode of game theoretic interaction, and exploring interesting areas of 
behavioral development. Maturity of such models will not only serve as a form of 
verification for complex social theories but more importantly, present a feasible 
avenue to simulate realistic scenarios of civil violence; in the hope to formulate 
violence management measures that are paramount to the mitigation of casualties. 
 For the multi-player IPGG in Chapter 6, future works can be embarked on 
to investigate models which incorporate behavioral elements such as punishment, 
reputation and mutual expectation; as well as those where players can realistically 
adopt beliefs that vary from time to time. Though interesting, complexity of the 
inherent model dynamics must be well managed for simulation outcomes to be 
effectively and meaningfully analyzed. Apart from just contributing or free-riding, 
the action spaces of players can be extended to include an added option of non-
participation. Assessing possible impacts of the above-mentioned model attributes 
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Ranking Poker Combinations 
 
 
Figure A.1: Name of poker cards combinations 
 
• Each card has a value (A, K, Q, J, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2) and a suit (♠, ♣, ♥, 
♦). The values from largest to smallest are: A, K, Q, J, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2. 
All suits are equal. 
• In Texas Hold’em, it is to be noted that each player form the best 5-cards 
combination from the seven cards they can use. The unused two cards are not 
used in any way in determining whose combination has a higher ranking. 
• The highest ranked combination is the “Royal Flush”. It is made up of the 
cards A, K, Q, J, 10 of any suits. All royal flush are equal. 
• The 2nd ranked combination is “Straight Flush” and is made up of any five 
consecutive cards of the same suit. If there is more than one “Straight Flush”, 
the one that is made up of larger values is higher ranked, otherwise they are 
equal.  
• The 3rd ranked combination is “Four of a Kind”, made up of four cards of the 
same value and 1 any other card. A “Four of a Kind” with larger value for the 
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four same-valued cards will be higher ranked than one with a smaller value. If 
there are still ties, the value of the 5th card will determine the better 
combination. If all the cards are equal in value, then the combinations are also 
equal. 
• The 4th ranked combination is “Full House”, made up of three cards of the 
same value and another two cards of the same value. For more than one “Full 
House”, the one with larger value for three cards wins. If there is still a tie, one 
with larger value for two cards wins. 
• The 5th ranked combination is “Flush”, which is made of all five cards of the 
same suit. If there is more than one “Flush”, the one with the higher highest 
value wins. If the highest values are equal, then the next highest value is 
compared and so on. 
• The 6th ranked combination is “Straight”, consisting of five cards of 
consecutive values. A “Straight” made up of larger values will be bigger than 
one with smaller values. 
• The 7th ranked combination is “Three of a Kind”. The “Three of a Kind” with 
larger value for the three same-valued cards will be ranked higher. Otherwise 
the larger of the last two cards will be compared, finally followed by the last 
card. 
• The 8th ranked combination is “Two pairs”. If there are more than one “Two 
pairs”, the larger pair of all combinations will be compared. The largest of 
them will be ranked the highest. If the larger pairs are all equal, the smaller 
pairs will be compared. If there is still a tie, the last card with the highest value 
will be highest ranked, otherwise all are equal. 
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• The 9th ranked combination is the “Pair”. A “Pair” with higher valued pair will 
be larger than one with the smaller value. If the “Pairs” are the same, then 
each remaining card will be compared staring with the largest one. 
• The smallest combination is the “High Card”. If there is more than one “High 
Card”, the largest card of each player will be compared first. If it is still tied, 
then the next largest card will be compared, and so on. 
 
